Iran Goes Nuclear

...The new government of Nicolas Sarkozy in France sees international action against Iran as absolutely essential, in radical contrast to its predecessor...

...As a result of its relentless economic growth, China is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil and relies on Iran for 15 percent of its oil imports...

...Delpech delivers a blistering critique of all the key players in the Iranian nuclear controversy: the Iranian regime, of course, as well as its diplomatic enablers in Russia, China, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA...

...She begins with Iran, reviewing the history and technical details of its nuclear program and demolishing the notion that the program could be designed for peaceful purposes...

...Her conclusions do not depend on assumptions about unknown conversion and enrichment-related work that the NIE now assures us was suspended in 2003...

...In addition, China is more than happy to refocus America’s attention and military might away from East Asia, particularly Taiwan...

...For most of that time, a central goal of U.S...

...Delpech moves on to Russia, asking why Moscow is not more alarmed about the potential development of nuclear weapons by a Muslim fundamentalist state on its periphery...

...Russian sources suggest that Rosatom also decided to take a pass on tenders issued by Iran in April 2007 for the construction of two additional nuclear reactors...

...Who is giving orders to the Agency...

...Contrary to the usual European critique, her complaint is not that America has provided insuffi cient support to the efforts of the EU-3, or that it has failed to talk directly to Iran...

...All responsible governments are said to be pulling frenetically in the same direction, disagreeing occasionally, but only over tactics...

...The authors are also excluding from their defi nition the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak, and other sensitive facilities that, along with Natanz, have been the focus of intense international concern since 2002...

...BY STEPHEN RADEMAKER Conventional wisdom holds that the international community is “united” in its concern about Iran’s nuclear program and “adamant” about stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons...

...Like Russia, China is keen to establish a diplomatic foothold in the Middle East...

...The infelicitous phrasing of the NIE certainly invites such misunderstanding...

...we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment...

...The NIE is not the only development since 2006 that is left untreated by Delpech’s narrative...

...nuclear cooperation with Russia on termination of Russia’s cooperation with Iran...

...For years they equated an IAEA referral of Iran to the Security Council with the failure of their initiative, and therefore on three occasions, between 2003 and 2005, they shielded Iran from such a referral...

...Following Russia’s decision in 1995 to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor in Iran, the Clinton administration shelved plans to negotiate a bilateral agreement with Russia permitting nuclear commerce between the U.S...

...She cites repeated instances in which the IAEA leadership has sought to infl uence diplomatic initiatives to restrain Iran, most notably its efforts to dissuade the IAEA Board of Governors from referring Iran to the Security Council...

...Distracted by Iraq and burdened by all the unhappy developments in U.S.-Iran relations since the fall of the shah, America insists at the rhetorical level that “all options are on the table,” but, in fact, is manifestly unwilling to use military force...

...She takes a club to these international platitudes, revealing a world largely indifferent to Tehran’s nuclear program, at times complicit in it, and always with something more important on its mind...

...The most important subsequent development is, of course, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released by the U.S...

...But she goes on to fl ay those governments that are widely seen as most committed to stopping Iran’s nuclear program, including Great Britain, France, and Germany (the so-called EU-3), to say nothing of the United States...

...The August 2007 agreement between the IAEA and Iran on resolving outstanding verifi cation questions not only ignores pertinent Security Council resolutions, but arguably is inconsistent with them...

...To this end, Congress enacted, and the executive branch enforced, laws imposing economic sanctions on Russian commercial entities that supplied Iran with nuclear and other sensitive technologies...

...In a littlenoticed footnote to this assertion, however, the NIE’s authors clarify that “by ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work...

...China has a similar record of past cooperation with Iran’s nuclear program, coupled with the provision of diplomatic protection for it today...

...In response to these kinds of pressures, the Russian nuclear agency, Rosatom, apparently decided a few years back to go legit...

...policy has been to change Russian behavior by changing the economic incentives infl uencing that behavior...

...Stephen Rademaker was an assistant secre tary of state from 2002 to 2006, responsible for international security and nonproliferation...

...Delpech faults the United States for failing to provide leadership on the Iran issue commensurate with its power and responsibilities in the international system...

...On the other hand, despite the election of Angela Merkel, Germany has moved in the opposite direction, becoming ever more reluctant to pay an economic price to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons...

...Rosatom’s change of heart regarding Iran was a hopeful sign that, perhaps, Russian foreign policy would one day shift to conform to Rosatom’s new calculation of its economic interests...

...Less than two weeks after the NIE was released, Russia shipped the fi rst batch of nuclear fuel to Iran for the Bushehr reactor after years of resisting Iranian pressure to do so...

...Turning to Britain, France, and Germany, the leaders of international efforts to negotiate with Iran, Delpech correctly points out that their early interest in the problem had more to do with Iraq than Iran, and even more to do with demonstrating the superiority of “soft power” over the muscular foreign policy of the early Bush administration...

...Clearly, Beijing’s principal interest is in enhancing its access to energy, but Delpech argues that it has strategic interests as well...

...The latest deadline set by the Council for suspension by Iran of its nuclear program “or else”—May 2007—has long since passed without any indication that Russia and China will allow the Council to deliver on its threat...

...In other words, the NIE’s authors are excluding from their defi nition of “nuclear weapons program” the underground enrichment facility at Natanz, which began life as a covert nuclear facility, and was only acknowledged by Iran and declared to be for civil purposes after its existence was revealed by an Iranian opposition group in 2002...

