While Pakistan Burns

...The threat then would be that if we can’t get clear progress in a measurable timeframe, this would leave the United States in the unfortunate position of having to signifi cantly decrease its assistance to Pakistan and move in the direction of India,” he says...

...invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 toppled the Taliban, most of al Qaeda’s central leadership relocated to the FATA...

...The FATA tribes apparently differ in their approach to al Qaeda, too, the northern tribes being more welcoming than the southern tribes...

...Since then, Musharraf has entered into similar treaties over the tribal areas of Bajaur, Swat, and Mohmand...

...What I think we should do in Pakistan is a parallel version of what Iran has run against us in Iraq: giving money, empowering actors...

...Furthermore, a campaign of that scale might topple Musharraf...

...mafi a in the past twenty years,” he said...

...News & World Report, believes there is no easy way to stop the fl ow of money to the Taliban and al Qaeda...

...And the insertion of American ground forces would heighten the risk of Musharraf ’s losing power...

...Even the Bhutto assassination attempt has fueled anti-Musharraf propaganda, as rumors quickly spread that he was behind the attack—intending to use it as a pretext to impose martial law...

...U.S...

...The United States has not applied sustained pressure on this issue...

...The 9/11 Commission Report warned that to carry out a catastrophic act of terror like 9/11, an organization requires “time, space, and the ability to perform competent planning and staff work,” as well as “a command structure able to make necessary decisions and possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money, and materials...

...Enemy forces in Pakistan are well armed and trained, and they have SA-18 surface-to-air missiles capable of downing American helicopters...

...The Anbar Salvation Front—a collection of Sunni tribesmen, Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, and others united in the goal of driving al Qaeda from their country—has been a vital ally in destroying the safe haven al Qaeda enjoyed in Anbar province...

...Despite his electoral victory in October, Islamic extremists have sworn to topple him from power, and his clumsy handling of confl icts with his supreme court has destroyed his already dwindling support among liberal elites...

...Musharraf ’s reluctance to abandon the accord framework does not mean he will never do so...

...We need a clear diplomatic message,” Jones said...

...Militants in the tribal areas vowed revenge for the raid...

...Jones thinks this pressure should be aimed at getting Pakistan’s military and intelligence services to undertake a “clear and hold strategy” against al Qaeda safe havens—not as a military offensive, but a police and intelligence operation...

...Whatever road we take in Pakistan will involve a substantial time commitment, and progress is likely to be slow...

...After the U.S...

...Within the military, there is a real desire to avoid another Operation Eagle Claw—the ill-fated attempt to rescue hostages held at the U.S...

...Kaplan says attempts are being made now to go after factions involved in the narcotics trade that back al Qaeda and the Taliban rather than those that back Karzai, “but the lines aren’t always clear...

...Musharraf talked tough, but he never declared the accords dead—and ultimately reaffi rmed his commitment to withdraw all Pakistani troops from tribal areas by year’s end...

...The mysterious fact that the streetlights were off and the phone lines dead during the attack further raises the possibility of collaboration with ideologically sympathetic low-level government officials...

...It’s a new step...

...embassy in Tehran during President Carter’s term...

...As to the carrots that might entice actors in Pakistan to turn against al Qaeda, the United States could enhance the prestige of commanders and units within Pakistan’s military who willingly cooperated in efforts to root out militants in the tribal areas...

...While these arrests represent a success for law enforcement, they also signal al Qaeda’s regeneration...

...both were in touch with high-level extremists in Pakistan and had members who had trained there...

...Musharraf could treat the FATA as a hostile province and impede militants’ movements by erecting fences along the perimeter (as Pakistan has done on parts of its border with India) and establishing an internal passport system...

...While Zawahiri may have been the strike’s target, the madrassa was affi liated with another key al Qaeda confederate, Faqir Mohammed, who had contracted a strategic marriage with a woman from the local Mamoond tribe...

...This leaves us with the present alarming picture: relative security for al Qaeda’s senior leadership, greater instability in Afghanistan, a steady fl ow of skilled terrorists coming out of training camps, and a systemic risk of catastrophic attack reminiscent of the risk we faced before 9/11...

...Look at how we broke the U.S...

...assistance, Jones says, should be tied directly to the arrest or killing of key al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al Zawahiri...

...But, contrary to some pessimistic views, we do have options...

...indeed, there may prove to be a link between militant infi ltrators of these institutions and the attempt on Bhutto’s life...

