7,000 Toys for the Generals
Warnke, Paul
7,000 Toys for the Generals by Paul Warnke It is now over 20 years since we began to deploy substantial numbers of armed forces in Western Europe, and almost as long since we began to place...
...The location of many of these weapons near the frontiers creates the risk that they might be overrun in the early stages in a limited surprise attack...
...And, of course, nothing was too good for NATO...
...However improbable a more limited attack may be, it is less mind-boggling to envisage small-scale fighting associated with political change and tension on the East-West frontier...
...The choice of mounting Paul Warnke, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, now practices law in Washington...
...In the long run, these changes may increase the deterrent impact on the Soviet Union, rather than decreasing it...
...a conventional defense and providing time for our adversary to reconsider and pull back could be taken away from us...
...It seems clear, therefore, that too much of NATO’s time, personnel, and planning now go into tactical nuclear weapons which are largely unusable except as an in terrorem device...
...If we refuse to include the weapons in SALT, we alarm the Soviet Union...
...They were, in the prevailing view, better weapons...
...It is hard to see why the exposed position of these weapons is a necessary ingredient in our deterrent strategy...
...During the 1 9 5 0 ~th~e deployment of nuclear weapons was almost automatic and undebated...
...A second question is the problem of distinguishing tactical from strategic nuclear weapons...
...Moreover, this reduction would permit the reassignment of personnel now required in the care and maintenance of these weapons...
...7,000 Toys for the Generals by Paul Warnke It is now over 20 years since we began to deploy substantial numbers of armed forces in Western Europe, and almost as long since we began to place large quantities of nuclear weapons there...
...Perhaps the only logical definition of a tactical nuclear weapon is that it is one which will be detonated on friendly soil...
...Accordingly, over a period of years, the present total of something more than 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons were stationed on European soil...
...I would, therefore, oppose the removal from Europe of all our tactical nuclear weapons...
...But there are, I believe, serious questions about whether we have the right number of such weapons and whether they are currently in the right places...
...This risk could lead to an early and premature decision to use them rather than to see them fall into enemy hands...
...The deterrent purpose of tactical weapons could abundantly be served by the maintenance of a few hundred at most...
...I believe this role to be an important one...
...Those of the 7,000 so-called tactical nuclear weapons in Europe that can reach Soviet targets are, to the Soviets, strategic nuclear weapons...
...if we do include them in these negotiations, to which the NATO countries are not privy, we can create deep concern and resentment within the alliance...
...We should begin now to consult in NATO about how many of these weapons should continue to be deployed, of what type and where...
...A military posture that lacks reality is less formidable than one which, though more austere, carries greater logic...
...An all-out Soviet attack on Western Europe is perhaps the least likely of the military emergencies that NATO may face...
...The number of tactical nuclear weapons now deployed in Europe should be substantially reduced...
...Reducing the number of these long-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would leave our nuclear deterrent unimpaired while also speeding the progress of SALT 11...
...Their existence , therefore, complicates the Strategic Arms Limitation nego tiations...
...For such contingencies the tactical nuclear weapon is the least appropriate instrument...
...The purpose of these tactical nuclear weapons is to fill the gap between conventional defense and the strategic nuclear deterrent...
...It is clear that the great number of these weapons, their nature, and the deployment of many in forward locations give rise to serious security questions...
...NATO’s ability to present a prompt and plausible conventional response to Soviet attack would not be diminished but enhanced...
Vol. 6 • May 1974 • No. 3
