THE PROBLEM IN THE PACIFIC
SEELY, Lt. Comdr. C. S.
The Problem In The Pacific By LT. COMDR. C. S. SEELY CONTRARY to recent suggestions, it is not at all probable that Japan can be bombed or blockaded into defeat by warships and planes based on...
...She could afford to lose them...
...This should be our major objective—and I believe it is...
...There are many good reasons for believing that Hainan, Luzon, Formosa, and some of the other Japanese-held islands will be very difficult to take...
...That is, a cheaper way to do this should be used...
...What Japan Must Defend We must realize that none of the many islands we have taken in over two and a half years of war was of any special importance to Japan...
...Japan did not need to hold these islands at all cost...
...Much has been said about cutting Japan's supply lines to the East Indies, and thereby blockading Japan into defeat, but the fact is generally overlooked that this cannot possibly be done until we establish a bridgehead on the southeast coast of China, or at least take Hainan Island...
...Islands which are within effective bombing range of Japan, such as those in the Bonin, Kurile, and Ryukyu groups, are much too small to be of appreciable value to- us—even if we had them—as bomber bases...
...Because we have recently taken, without too much trouble, some small, lightly defended islands there is danger that we will be lulled into complacency as regards this island-taking business...
...It seems reasonably certain that for at least another year or so our carrier and island based bombers will be able to do little more to Japan "proper than to "annoy" the Japanese, and intensify their will to resist—make them mad at us...
...A stiff fight must also be expected at Mindanao, and perhaps the Celebes...
...My guess is that Japan will sacrifice at least 2,000,-000 men before she surrenders these islands, if we attack from the sea...
...Carrier-based bombers undoubtedly are just the thing for smashing military installations on small, and relatively unimportant, islands, such as Guam, Truk, Ponape, Yap, etc., but probably are hardly worth their cost for bombing Japan proper...
...C. S. SEELY CONTRARY to recent suggestions, it is not at all probable that Japan can be bombed or blockaded into defeat by warships and planes based on islands or carriers...
...And if we can secure Formosa, the only island that is both big enough and near enough to Japan to be of good use as a base, we should be able to secure a bridgehead on the China coast, which would serve our purpose better than any island could...
...Perhaps after all major Japanese resistance on the mainland is ended, carrier attacks on Japan can be profitably made, but hardly before then...
...In any case, our problems in the Orient will be much simpler after we establish a great bridgehead...
...The opinions and assertions expressed above are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Nary Department or the naval service at large...
...It seems clear that such a base must be established before we can rightly contend that victory is certain, or even possible...
...expeditions—like the Doolittle raid—which while perhaps "magnificent," and productive of big newspaper headlines and radio superlatives, are hardly war...
...But Japan needs, cannot afford to lose, and certainly will defend at almost all cost, Hainan, Formosa, Singapore, Java, Sumatra, Luzon (including Corregidor), and Borneo, in about the order named...
...The prospect of defeating Japan without establishing a major base on the China coast is not good...
...that she used them merely as advanced guards to delay our approach while she strengthened her inner defenses...
...A Bridgehead In China Saipan and all the other islands in Micronesia, Melanesia, and the Philippines, are much too far away from Japan to be of great value to us as bomber bases, except, of course, for "nuisance" raids...
...We can, of course, finally take all of the small lightly defended islands, as the power controlling the sea can always do this, but this rule does not hold good for large, strongly defended islands...
...And the expense of building and maintaining a carrier and escort fleet large enough to interfere seriously with Japan's war industry is prohibitive...
...However, it is doubtful if a bridgehead can be established from the sea until we secure Luzon or Formosa, and Japan probably will not give up Hainan island until she has lost practically all the other southern islands...
...What she will do if we push across Burma and Siam to the east China coast is not yet apparent, but she probably will not sacrifice many men to save islands which will fall of their own weight if a large bridgehead is established on the China coast, whether by land or by sea...
...Either job will require considerable time and materials, but not necessarily great loss of life...
...Japan is too large and too far away from any of our major naval bases to be battered into defeat by carriers, or warships of any kind...
Vol. 8 • July 1944 • No. 30
