A Europe Whole and Free

...When it comes to the president, however, Goldgeier draws on psychological studies, as well as interviews with administration officials, to claim that Clinton deluded himself into believing that expansion would not preclude better relations with Russia...

...The task ahead for historians and political scientists is to produce an account that illuminates the ideas behind NATO expansion as impressively as Goldgeier's work illuminates the bureaucratic politics—for it is an ideological belief in democracy, more than anything else, that made the United States initiate expansion at a time when its European allies remained lethargic...

...Moreover, why did Talbott take over Holbrooke's role as "enforcer" in 1995 after Holbrooke departed for Bosnia to negotiate a peace accord...

...Of course, even while it was committed to a belief that the United States should pursue ideological ends, the administration was equally committed to the anti-ideological methods of realpolitik...

...To propose expansion at that moment might have provoked a backlash in Russia while discrediting the advocates of enlarging NATO...

...In fact, the ideas and events we need to examine go back long before the collapse of eastern European communism in 1989...

...The Senate ratified expansion with an 80 to 19 vote...

...Now Americans look back on expansion as the most natural thing in the world...

...The one question left unanswered is "Why...

...If Warren Christopher, William Perry, and John Shalikashvili thought NATO expansion was a bad idea, why didn't they mount a passionate campaign to convince Clinton of that...

...Goldgeier rejects the idea that "where you sit is where you stand"—the notion that everything can be explained by bureaucratic jealousies...

...Goldgeier's richly detailed account of insider politicking marvelously captures the ambivalence, conflict, and confusion behind any such decision...

...Missouri's John Ashcroft introduced an amendment to prevent an expanded NATO from taking actions other than defending its own territory, but ninety senators voted for a counter-amendment that approved intervention in ethnic conflicts...

...But for those like Secretary of Defense William Perry who believed that a strategic partnership with Russia was the foundation of European security, NATO expansion was misguided if not dangerous...

...The driving force behind NATO expansion in the 1990s is not just Goldgeier's bureaucratic politicking, but the alliance's long-standing interest in sharing its commitment to democracy...

...The twinning of strategic and ideological objectives has always been a hallmark of American foreign policy, and even though NATO came into being in response to the Soviet threat, its strategic mission was never distinct from its ideological mission...

...Why were the nation's leading historians and columnists dead set against it...

...But if Tal-bott knew that Holbrooke favored expansion, why did he bring him in...

...The answer, according to Goldgeier, is that National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke kept the issue alive long enough to push it over the top...

...For those like Anthony Lake who believed that promoting democracy should be the guiding principle of our foreign policy, expansion was also a must...

...The signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995 seemed to have answered the Yugoslavian question...

...They first won such influential converts as Strobe Talbott and President Clinton...

...Political considerations received little attention until after the administration decided on expansion...

...The first third of Not Whether ^-ut When traces the competition to determine the contents of Clinton's speech at the NATO summit in January 1994...

...BY ARIEL DAVID ADESNIK When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO on March 12, 1999, the proponents of expansion cheered loudly about the bright future of peace in Europe, while critics muttered darkly about a reckless provocation that would break down Russian democracy and incite bloody conflicts across the old Soviet bloc...

...And there are dangers precisely in the fact that our current commitment to democ-racy—for the likes of Lake, Holbrooke, and Talbott—is only partial...

...And so, after Yeltsin's reelection in June 1996, America took the decisive step of providing a timetable for expansion and naming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as candidates for membership...

...Ironically, the man responsible for recruiting Holbrooke was Strobe Talbott, whose fear of a backlash in Russia prevented Clinton from making a bold statement at the 1994 NATO summit...

...Ten months later, no one seems to care...

...Is this right...

...By focusing on bureaucratic politics, Not Whether But When avoids answering this question...

...istration prevail...

...expansion in the pages of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, its former opponents at State and Defense remained silent...

...But in Not Whether But When, James Goldgeier insists that the 1999 NATO expansion was a major historical incident—in both external relations and internal politics...

