Cuban Missiles and Kennedy Macho: New Evidence to Dispel the Myth
Cuban Missiles and Kennedy Macho: New Evidence to Dispel the Myth by Graham Allison The story of the Cuban missile nedy’s assassination praised the Adcrisis, as told both by fans and critics,...
...Now Kennedy was forced to confront the Turkish missiles once more, and this time they were hostages of the Soviet Union...
...Elements of JFK’s “softness” when confronting the prospect of nuclear war emerge...
...that Saturday, felt nuclear war to be closer on that day than at any time in the nuclear age...
...The President had raised the matter a second time with the State Department and made it plain that he wanted the missiles removed, even at some political cost...
...Robert Kennedy recorded his judgement that the second Soviet proposal-missiles in Cuba for missiles in Turkey-“was not unreasonable and did not amount to a loss to the U. S. or to our NATO allies.’’ Indeed, because the Jupiter missiles in Turkey had been judged obsolete, the President had twice ordered their removal...
...Second, if this new information is correct, why did the Kennedy Administration go to such extremes in puffing the hard-line account after the crisis, for example, in the bitter attack on Stevenson for being soft...
...Confusion fueled tension, and new sources of confusion further clouded the picture...
...and undertake, with suitable safeones the Soviet Union would under- guards, to halt the further introduction of stand...
...And still there was the issue of a response to the two Soviet proposals...
...But JFK hesitated and faltered and dealt...
...More recently, revisionists ten in the wake of President Ken- have criticized Kennedy’s recklessness Graham Allison teaches politics a t Haward...
...And Khruschev could be assured that they would be removed within...
...no deals...
...The President through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments-(a) to remove promptly the restrained himself...
...But during the past decade a great deal of evidence has come to light that casts serious doubt on this interpretation...
...strong and overwhelming retaliatory By afternoon a u- s. note action...
...Did the private exchange amount to a “deal...
...the Presilikely: an air strike or invasion of dent privately instmcted Robert K ~ ~ - Cuba* What happen, he asked, nedy to deliver a copy of the letter to in Berlin or Turkey...
...Could the U. S. withdraw NATO missiles from Turkey under Soviet threat...
...that nothing had been achieved by 2. We, on our part, would agree-upon limited force, for this is exactly what the establishment of adequate arrangements they had predicted...
...He accepted the loss of an American U-2 and the life of its pilot and just deliberated...
...Could we survive a nuclear crisis managed by a President captivated by a machismo image of JFK in the missile crisis...
...The second Russian letter, proposing American missiles in Turkey as the quid for the Soviet quo, arrived at 10:17 on Saturday morning...
...The Soviet SAM network was operational and the Soviets meant to use it...
...But the grounds for the new interpretation include not only RFK’s account, but also a great deal of circumstantial evidence (the logic of JFK’s problem and the fact that U. S. missiles in Turkey were withdrawn shortly after the crisis) as well as the testimony of various other participants...
...Instant histories writ- pro quo...
...However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time...
...The President had intended that the Turkish missiles be removed more than a year ago...
...The Soviets had raised the ante...
...First, there is the contrast between the story told by Kennedy sources in the aftermath of the crisis and RFK’s recollections in 1968 when writing his memoirs...
...unless [the President] rehad been drafted rejecting the Turkish ceived immediate ‘notice that the mistrade and demanding a halt to work siles would be withdrawn.’ ’3 The preson the missiles in Cuba...
...The United States should spective and his particular problem ignore the second letter, respond to (removal of the Russian missiles from the terms of the first letter, and Cuba without war), this ultimatum Propose the following: an American seems puzzling, especially in the light Pledge not to invade Cuba in return of his earlier preference for postponfor the Soviet withdrawal Of InkSileS ing forceful action...
...Second, intelligence reported that work on the missile sites was now proceeding full speed, both day and night...
...As RFK recalled, “He was angry...
...JFK sent his brother, Robert Ken- By Friday, October 26, it seems clear nedy, to Soviet ambassador Dobrynin to arrange a private “deal...
...Had RFK not written his memoirs, and indeed, quite probably, had his editing of a first draft not been cut short by assassination, this speculation would remain in the realm of the fanciful...
...He Was Angry’ Discussion returned to the question of a U. S. reply...
...another turn of the thumbscrew when Khruschev first blinked...
...Over sharp disagreement, and to the dismay of many members of the group, Kennedy reversed the earlier decision, postponing the choice yet another day...
...As JFK had argued the previous week in re j e c t ing UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s suggestion of a similar trade-off, he could not make “concessions that could break up the alliance by confirming European suspicions that we would sacrifice their security to protect our interests in an area of no concern to them...
...Then, at the point of action, President Kennedy’s doubts emerged...
...In evaluating JFK’s performance in the missile crisis, both those who give him high marks and those who say he failed have accepted the official version of the event as fact...
...According to presidential assistant Theodore Sorenson’s record of the deliberations, “The President had no intention of destroying the alliance by backing down...
...For States could proceed toward peace ing to propose a solution: an air strike Your Proposals-which Seem generally At Some point in the some members Of the group, this was and disarmament, or we could take the blackest moment of the crisis...