...He notes that militants are supported not just by rogue elements but seemingly at the top levels as well...

...Where does the dearth of military options leave us...

...Though her ideas are “the starting point for a conversation” rather than a well-developed proposal, she notes surface similarities between Iraq and Pakistan...

...Pakistan’s military, meanwhile, does not appear to be up to the task of confronting the militants...

...There is ample justifi cation for renouncing the accords, which the Taliban violated from the outset by killing Pakistani troops, sending its fi ghters into Afghanistan to fi ght coalition forces, and setting up separate governmental entities...

...American policymakers and analysts still have a state-centric orientation, and have poorly incorporated nontraditional actors into their strategic thinking...

...The accords even allowed nonPakistani militants to continue to reside in Waziristan if they made an unenforceable promise to “keep the peace...

...It can work with Pakistani and other intelligence services to shut down the businesses of individuals involved in the fi nancial apparatus that backs our enemies—such as organized crime kingpin Dawood Ibrahim—obtaining blackmail information on them and arresting their operatives...

...and Pakistani offi cials tried to spin them as successes...

...Prompted by assassination attempts against Musharraf, Pakistan’s military mounted a campaign to fl ush al Qaeda out of the tribal areas— but it suffered so many losses that by September 2006 Musharraf felt he had no option but to deal with his would-be killers...

...They don’t believe this is the correct way to practice the religion...

...Under the current system of covert pinprick bombing, Pakistan frequently takes responsibility for U.S...

...Some of this will involve working with some shady characters, but the alternative—sending U.S...

...The failure of these accords was predictable and almost immediate...

...strategy should be diplomatic pressure on Islamabad, once the political situation in Pakistan is calmer...

...A Predator strike destroyed the school, but it hardly slowed down Mohammed, who gave an interview to NBC at the scene of the wreckage and later spoke at the funeral for the victims...

...The major problem with this approach is that it hinges on Musharraf...

...The most notable achievement in this regard occurred in southern Afghanistan, where NATO and Afghan forces killed Mullah Dadullah Lang, the Taliban’s top military commander, back in May...

...There are settled tribes that live by agriculture, and tribes that have lived by smuggling, banditry, and tribal warfare...

...As in Afghanistan under the Taliban, terrorist training camps—believed by U.S...

...A critical factor in the turnaround during the tenure of General David Petraeus as the top U.S...

...The operatives had trained at al Qaeda’s FATA camps and met with high-level operatives Matiur Rehman and Abu Ubaidah al-Masri in Pakistan...

...One expert on irregular warfare who frequently consults with the federal government argues that the Anbar Salvation Front model should be considered for Pakistan...

...The procession celebrating the return home of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto was cut short by twin bombs that killed over 130 and wounded several hundred more on Thursday night...

...American successes in Iraq over the past year may hold some lessons for tackling the problem in Pakistan...

...Most observers believe Pakistan lost about 1,000 men in its fi ght to control the FATA, but some think it has lost more soldiers in this fi ght than the 3,800 the United States has lost in Iraq...

...The long process of improving our understanding of the Pakistani political scene at a granular level is essential to success...

...The blast shattered the windows in her vehicle and set a police escort car ablaze...

...Pakistan’s government could still play an important role despite its military’s weakness...

...It was a sophisticated attack, and the bombs may have been accompanied by sniper fi re...

...There are people within the Pakistani tribes who don’t buy into the Taliban’s concept of Islam,” this analyst said...

...A large number of ISI agents who are responsible for helping the Taliban and al Qaeda should be thrown in jail or killed,” he said...

...Some State Department offi - cials defended the agreements, and President Bush himself offered tepid support during a September 2006 press conference with Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf...

...Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the author of My Year Inside Radical Islam...

...Although that accord ceded control over signifi cant portions of the FATA to tribal leaders aligned with al Qaeda and the Taliban, Washington was slow to sound the alarm...

...Then, too, Pakistani soldiers have shown reluctance to fi ght their “Muslim brothers...

...strikes...

...We are not doomed to remain on our present course—supporting Musharraf no matter what he does and bombing targets of opportunity, with no plan for depriving al Qaeda of its safe haven...

...All of which conjures up images of the “nightmare scenario”: a nuclear-armed state openly aligned with our terrorist enemies...

...At the clan and tribal level, we don’t have a good idea of this...

...This unwillingness was bolstered by a fatwa issued in 2004 by clerics Mohammed Abdul Aziz and Abdur Rashid Ghazi stating that Pakistani soldiers killed in South Waziristan deserved neither a Muslim funeral nor burial in a Muslim cemetery...

...American Special Operations forces are already engaging in actions coordinated with the airstrikes...

...Impeding the movement of FATA-based extremists would not only hinder their efforts, but also help coalition forces in Afghanistan to track who had visited the highrisk FATA...

...Before you start getting involved in these situations,” a senior American military intelligence offi cer told me, “you need to know who is whose enemy, which groups are backing the Taliban and al Qaeda...

...There is always the option of a full-scale U.S...

...One year and three more accords later, all analysts concede that the tribal areas are now the stronghold of al Qaeda’s senior leadership—probably including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri...

...His solution was the Waziristan Accords, peace agreements that essentially ceded North and South Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda...

...This occurs against the backdrop of Musharraf ’s political impotence...

...Anybody who traveled out of the FATA could be treated as though he were entering from an enemy nation, and would be subject to searches and questioning...

...NATO’s air campaign against Serbia’s military lasted from March 24 through June 11, 1999, and comprised over 38,000 missions involving approximately 1,000 aircraft and a barrage of Tomahawk missiles...

...Seth Jones of RAND is cautious about this approach because of the heavy support for the Taliban within the ISI...

...Al Qaeda now enjoys both of these in Pakistan...

...Shortly after the accords were signed, a U.S...

...and British authorities announced the disruption of an ambitious scheme to blow up airliners en route from Britain to the United States with liquid explosives...

...The narcotics industry is diffuse, with lots of different players...

...counterinsurgency operation in the FATA, including the insertion of American ground troops...

...We won’t quickly fi nd an ally in Pakistan as capable as the late Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, who led the Anbar Salvation Front, but the broader lesson is the need to understand local actors and rely on more than our sheer military might...

...military training could focus on units and commanders who had demonstrated their willingness to undertake military or policing efforts against extremist groups...

...If you go after opium growers,” he said, “you’ll undercut [Afghan president Hamid] Karzai’s government because a lot of these guys back him...

...Their camps won’t be actively producing terrorists,” he said, “but they’ll survive the air campaign...

...One day last month, authorities in Europe broke up two terrorist cells in Denmark and Germany...

...Although it is known that al Qaeda benefi ts from the drug trade, controlling smuggling routes from Afghanistan to Pakistan and essentially taxing each shipment, a solution to regional drug traffi cking remains elusive...

...Surely it would be better to act now, using every means at hand to craft an alternative strategy...

...The topography makes it difficult to insert and remove forces without being detected...

...There are barriers, though, to expanding the Special Operations forces’ role...

...commander in Iraq has been our improved ability to align with tribal elements that oppose the brutality of al Qaeda...

...Al Qaeda draws its strength from specifi c individuals and clans inside Pakistan, including powerful allies in the military and intelligence service, tribal sheikhs, and fi gures in the underground economy...

...Al Qaeda’s rebound was several years in the making...

...As part of the accords, Pakistan’s military agreed that it would no longer carry out air or ground strikes in the tribal areas, that it would disband its human intelligence network, and that it would abandon outposts and border crossings throughout Waziristan...

...Pakistan faces a choice not too different from what it faced on 9/11...

...The way people make their living is also similar...

...He is grateful for the assistance of Joshua Goodman in the preparation of this article...

...the numbers are secret and estimates vary widely...

...Nor is any satisfactory alternative military strategy on offer...

...Military affairs analyst Bill Roggio agrees that in an ideal world we would conduct counterinsurgency operations jointly with Pakistan’s armed forces, but deems this unlikely in the current American political context...

...Every option for moving forward has associated challenges and pitfalls...

...A year ago, after the signing of one agreement, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States told a network reporter, “The Waziristan accord is not a good thing—it’s a very good thing...

...It is unclear what level of casualties caused Musharraf to make a deal with the extremists...

...Emblematic of the latter is an October 30, 2006, strike against a madrassa in a Bajaur village that allegedly served as an al Qaeda training camp...

...The U.S...

...Some commentators favor this approach...

...If Pakistan nullifi ed the FATA agreements, it could take aggressive measures without risking its troops in the tribal areas...

...Thus far, American policy toward Pakistan has amounted to virtually unconditional support for Musharraf, coupled with occasional airstrikes against high-level al Qaeda targets in the tribal areas...

