The Iraq Endgame

...The surge strategy Petraeus and Odierno developed and executed in 2007 achieved its objectives: reducing violence in Iraq enough to allow political processes to restart, economic development to move forward, and reconciliation to begin...

...Iraq’s signing a Strategic Framework Agreement would have openly and publicly committed themselves to the United States—and against Iran, in the zero-sum thinking of Tehran...

...Above all, we must recognize that there is never a glide path in war...

...This is not a matter of Iraqi sovereignty...

...The ability of organized enemy groups, either Sunni or Shia, to conduct large-scale military or terrorist operations and to threaten the existence of the Iraqi government is gone for now...

...These trends can be reversed, with care, over the coming months if the United States can summon some strategic patience...

...Leading congressmen and senators insisted that a security guarantee would raise the Strategic Framework Agreement to the level of a treaty requiring Senate ratifi cation—which is true...

...This administration must ensure that it hands its successor not only a relatively peaceful Iraq, but an Iraq that is headed in the right direction...

...Although enemy networks and organizations have survived and are regrouping, they will likely need considerable time to rebuild their capabilities to levels that pose more than a local challenge—and intelligent political, economic, military, and police efforts can prevent them from rebuilding at all...

...In recent testimony, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates enumerated them: “the prospect of violence in the lead-up to elections, worrisome reports about sectarian efforts to slow the assimilation of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security forces, Iranian infl uence, the very real threat that al Qaeda continues to pose, and the possibility that Jaysh al-Mahdi could return...

...But American domestic politics made that impossible...

...In ethnically mixed areas, American troops are seen as impartial arbiters and mediators...

...In August 2008, the Iraqi security forces, with limited support from American troops, did re-clear the city—but their targets were primarily leaders in the Sons of Iraq movement and members of the local government and community that had supported them...

...In predominantly Shia or Sunni areas, they are seen as guarantors of continued safety, destroying the justifi cation for illegal militias...

...American domestic politics also prevented the administration from placing the security agreement in the larger context of a U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership, since that concept was ridiculed by those who refused to accept the possibility of success in Iraq...

...Although a dramatic increase in violence or the rebirth of a large-scale Sunni insurgency in the next six months is unlikely, it is possible that American policies are combining with Iraqi mistakes to undermine the long-term prospects for success...

...Violence has remained at historic lows even after the withdrawal of all surge forces and the handover of many areas to Iraqi control...

...A similar alliance is operating in Ninewa Province, where Kurdish leaders appear to have joined with the IIP to ensure that they will continue to have infl uence in the largely Arab province when provincial elections eliminate the current disproportionate Kurdish sway in the provincial government...

...As a result, the negotiations have dragged on, Iraqi demands have increased, and it is possible that Maliki will now wait until after the American election to see who wins—all because domestic political constraints prevented the Bush administration from making the necessary opening bid...

...Every brigade that leaves reduces our leverage just when we need it most...

...The extremely limited American presence in Ninewa, as in Baquba, has enabled these developments, which may call into question the legitimacy of the upcoming provincial elections in some areas...

...It appears from media reports that General Petraeus initially proposed no reduction in the number of U.S...

...and coalition forces in Iraq...

...Surge operations had cleared Baquba and areas further east, but not the rim of the province from Khanaqin along the Iranian border and then through Balad Ruz toward Baghdad...

...forces support Iraqi forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in the handful of areas where any signifi cant insurgent capability remains...

...The relief of getting Iraqi violence under control and American casualties down turns naturally into a desire to declare victory and withdraw...

...At all events, we must see Iraq through the upcoming two elections, pressing the government to conduct them fairly and inclusively as well as ensuring that enemy groups do not disrupt them with violence...

...Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War...

...They also give us leverage at every level to restrain malign actors within the Iraqi government and to insist that Iraqi leaders make concessions and take political risks they would rather avoid...

...It was pacifi ed in 2007 with a great deal of hard fi ghting that resulted in the defeat of illegal Shia militias and the capitulation of the local Sunni insurgent groups, many of whom joined the Sons of Iraq, volunteer security forces organized and initially paid by the United States...

...That is a danger to be avoided at all costs...

...Shrewdly refusing to admit the degree of direct Iranian pressure, Maliki and his associates used the cloak of “Iraqi sovereignty” to conceal their uneasiness at taking responsibility for making a deal with the United States—uneasiness not before their own people, but before Tehran...

...But we are engaged in continual negotiations with the Iraqi government about what our forces will do and what Iraqi forces will do, and we have tremendous leverage in those negotiations...

...But American brigades do more than that...

...The United States seeks a free, stable, independent Iraq, with a legitimately elected representative government that can govern and defend its territory, is at peace with its neighbors, and is an ally of the United States in the war on terror...