...This called the Soviet bluff and left them no alternative...
...First, CIA Director John McCone reported that a single Soviet ship had detached itself from the others outside the quarantine line and was headed for Cuba...
...Dean Acheson, a member of the ExCom, found the idea outrageous...
...For the secretary of state, removal of obsolete missiles from Turkey did pot justify a row with the Turkish government...
...The President should not be seen accepting Saturday’s deal...
...RFK reported “almost unanimous agreement that we had to attack early the next morning...
...Most members see no alternative to an air strike...
...Around the table, suspicion and tension mounted...
...But again, State Department representatives found the Turks intransigent and decided against allowing the issue to become a source of discontent in relations with Turkey and the NATO alliance...
...That statement was followed by a message to Khruschev accepting the offer of the first letter (Soviet withdrawal of missiles coupled with a U. S. pledge not to invade Cuba) and threatening an air strike on the missiles if the Soviets tried to welch...
...In the the Air Force chief of staff, the order reversing the Air Force reprisal was received with disbelief...
...to ~Soren~- d with an attack On Turkey, would or son’s account, Robert Kennedy inshould the Turkish missiles be fired...
...This new interpretation of the resolution of the missile crisis raise more questions than it settles...
...Maybe the Soviets wanted to test the permeability of the quarantine...
...He overturned the previous decision to respond to the Soviets’ first shot...
...Recall the background...
...It isn’t the first step that concerns me,” he said, “but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth steps-and we don’t go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so...
...According to RFK’s record of the deliberations, “the change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khruschev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well...
...In presidential terms, the case for a private carrot to balance the public stick seems compelling...
...Robert Kennedy recounted his visit with Dobrynin in considerable detail, including the discussion of missiles in Turkey...
...Absolutely not...
...Third, and most distressing, Soviet SAMs had shot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba...
...Specifically, it now seems clear that on Saturday, October 27, the next to and demands that the Soviets withlast day of the crisis: 1) Soviet sur- draw all strategic offensive missiles face-to-air missiles (SAMs) shot down from the island...
...ordinary diplomatic move, one later The time available for him to make up labeled a “Trollope Ploy,” after a his mind and get his government recurring scene in the writings of together was very short...
...The decision will probably be made on Saturday or Sunday and carried out the following Tuesday But at the last minute, disaster is avoided...
...At a minimum, the machismo story must be radically revised...
...Given the accuracy of this new information, what does it imply for arguments about JFK’s role in the crisis...
...Indeed, arrangements would have to be made without the knowledge of most members of his own ExCom, let alone the rest of the government or the wider public...
...the President paused quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to Over the first- give assurances against an invasion of Cuba...
...At the initial level, there could be no “deal”-the missiles in Cuba must be removed with no strings attached...
...The essence of the official answer is that he stated his demand clearly, refused to budge even an inch, and thus left Khruschev with the last clear choice between withdrawal on the one hand, and a path that could lead to nuclear war on the other...
...New evidence about the final Saturday stands at odds with this interpretation...
...The arrangements...
...So much for the standard version of the climax of the crisis...
...In particular, no one (with the exception of Curtis LeMay) has questioned the theme of JFK’s toughness under fire...
...Our Quid, Their Quo The question is: How did Kennedy make Khruschev capitulate...
...Having just returned from Paris and Bonn, where he had briefed General Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Conrad Adenauer about the crisis, Acheson assured the ExCom group that such a trade would undermine the faith of the whole alliance in America’s word...
...formed Dobrynin that: “The point of At this Point, he ordered ’that the escalation was at hand...
...Harold Macmillan (Prime Minister of Britain at the time) has recalled his support for the President’s “most difficult decision...
...In missiles himself, and 2) seeing his dewration, he conceived an extra- missiles destroyed by a u. s. attack...
...He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after the crisis was over, those missiles would be gone...
...He had demonstrated considerable attentiveness to Khmschev’s problem, and now Khruschev seemed to be asking for a path by which to retreat without humiliation within his own government...
...Soviet specialist Llewelyn Thompson warned that, “the Russians would certainly interpret acceptance as proof of weakness...
...Ken assembles the Executive Committ the National Security Council s a U. S. naval quarantine eapons shipments to Cuba that the blockade will not solve the problem: it prevents the Soviets from importing additional missiles but it cannot stop the rush to ready 42 missiles already on the island...
...A formal White House statement was released, dismissing the Saturday Soviet letter with reference to “inconsistent and conflicting proposals...
...If the Soviet ship continued coming, if the SAMs continued firing, if the missile crews continued working, and if Khruschev continued insisting on concessions with a gun at our head, then-we all believed- the Soviets must want a war and war would be unavoidable...
...2) Kennedy ordered U. s. ade...
...In the fall of 1962, after Khruschev has given Kennedy repeated assurances that the Soviet Union will not install offensive weapons in Cuba, an American U-2 photographs the Soviet Union sneaking missiles into Cuba...
...If RFK‘s testimony stood alone, these questions would have more bite than they do...
...Thus Khruschev submitted...
...The conclusion seemed foregone...
...The ExCom turns to the question of the next U. S. step...
...To appreciate the significance of these facts, and their implications for the dispute about machismo and JFK’s performance in the crisis, it is necessary to reexamine carefully one slice of this fascinating story...
...The issue in question is that of JFK’s actions in resolving the crisis...
...President John sile crisis, particularly JFK’s guts in F. Kennedy stood “eyeball-to-eye- refusing to compromise American inball” with Chairman Khruschev, faced terests, and his courage in sticking to him down, and forced the Soviet the original demand that all Soviet Union to withdraw its offensive mis- missiles be removed without a quid siles from Cuba...
...Nothing had changed...
...Cuban Missiles and Kennedy Macho: New Evidence to Dispel the Myth by Graham Allison The story of the Cuban missile nedy’s assassination praised the Adcrisis, as told both by fans and critics, ministration’s bold moves in the misis a tale of machismo...
...On Friday, October 26, a secret letter from Khruschev arrived, proposing a resolution of the crisis on the following terms: Soviet missiles would be withdrawn and, in return, the U. S. would promise not to invade Cuba...
...If a second U-2 were attacked, the U. s. would destroy all the SAM sites...
...But at a second level, let there be no misunderstanding...
...and irresponsibility in insisting that Khruschev capitulate and cry uncle during a confrontation that JFK himself judged to have a one-in-three chance of nuclear war...
...The essential points of this taken action that would raise hackles The first thing that needs to be done...
...If we attacked Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin with a Cuba, and the Russians reciprocated strong warning...
...As Sorenson recalled “Our little group, seated around the Cabinet table in continuous session...
...Still the quandary persisted: How inoperable, under effective United Nations could the United States respond...
...So, (one might be led to speculate), RFK went to Dobrynin with more than a threat...
...Or perhaps they planned to provoke an incident...
...peans would interpret the defuzing of is for work to cease on offensive missile the Turkish missiles as the first step in bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in a deal, whatever the United States Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered said...
...causing the first fatality of the crisis: The ExCom could no longer postpone the issue of military force...
...He had already in Cuba...
...On Saturday, this Soviet offer was reversed by a second, much tougher letter demanding U. S. withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey as the price for Soviet withdrawal of missiles in Cuba...
...the refusal, against the advice of weaker brethren in America and elsewhere, to bargain the security of the Western world by yielding to the specious Russian offers of a facesaving accommodation at the expense of America’s allies...
...They were not at all surprised such weapons systems into Cuba...
...Victorian novelist Anthony Trollope in which a marriage-hungry maiden takes a squeeze on her hand as an Making of a Deal OPPortunitY to accept a ProPosal of Given the President’s unique permarriage...
...This shift follows changes in the conventional wisdom rather closely...
...Robert Kennedy noted their followsy:o u would agree to these argument: They had 21WaYs felt the weapons systems from Cuba under approblockade “to be far too weak a course priate United Nations observation and superand that mlitarY steps were the only vision...
...He ordered NATO missiles in Turkey defuzed...
...Most members of the ExCom were startled...
...The main points in this official interpretation include the following...
...and 3) sites proceeds at an accelerated pace...
...A fuller account of this evidence is presented in the author’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis...
...The next day, Soviet an American U-2 reconnaissance plane ships steaming toward Cuba stop dead over Cuba, and Kennedy refused to on the water, just outside the blockretaliate...
...The Soviets had fired the first shot...
...Joint Chiefs of Staff joined the meet- As 1 read your letter, the key elements of on Monday, followed shortly by an acceptable as I understand them-are as invasion...
...The Air Force had prepared an attack plan and was ready to go...
...To most members of the ExCom, a deal of this sort was simply out of the question...
...He arranged a deal-a private deal that sacrificed chips that he and his advisors judged dear to U. S. national security and the security of our allies...
...The two letters could be a device for stalling while the missiles became operational...
...Sunday morning, October 28, Khruschev announces that the Soviet Union will withdraw the missiles from Cuba...
...What was above as well as below the line could not have been plainer...
...Others, for example, Dean Acheson, insisted throughout the crisis on tough decisions and tough actions...
...In RFK’s words, I said that there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that in the last analysis this was a decision that would have to be made by NATO...
...But work at the Cuban missile missiles in Turkey defuzed...
...round implications of the option that To make Sure Khruschev could not was coming to Seem more and more misunderstand the message...
...Robert Ken- ident thus posed for Khmschev a nedY disagreed sharply with both the choice between 1) withdrawing the content and the tenor of the draft...
...a short time after the crisis...
...In the spring of 1962, at presidential insistence, Rusk had raised the issue with the Turkish foreign minister, heard loud objections, and allowed the matter to drop...
...A careful reading of Thirteen Days, however, discloses important, confirming evidence...
...Earlier in the week, the ExCom had decided that if a U-2 were shot down, the U. S. would retaliate against a single SAM site...
...no hesitation at the outset...
...Had Kennedy folded, or simply checked...
...the United missiles in Turkey be defuzed...
...involving] the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere...
Vol. 4 • October 1972 • No. 8