...After Yeltsin consolidated his power and led Russia into the Partnership for Peace in May 1995, concerns about a Russian backlash diminished...

...In the end, the president compromised, stating that the partnership was a precursor to expansion, but declining to set a timetable or name prospective members...

...Why were State and Defense opposed...

...With the exception of Lake and his few allies, all administration officials wanted Clinton to present the Partnership for Peace—a limited military cooperation between the United States and the old Soviet bloc—as the last word on European security...

...For those like Zbigniew Brzezinski who believed that Russia remained a threat, NATO expansion was a must...

...Some senators challenged the cost estimates the administration provided, but what no one suggested was that the United States should not, if possible, protect the new Polish, Hungarian, and Czech democracies...

...Yet for as long as Chinese students want to raise the Statue of Liberty on their shoulders in Beijing and for as long as Islamic radicals torch the American flag in Tehran, ideology and image will serve alongside armed and economic might as the strategic foundation of the lone superpower...

...Why did Lake and Holbrooke support expansion...

...Did the president come to his 1996 position as a result of the ideas of some members of his administration, or was he responding to events in Russia...

...When historians and columnists argued against expansion, the administration mobilized both the Polish-American community and the defense industry to make clear to the Senate the price of rejecting expansion...

...Even when writers challenged Americans ideology and image are intangible but nonetheless real strategic assets—no less real than advanced weaponry or a booming economy...

...The United States' ideology and image are intangible but nonetheless real strategic assets no less important than advanced weaponry or a booming economy...

...And then, in a combined lobbying effort of the National Security Council and the State Department, they convinced the Republican Senate that NATO expansion would help deter any future Russian threat...

...Things began to shift when Holbrooke became assistant secretary of state in August 1994...

...But, more, their silence suggests that they shared the fundamental premise of NATO expansion: that the United States' mission is to embrace and protect those nations that share its values...

...Goldgeier argues that Talbott became more sympathetic to NATO expansion after being promoted from ambassador to the former Soviet Union to deputy secretary of state, a position that entailed responsibility for European as well as Russian affairs...

...And why did a Republican-controlled Senate in a time of peace overwhelmingly consent to a Democratic president's initiative creating a new American defense commitment in Central Europe...

...And he rejects the assertion that officials pushed through NATO expansion to win ethnic Polish, Hungarian, and Czech votes...

...Just weeks after enlisting in the alliance, the new states made America look good by backing the war effort in Kosovo...

...With Russia stabilized, there was no reason not to pursue this historic agenda...

...This is only half an answer, for it ignores the effect on Talbott of changing conditions in Europe...

...As with Tal-bott, positive trends in Russia and Yugoslavia may have allayed their fears of an anti-NATO backlash...

...When the United States pushes for democracy even without clear strategic interests at stake, it earns the respect of its allies, as well as that of reformers and dissidents across the globe...

...Expansion's opponents in the Senate mounted as lackluster a campaign as their counterparts in the administration...

...As Goldgeier puts it, Holbrooke was the "enforcer" who made the reluctant officials at State take concrete steps toward expansion...

...One begins to wonder what Goldgeier meant by "intense bureaucratic opposition" to expansion, for the rapid progress made on expansion in 1995 and 1996 provoked no strong reactions from within the administration...

...The insistence of Lake, Holbrooke, Talbott, and others on preaching ideas but practicing realpolitik prevents them from recognizing this...

...In 1997, North Carolina's Jesse Helms pressed Madeleine Albright, the new secretary of state, merely to assure him that Russia would have no influence over NATO's affairs...

...Yet after Yeltsin won reelection in 1996, Clinton announced that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would join NATO before the end of the decade...

...In 1993, Yeltsin attacked his own parliament with tanks and artillery...

...In the end, Goldgeier argues, the views of senior officials derived mostly from what they thought about Russia...

...After all, "in the face of intense bureaucratic opposition, . . . how did the few supporters of NATO enlargement within the Clinton adminAriel David Adesnik is a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace...