STRIFE-TORN CHINA
SEELY, Lt. Comdr. C. S.
Strife-Torn China By LT. COMDR. C. S. SEELY ONE of the reasons why we must expect difficulties in pursuing a war to the death against Japan is that China, our potentially great ally in the Orient,...
...Roughly these sections are as follows: 1 ? The largest section, consisting of more than half of China's strength is now directly aiding Japan, and will continue to do so until almost the very end...
...They have decreased in number and strength since then, and this trend probably will continue...
...4? The rest of China's strength, not more than one-eighth of the total, is under the control of many groups whose leaders usually act independently...
...Chiang Has 25 Per Cent These leaders may not like present Japanese methods, but they prefer yellow-brown (Asiatic) domination of China to white (Western) domination, and they believe that a choice had to be made...
...C. S. SEELY ONE of the reasons why we must expect difficulties in pursuing a war to the death against Japan is that China, our potentially great ally in the Orient, is now, and will be for a long time, hopelessly divided politically, and therefore unable to give us much assistance...
...This section of China needs education just as much as it needs weapons, and the former will be much more difficult to supply than the latter...
...Many of the leaders of this section are pro-"Asia for the Asiatics" Chinese of long standing (they were numerous and strong when I first visited China in 1923), and may be expected to favor China-Japan collaboration under all circumstances...
...The original leaders of this section were in control of a considerable part of China when Japan made her infamous 21 demands during World War I. (There is good reason for believing that these "demands" were at least partly an "inside job...
...This section is increasing in strength and will continue to do so at least until we land a great army in China...
...It is not an overstatement to say that there is absolutely no prospect of any real national unity in China being achieved in time to aid us—unless the war lasts many years...
...The strength of China, including political leadership, manpower, natural resources, public utilities, and everything else that makes a nation strong, can be divided into four main sections which are separated by such great differences that united action is virtually impossible...
...This section is decreasing in strength and it depends greatly, if not entirely, on outside (mainly United States) help...
...In fact probably not more than one in ten of these soldiers is sufficiently educated to set the sights on a. simple old style ("foolproof") rifle, much less operate a complicated weapon such as a modern machine gun...
...They believe that the Chinese could not absorb a white race, should one get control over them, because the white races operate from a distance, a circumstance that prevents their absorption into the blood stream of the Chinese...
...These groups keep themselves in positions where they can take advantage of changing political conditions...
...Only a very few could be taught to operate artillery pieces, tanks, or planes...
...Russia probably could find a way—perhaps by "Lend-Lease"—to aid this section of China even if she never declares war on Japan, should she have war materials to spare, as will be the case when the war in Europe ends...
...This section of China was a large army, but the great majority of the soldiers are grossly ignorant and therefore could not effectively use modern war equipment even if they had it...
...We certainly cannot expect much help from a divided China...
...that the Chinese will finally absorb the Japanese as they did the Tartars, Mongols, and Manchus, and thus regain control of their destiny...
...3? About one-eighth of China's strength is under the control of various liberal, radical, socialist, communist, cooperator, and other elements with varying shades of leftist leanings...
...Should the war last a long time no doubt a considerable number of these men could be trained as effective fighters, but otherwise they will be of little value to our cause except as laborers...
...They are willing to accept Japanese domination mainly because they believe this will submerge China only temporarily...
...This section detests the Chungking government only a little less than it does Japan...
...As late as 1936 there were several hundred of these groups...
...The Spanish in the Philippines, the British in India, and the Dutch in the East Indies are excellent examples of this theory in many years of practice...
...Toll Of Internal Strife This section sti-ongly opposes fascistic influences, but it cannot now fight effectively against Japan because its leaders consider it more important to keep most of its 600,000 soldiers—no doubt among the best in unoccupied China—at home to protect it from attack by the Chungking government...
...2? Perhaps about one-fourth, but not more, of China's strength is aiding the Chiang Kai-shek government...
...The opinions and assertions expressed above are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large...
...The leaders of this section are usually called "Communists," no doubt because they are friendly toward Russia, but they consider themselves the true interpreters of "Sun Yat-sen Democracy...
...We began helping this section about 1927, mainly because of missionary propaganda in its favor...
...It probably would collapse immediately and be absorbed by the other sections should our aid be withdrawn...
...The strength of this section will vastly increase if Russia decides to move against Japan...
...It looks to Russia for support, and as it controls the terminal of the only good road into China from Russia, it probably will get substantial help should Russia eventually join the other nations now fighting Japan...
...None of them will aid us much against Japan...
...It seems clear that if defeat of Japan is to be obtained within the near future American and British troops must bear the brunt of the fighting...
...that many influential and patriotic Chinese not only favored this deal, but actually invited Japan to attempt it, as a move toward unification of the Orient to forestall further white penetration...
Vol. 8 • September 1944 • No. 37