...The biggest disappointment is that her narrative ends in August 2006, shortly before the European edition of her book was released...

...Rosatom wants to compete in the international market with the likes of Areva, General Electric, and Westinghouse, and it seems to have recognized that it will not be able to do so if it continues to be seen as a supplier to Iran...

...She would surely say, however, that Russia’s recent actions were a predictable retreat in the face of apparent American equivocation, and the NIE would no doubt be the new Exhibit A on her list of abdications of international responsibility...

...Therefore, for purposes not only of Delpech’s analysis, but also Bush administration foreign policy, the NIE’s conclusion that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program” is a classic straw man...

...Thus, far from conforming Russian foreign policy to Rosatom’s economic interests, the NIE prompted Russia to conform Rosatom’s actions to Russian foreign policy...

...Iran and the Bomb does not give us the benefi t of Delpech’s reactions to these developments...

...The use of force would not be the optimal outcome, but “negotiations that are not accompanied by any threat in the event of a failure to meet obligations have no chance of success...

...Delpech’s verdict is harsh: “Europe will have to shoulder part of the blame for the development of Iran’s nuclear programme if the Iranian bomb sees the light of day...

...She expresses confi dence that Iran will not comply, and questions whether the Security Council will respond to that noncompliance by imposing sanctions...

...She observes correctly that, in private, Russian offi cials agree that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons...

...The result was additional time for Iran to advance its nuclear program...

...Specifi cally, the United States has sought to persuade the Russian nuclear establishment that its involvement with Iran is a liability, and that ultimately Russia stands to make much more money by abandoning the Iranian market...

...Launched in secret 20 years ago, pursued in violation of Iran’s legally binding safeguards obligations, and with no economic justifi cation for the huge investment required, Iran’s program only makes sense as a nuclear weapons program...

...She assigns a greater share of the blame, however, to America...

...Her subtitle says it all: The Abdication of International Responsibility...

...Implicit in Russia’s decision to ship the fuel was a decision to direct Rosatom to complete the construction of Bushehr...

...The NIE is sure to compound the diplomatic challenge of persuading Russia and China that the Council must back up its demands with action...

...With so much prestige and ideology invested in their diplomatic project, the EU-3 could not afford to see it fail...

...Regrettably, this hope must now be counted among the casualties of the NIE...

...she asks...

...As popularly understood (or, more precisely, misunderstood), the NIE casts grave doubt on Delpech’s basic premise that Iran remains a nuclear threat that must be contained...

...intelligence community this past December...

...Delpech is especially critical of the IAEA, excoriating the agency for exceeding its mandate as an international inspectorate...

...The most interesting and leastnoticed changes involve Russia...

...At times, however, the author’s outlinelike organizational style impedes rather than facilitates the reader’s comprehension...

...As the narrative ends, the Security Council has just taken its fi rst meaningful action, adopting a resolution requiring Iran to suspend its nuclear program within 30 days...

...Yet Russia has provided considerable nuclear assistance to Iran over the past 15 years, and persists today in blocking meaningful action against Iran at the U.N...

...Delpech’s logic is crystal clear and backed by a fi rm command of the facts...

...As a result, developments since then are not addressed...

...The Board of Governors or the country under examination...

...The same can be said, incidentally, about the premises upon which the Bush administration and other governments have been operating since 2002...

...Reviewing possible explanations, such as the desire to build a strategic partnership with Tehran and business considerations, she concludes that “in Moscow it is sometimes diffi cult to distinguish between strategic issues, commercial issues and criminal activities...

...In fact, the Security Council has since acted twice to impose sanctions, though Russia and China have wielded their veto power at the Council to ensure that those sanctions have more bark than bite...

...There have been other important diplomatic developments as well...

...It is a fact that may be true under the NIE’s cramped defi - nition of a “nuclear weapons program,” but it is not a fact that negates Delpech’s analysis, or that of those countries that have been working to constrain Iran’s nuclear program...

...With America in a “state of paralysis,” Delpech comes to the dire conclusion that “what Iran is about to show is that there is no longer anyone in control of the international scene...

...Accordingly, Rosatom began dragging its feet on completing the Bushehr reactor, while also seeking to renegotiate the price with Tehran...

...As Delpech notes, Russia’s behavior toward Iran since the demise of the Soviet Union appears to result from a combination of strategic calculation, business opportunism, and criminal activity...

...Security Council...

...and Russian nuclear industries...

...Enter Th?r?se Delpech, a French offi cial —director of strategic studies at the French Atomic Energy Commission —but certainly not a spokesman for the French government...

...The Bush administration changed this policy last July by initialing a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia...

...She also takes the agency to task for resorting to “all sorts of euphemisms and understatements” to avoid fi nding Iran in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations, for not fully exercising its inspection authority in Iran, and for removing two particularly effective IAEA inspectors at Iran’s request...

...Delpech’s conclusions about the ominous nature of the Iranian program relate to the now-declared “civil” facilities that became known once Iran was caught illegally concealing them...

...The tendency of the IAEA leadership to see itself as an independent power center has grown more pronounced...

...The House of Representatives has signaled its disagreement with this policy change, however, voting 397-16 in September to approve legislation that would condition U.S...

...Rather, her complaint is that the America has not been tough enough...

...The assertion in the fi rst sentence of the NIE—“We judge with high confi dence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program”— appears to assure us that Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons...