An Island Paradise for the Admirals

...Part of the explanation for the discrepancy is that the Soviet naval units tend to spend much of their time at open sea anchorages, out of sight and perhaps out of mind of the people of the region...

...The proposal to build a naval and air base on the island of Diego Garcia where there is today only a limited communications facility requires the most rigorous examination and searching questioning...

...The position of the State Department was expressed in 197 1 by David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations: “U...

...Overrating of the Soviet Union’s naval strength in the Indian Ocean, or elsewhere, yields the Soviets unnecessary and undeserved political gains, particularly in third world countries...

...As far as the Navy is concerned, the austere communications facility on Diego Garcia was simply a convenient way-station Oil the road to something bigger and better...

...In 1971 Soviet naval combatants and auxiliaries made 33 port calls to seven states in the region...

...Ship-day totals are the number of ships in the ocean multiplied by the number of days they spend there...

...Three years ago hearings on the Indian Ocean were held by another Foreign Affairs subcommittee...

...The Soviet Navy lacks reliable and secure shore-based support facilities on the Indian Ocean...

...The Soviet Union is not...

...In any case, we should try to reach agreements about controlling military traffic through the Suez Canal before setting firmly on the path toward a naval arms race...

...Misleading presentations of comparative Soviet and U. S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean are very common...

...Less than a year ago, James Noyes of the Defense Department assured Congress that “there are no plans to transform this facility into something from which forces could be projected, or that would provide a location for the basing of ships and aircraft...

...This is one of the reasons the Soviets have more naval ships in the region...

...The first prerequisite to an expanded U. S. naval presence was a series of radio and communications facilities to handle increased naval traffic...

...The Soviet Navy, as does the U. S. Navy, has access to ports and facilities in a number of countries, but the use of these facilities does not confer base rights or convert them into Soviet naval bases...

...I think our interests are marginal...

...If his reasoning about perceptions is true, the U. S. Navy should cease and desist from trumpeting the Soviet naval threat to the skies and running down U. S. capabilities...

...Some countries in the area fear that they will be dragged into superpower conflicts...

...Port calls are perhaps a more accurate indication of impact and influence in the region...

...The U. S. Navy, however, has long had different ideas...

...This was in recognition of the fact that the U. S. has no vital interests at stake in the region and that U. S. security interests there are comparatively limited...

...Diego Garcia was added to the network extending from Asmara, Ethiopia to the Northwest Cape of Australia...

...USN, is director of the Center for Defense Information...

...The U. S. Navy has the capability to move into the Indian Ocean in force from the Pacific and Atlantic on any necessary occasion...

...The probable reopening of the Suez Canal-which would permit more Soviet ships to enter the Indian Ocean-has increased the pressure for a U. S. naval build-up in the area...

...The marginal benefits in efficiency would not compensate for the problems created...

...A support base at Diego Garcia makes sense only if we plan significantly increased deployments in the Indian Ocean...

...The next step is developing a supply and repair base in the Indian Ocean...

...Strictly speaking, this is not the first money for such purposes...

...The U. S. also has more oilers, repair ships, and underway replenishment ships and can sustain a fleet at sea without shore facilities better than the Soviet Union...

...Is this necessary...

...This is where we now find ourselves: the Defense Department is asking Congress for $29 million in the 1974 supplemental bill and an additional $3.3 million in the fiscal 1975 budget, and it wants this money to start making Diego Garcia into a supply base...

...In May 1973, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, observed that “the subcontinent is very far away...

...Now, on Diego Garcia, the United States is building a naval support base, essentially under its own control, in the Indian Ocean...

...The U. S. Navy made 157 port calls to 20 states in the Indian Ocean region in 1971...

...the United States has a total of 14 of these ships in action or already funded...

...Under the guise of funding for the existing “very austere” communications facility, the Navy has already received $6 million in fiscal 1973 for dredging the Diego Garcia harbor to create a turning basin 2,000 feet wide and 6,000 feet long to accommodate submarines and aircraft carriers...

...One of the problems is the increased risk that a local conflict could turn into a confrontation between the two superpowers...

...Plans for moving into the Indian Ocean date back to the early 1960s and even before...

...Examples would be hostility between India and Pakistan, or between Iran and some of its neighbors such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia...

...The line that will be used to sell the permanent base is “The Russians Are Coming...

...The U. S. Navy helps to make up for this lack of publicity by providing the Soviet Navy with a lot of free a dv er t i si ng . S e cretary Schlesinger has said that perceptions of military capabilities by third parties are as important as actual capabilities, yet his deportment keeps referring to the ominous Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean...

...and diplomatic means...

...In fact, Soviet practice has been to rely primarily on its own auxiliary ships for fuel, provisions, and repairs...

...I am skeptical that the Soviets have many ships that they can afford to take from higher priority regions for use in the less important Indian Ocean...

...The construction of an austere communications facility at Diego Garcia was approved by Congress after constant Administration reassurances that it would be no more than a communications facility...

...As Admiral Zumwalt said recently, “Their tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean.’’ Does the threat warrant the steps which are being proposed...

...One of the most misleading is the number of “ship-days’’ spent by naval vessels of tne two countries in the Indian Ocean...

...Until very recently, U. S. policy toward the Indian Ocean was, with some exceptions such as the dangerous “tilting” exercise in gunboat diplomacy during the India-Pakistan war in 1971, sound and reasonable, ane of restraint and constrained military presence...

...Our search for influence in the region can quickly be transformed into compulsion to defend the positions and privileges we obtain...

...Overall U. S. objectives and the well-being and security of the countries of the region were best achieved through economic Gene LaRocque, Rear Admiral Ret...

...Even now, the United States has a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union in its ability to support naval forces overseas without an extensive network of foreign bases...

...The existing 8,000-foot runway can handle most aircraft, the design aircraft being the Future improvements on the harbor, runway, and re-fueling and support facilities will go a long way toward making the base at Diego Garcia similar to the one at Subic Bay in the Philippines...

...Moreover, the data on port calls tell a different story than those on ship-days...

...The conclusion I draw from a look at a broad range of factors is that the U. S. Navy is exaggerating both the Soviet Naval threat in the Indian Ocean and our own weaknesses...

...and the privileges soon become national security imperatives...

...I think the Nixon doctrine is quite applicablenamely, we ourselves don’t want to become involved...

...In 1971, for example, the Soviet Union is said to have accumulated 3,149 ship-days versus 1,350 for the U. S. It is important, first, to remember that most of the Russian ships are noncombatantsoilers, oceanographic vessels, and the like...

...An Island Paradise for the Admirals by Gene LaRocque We are at a crucial point in the evolution of U. S. policy toward the Indian Ocean...

...Nuclearpowered naval surface ships-which the Russians do not have-are especially useful for extended deployments...

...Those who may doubt that this is the Navy’s intentionthat is, those who believe official statements that Defense is “not aware of any plans to ask for more money”-should examine the record of how, despite assurances to the contrary, year by year the Defense Department’s requests and plans have expanded as the camel’s nose has been pushed further and further under the tent...

...The Navy dream has been to inherit the British Imperial legacy “East of Suez...

...Spiers cogently summed up a restrained U. S. policy toward the Indian Ocean which is just as sound today as it was then: There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control, or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral given the nature of our interest there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement...

...We consider, on balance, that our present interests are served by normal commercial, political, and military access...

...With more U. S. and Soviet naval forces on hand, iiivolvement by the two powers would be all the more likely...

...The need for this is very doubtful...

...The State Department witness on that occasion was Ronald Spiers, director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs...

...S. security interests in the Indian Ocean region are quite limited...