...intelligence to number almost 30—operate freely...

...BY DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS If there were any doubt about the reach of militants in Pakistan, last week’s events should have put them to rest...

...It can support tribal groups that oppose al Qaeda and the Taliban against rivals who favor them...

...Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff recently told ABC News that the plot, if successful, would have killed thousands...

...Al Qaeda is regenerated, and a number of recent terror plots are linked back to its tribal areas...

...To me this suggests that there are fi ssures, both ideological and tribal, that can be exploited...

...Still, even as it hopes for the best from Pakistan, Washington should be prepared for continuing inaction...

...What about covert action...

...The siege of the militant Lal Masjid mosque in July occurred in Islamabad, the capital...

...Both cells were allegedly planning attacks...

...America could make sure they had the best equipment by earmarking aid for specifi c regiments or commanders...

...The attackers almost succeeded in killing Bhutto as well...

...military offi cial told the Associated Press that “American troops on Afghanistan’s eastern border have seen a threefold increase” in cross-border attacks from Pakistan...

...As a senior American military intelligence offi cer put it, “FATA should become Taiwan to Pakistan’s China...

...One senior American military intelligence officer said it would take a sustained air campaign to deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven in the FATA...

...It should develop a basket of incentives to persuade Musharraf to junk the agreements...

...A number of attacks on Pakistani forces were launched from the FATA thereafter, in clear violation of the accords...

...He was presented with a sterling opportunity to cancel Pakistan’s accords with militants earlier this summer, after his forces raided the Lal Masjid...

...Special Operations forces act in small teams and are lightly armed, so they could be overwhelmed by larger contingents of al Qaeda and Taliban fi ghters...

...Such a campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the offi cer said, would “heavily degrade” but not eliminate al Qaeda...

...Kaplan does think that attempting to shut down sources of al Qaeda and Taliban funding within Pakistan’s underground economy holds promise, given the American authorities’ experience with combating multinational criminal organizations...

...Certainly top leaders of ISI have shown little interest in arresting their own...

...Others favor an even more aggressive Pakistani role, beginning with a declaration that the treaties concerning the tribal areas are dead...

...David E. Kaplan, who investigated the nexus between organized crime and terrorism for U.S...

...The government’s successive concessions to militants have not always been viewed as defeats...

...Last year U.S...

...Steve Schippert, the managing editor of ThreatsWatch, told me, “At the end of the day, there is no getting around that if al Qaeda is going to be defeated in Pakistan, it will take our boots on the ground...

...Supporters of al Qaeda exist in the military and intelligence services...

...The DEA didn’t even have an offi ce in Afghanistan until after 9/11, so they have a lot of catching up to do...

...But exploiting them will take a good deal of time, given our lack of cultural and institutional understanding...

...That course is proving ineffective...

...That mosque had been a center for the recruitment of fi ghters and suicide bombers to combat coalition forces in Afghanistan...

...One result is the heightened terrorist threat manifest in the attack on Bhutto, but also in recent plots against the West...

...Such knowledge could perhaps be gleaned from our Afghan allies, since neither Pashtun nor Baluch society recognizes the artifi cial border between Afghanistan and Pakistan...

...The United States can then use a variety of sticks and carrots...

...military intelligence offi cer quoted above believes we should be ready to undermine support for the Taliban and al Qaeda within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and military...

...forces into Pakistan for a sustained bombing campaign— is worse...

...Worse, it may allow for another catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States...

...Extremist violence in Pakistan is hardly news...

...Unfortunately, the potential for things going awry is high if Special Operations missions are increased...

...We’re talking about a Serbia-style prolonged campaign,” he said...

...Similarly, U.S...

...Shadowy fi gures like Generals Hamid Gul and Mirza Aslam Beg, whose ideological sympathies lie with the Taliban and al Qaeda, lurk in the background...

...Still, the stronghold of militant activity in Pakistan is clearly the remote and mountainous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border with Afghanistan, where Pakistan has ceded more and more ground to al Qaeda and its allies over the past year...

...We need to better understand the patronage networks that al Qaeda and the Taliban benefi t from, and undermine them...

...But the bad news is that these guys are in Afghanistan and Pakistan...

...You have multiple tribes,” she said, “some of which have been in confl ict and some of which have been aligned...

...indeed, U.S...

...Seth Jones, of the RAND Corporation, argues that the centerpiece of U.S...

...This will not deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven, although it may occasionally yield important kills...