...Maliki’s actions may refl ect the continued powerful infl uence of malign sectarian actors among his advisers, or it may refl ect the determination of a temporarily strong political leader confronting elections that are likely to weaken his base...

...It served in the past as a staging area for Shia militias and al Qaeda terrorists launching attacks in Baghdad...

...But it has also taken steps in the wrong direction...

...He has also used it to insist on the accelerated transfer of Iraq’s cities, especially Baghdad, to Iraqi control and the withdrawal of American forces from those cities...

...We are not going to force the Iraqis to do anything...

...General Jack Keane (USA, Ret...

...American troops continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in Iraq, which has not given up, and against Iranian-backed Special Groups, which are also reconstituting...

...There is no question that we should be able to start withdrawing signifi cant numbers of American forces from Iraq in 2009 and accelerating our withdrawal in 2010...

...When America provides combat forces to maintain internal or external security in a foreign state, it acquires the right to bargain hard for what it thinks is best for the common interest, even when the host state’s government does not agree...

...The presence of 140,000 American troops on the ground in Iraq requires the Iraqi leadership to pay attention to America’s suggestions in a way that nothing else can...

...The existence of malign sectarian actors in the Iraqi parliament and in the prime minister’s inner circle is not news...

...The Iranians sensed an opportunity and responded with a massive public information campaign in Iraq and a virulent private campaign to put pressure on Iraq’s leaders...

...We have engaged in such hard bargaining in South Korea and in Europe, and it is a normal part of alliance relationships...

...America’s refusal to offer a long-term security guarantee gave weight to the constant Iranian refrain that Iran will always be there, while America will ultimately leave Iraq to its fate...

...Accordingly, President Bush has approved the withdrawal of 8,000 additional troops by February 2009...

...It is similarly well known that Iran seeks to drive the United States out of Iraq and has been putting tremendous pressure on Iraq’s leaders to obey Tehran and reject Washington...

...More remained to be done in Diyala as the surge ended, however...

...is the former vice-chief of staff of the Army...

...It appears that the current Iraqi leadership has recognized that it must allow the Sunni tribal movements, particularly in Anbar, to organize and gain power in their own communities, but it sees the urban Sons of Iraq movements as political threats to its power...

...It was only reasonable that Maliki and others in the Iraqi government should have expected an American commitment to match their own, and we should have given it to them...

...These three factors help explain the development of signifi cant negative trends in Iraq in recent months: the downward spiral of negotiations over the Strategic Framework Agreement, delays in the passage of an electoral law, escalating tensions along the Arab-Kurd border, and Iraqi government attacks on certain Sons of Iraq groups in and around Baghdad...

...We should not accept timelines for the departure of American troops from Iraq’s cities, particularly Baghdad, before the parliamentary elections of 2009...

...Indeed, American combat brigades have become the principal enablers of economic and political development in Iraq...

...No area of Iraq today requires the massive, violent, and dangerous military operations that American and Iraqi forces had to conduct over the last 18 months in order to pacify various places or restore them to government control...

...For all the progress made to date, the next president will face signifi cant challenges in Iraq...

...As a result, the problems that premature transition can cause are on display in the city of Baquba, the capital of Diyala Province northeast of Baghdad...

...Diyala has always been one of the most challenging provinces in Iraq because of its swirling mix of Kurds with Sunni and Shia Arabs and its proximity to Baghdad...

...Clearly, then, the number of brigades needed in Iraq should be tied not to the level of violence but to the roles the Americans perform and the importance of those roles to the further development of Iraq as a stable and peaceful state...

...For too long, we have allowed domestic American political considerations to reduce our leverage and weaken our bargaining position, and we have refused to recognize the critical role the presence of our combat forces plays in keeping us in the game at all...

...Rumors began circulating that the Iraqi government believed it would have to re-clear Baquba, even though violence remained low and American leaders did not agree...

...An understandable desire to seize on the reduction in violence to justify overly hasty force reductions and premature transfer of authority to Iraqis puts the hard-won gains of 2007 and 2008 at risk...

...With Barack Obama’s recent declaration that the surge in Iraq has succeeded, it should now be possible to move beyond that debate and squarely address the current situation in Iraq and the future...

...The counter insurgency fi ght that characterized 2007 continues mainly in areas of northern Iraq...

...BY JACK KEANE, FREDERICK W. KAGAN & KIMBERLY KAGAN On September 16, General Raymond Odierno will succeed General David Petraeus as commander of U.S...

...As long as the outcome remains in doubt, we must never imagine that the situation is under control and we can put it on autopilot and ignore it...

...We must also support the Iraqi government in its efforts to push Kurdish militias out of Diyala and Ninewa provinces...

...American troops will not stay anywhere in Iraq if ordered by the Iraqi government to leave...

...But mostly our troops are enforcing the peace...

...We should therefore not withdraw any brigades from Iraq before the provincial elections have occurred and the results have been certifi ed and accepted...

...Assuming that Iraqi provincial elections in 2008 or early 2009, and parliamentary elections in 2009 or 2010, are accepted as legitimate by the Iraqi people and the international community, it is also highly likely that we can continue to withdraw from Iraq’s cities, including Baghdad, and move from a patrolling role to an advisory and support role in the same period...

...American brigades also play critical roles in economic reconstruction, not by spending American money but by helping Iraqis spend their own money...

...Thus, the president’s announcement of new troop withdrawals has come before we even know when Iraq’s provincial elections will occur...

...brigades below the pre-surge levels, and that was certainly the right recommendation...

...We must bargain harder in Iraq and give ourselves the tools and leverage we need to succeed...

...American errors have contributed to these developments...

...The Bush administration therefore had to tell Baghdad at the outset that America would not match the commitment we were asking the Iraqis to make with an equal commitment of our own...

...The Iraqi leadership has made important strides toward developing a new and inclusive political system that addresses the concerns of all Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian groups...

...Again, contrary to conventional wisdom, the threat of American withdrawal and America’s refusal to guarantee the security of Iraq and its constitutional processes presses Iraq’s leaders to make bad decisions, not good ones...

...American staffs help local Iraqi leaders develop prioritized lists of their needs, budgets to match those priorities, and plans for executing those budgets...

...The notion, popular in some American political discussions, that withdrawing our forces increases our leverage is nonsensical...

...troops largely turned responsibility for the city of Baquba over to the Iraqis and moved out to clear the peripheral areas of the province...

...This action— which could not have taken place if American forces had continued to patrol the city—was part of a larger effort by Maliki to weaken the urban Sons of Iraq...

...And, above all, we are not going to maintain a large military presence in Iraq indefi nitely...

...Nor is it news that Iraqi politicians, elected under a closed-list system that emphasized ethnosectarian identity at the expense of political interest, have weak electoral bases and much reason to fear the results of open and honest elections...

...The return of the Sunni Iraq Islamic party (IIP) to the government appears to have created an unholy alliance between Maliki and IIP leader (and Iraqi vice president) Tariq al-Hashimi aimed at weakening grassroots Sunni political movements in and around Baghdad and ensuring that the unpopular and unrepresentative IIP continues to wield power after provincial elections...

...We should continually press the Iraqi government not simply to pay the Sons of Iraq (as it has announced it will do beginning in October), but to bring most of them into the political process...

...But the timing of force reductions and withdrawals from urban areas is critical, and the current pace is too fast...

...They also made clear that no such ratifi cation would be forthcoming if the document bound the next administration...

...Current force levels may, in fact, already be too low...

...Doing so requires a signifi cant American presence on the ground in Iraq’s population centers, where, in addition to all the other key non-combat roles they play, American soldiers are the canaries in the mine shaft...

...Maliki has been using “Iraqi sovereignty” to do more than delay those negotiations, however...

...American troops support the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that mentor Iraqi provincial leaders and help local communities communicate their needs to the central government...

...Reductions in violence permitting political change were the goal of the surge, but they are not the sole measure of success in Iraq...

...Whatever Maliki’s motivations, however, the bottom line is clear...

...The specter of Iranian power combines with the enormous question mark hanging over the future of American support to make Maliki look to his own resources to stabilize his position...

...The end of the surge meant the withdrawal of significant American forces from Diyala, so U.S...

...Reducing our troop strength solely on the basis of trends in violence also misses the critical point that the mission of American forces in Iraq is shifting rapidly from counterinsurgency to peace enforcement...

...They know before anyone else when Iraqi leaders at any level are starting to play games that can undermine mission success...

...This Kurdish-IIP alliance helps explain why there are virtually no Sons of Iraq in Ninewa...

...Frederick W. Kagan, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD...

...Some of the Sons of Iraq were leaders of the insurgency and should have no place in Iraqi politics, but in its Baquba operation, the Iraqi government was not suffi ciently discriminating in whom it sought to exclude (much less detain...

...At the outset of negotiations over the Strategic Framework Agreement, for instance, we should have offered Iraq a security guarantee...

...American soldiers provide essential support to Iraqi soldiers and police working hard to develop their ability to function on their own...

...We are not going to depose Maliki or retake control of Baghdad...

...When an American brigade is withdrawn from an area, there is nothing to take its place—all of these functions go unperformed...