China's Imperial Dream
OKAZAKI, HISAHIKO
China's Imperial Dreams The strategic importance of Taiwan. BY HISAHIKO OKAZAKI AMERICA MAY NOT KNOW it, but it has a Taiwan problem. No, the problem isn't that Taipei might declare independence...
...In modern times, however, China has seen its sway in Asia significantly reduced...
...If China claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the sea lanes in this region, the only safe shipping route in Asia in an emergency would be passage through the Lombok Strait in Indonesia and along the east coast of the Philippines...
...Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei have no access to the open ocean except through the South China Sea...
...Why this goes unappreciated in Washington is not hard to fathom...
...China would gain at least one major military benefit...
...Of course, not everyone is convinced of the threat posed by China to the international order...
...With that, Chinese control of the South China Sea would be complete, anchored by Taiwan in the north and Singapore in the south...
...And Beijing, although sometimes noisy in defense of "overseas Chinese," has generally been cautious in intervening on their behalf...
...A Taiwan controlled by Beijing would also pose a threat to the sea Hisahiko Okazaki is director of the Okazaki Institute in Tokyo, Japan...
...But if Beijing's control extended to the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, Singapore would likely find it difficult not to show a decidedly more pro-Beijing face...
...In contrast, Taiwan's east coast borders some of the deepest seas in the Pacific...
...Although the U.S...
...ground combat forces landed in South Vietnam...
...It would be tragic if now, for lack of firmness on America's part, that foundation were undone by too cavalier an assessment of China's designs on Taiwan...
...Finally, any scenario in which China gains control of Taiwan, whatever the reason, would be perceived by states in the region as a sign of American impotence...
...Such lengthy surface exposure makes the subs vulnerable and, as a result, reduces the threat they pose to other navies...
...Similarly, in Malaysia, China might show more sympathy toward the local Chinese, who have always complained of racism by the government...
...And if China acquired Taiwan, the map would be transformed virtually overnight...
...If China acquired Taiwan, whether by peaceful or violent means, it would have enormous consequences for the destiny of nations throughout the Pacific Rim, for American influence in the region, and for the promotion of democratic governance in Asia more generally...
...West European powers governed South and Southeast Asia...
...America's intervention nearly 40 years ago formed the very foundation that supports the stability and prosperity experienced today in much of Southeast Asia...
...The Chinese believe they have been the greatest land power over the past thousand years...
...Possession of Taiwan would give de facto control of the northern entrance to the South China Sea to China and allow it to transform a large part of the sea into a kind of Chinese "inner waters...
...Those who deny the threat usually say it will be decades before the Chinese can match the economic and military power of the United States...
...The Russians took Siberia...
...By 1965, many Southeast Asian nations were more or less resigned to eventual Communist dominance of the region...
...For example, in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese play a very prominent role in the economy...
...In September 1965, for example, the Communist coup in Indonesia failed, and in 1967 Southeast Asian nations formed ASEAN to thwart Communist expansion...
...Today, geography constrains Chinese naval operations...
...The implications of China's being able to impose a naval chokehold, or merely to harass commercial vessels, would be immense...
...Not long ago, an American scholar asked if the United States should care whether Taiwan becomes part of one China...
...campaign in Vietnam eventually failed, America's actions on behalf of Saigon gave neighboring countries the courage and time to defeat their own Communist challenges...
...But early that year, the first U.S...
...Because China lacks ready access to deep waters—particularly on its East China Sea coastline where its major naval bases are located—its submarines are generally forced to sail on the surface for a considerable distance before coming into deep ocean near the Ryukyu archipelago...
...The same holds for most Thai and Malaysian ports...
...Control of the sea lanes would be a powerful tool for Chinese officials to hold over the heads of Southeast Asian governments, who'd be pressured to adopt pro-Beijing policies or, at the very least, neutral ones...
...And Japan and the United States controlled China's access to the Pacific by colonizing Taiwan and the Philippines, respectively...
...This deferential posture gives Beijing great power over Washington's actions regarding Taiwan...
...But this would clearly not be the case if the geopolitical map were suddenly redrawn...
...Rather, it's that American policymakers fail to recognize the many strategic and regional advantages of keeping Taiwan free of Beijing's political and military control...
...lanes passing through the South China Sea...
...Obviously, these countries depend on unimpeded access to the South China Sea so they can easily export goods, expand their economies, and maintain political stability...
...These historical grievances all remain fresh in the minds of the Chinese, and so the annexation of Taiwan, coming on the heels of the return of Hong Kong, would not calm but further inflame Beijing's imperial ambitions...
...Southeast Asian governments have long exploited these divisions—pitting one camp against the other—to keep their Chinese minorities politically weak...
...At present, ethnic Chinese populations, whom China typically calls "overseas Chinese," are divided into three camps: pro-Beijing, pro-Taiwan, and apolitical...
...For their part, American policymakers seem to wish unification would hurry up and happen already, if only to simplify their dealings with mainland China...
...Then there is prosperous and generally pro-Western Singapore, a predominantly ethnic Chinese city-state surrounded by Malay peoples...
...With more support from China, they could gain commensurate political power...
...Gaining control of Taiwan would also change, psychologically speaking, how the Chinese view the regional map...
...Nor should one forget the large Chinese communities now living in various Southeast Asian countries...
...But serious consideration of American interests and those of China's regional neighbors would lead one to wish for just the opposite...
...There is no question that Beijing would use this domestic constituency to try to influence the policies of their national governments...
...But this dependence makes them highly vulnerable to foreign intimidation...
...No, the problem isn't that Taipei might declare independence and prompt a cross-strait crisis...
...For the great majority of American policymakers and strategists working on Asia, the guiding principle with respect to Taiwan is that Washington must not harm relations with China...
...Call it the Finlan-dization of Southeast Asia...
...China already claims extensive territorial waters in the area...
...America's credibility in the region would disappear...
...If China controlled Taiwan, Taiwan-based Chinese submarines would be free to operate throughout the western Pacific without having to run the extended shallows of the East China Sea...
...The dynamic works like this: Because mainland China considers it supremely important for Taiwan to be absorbed into one China, Washington obsesses over the process of unification while ignoring the strategic consequences...
...But should China absorb Taiwan—even under an interim arrangement of "one state-two systems"— these divisions would be replaced by a generally unified Chinese community...
...Though it has made occasional pro-Chinese gestures in a bow to racial and geopolitical realities, Singapore's government has been cautious not to move too far in this direction...
Vol. 9 • September 2003 • No. 2