A VITAL PACIFIC BRIDGEHEAD
SEELY, Lt. Comdr. C. S.
A Vital Pacific Bridgehead By LT. COMDR. C. S. SEELY OUR recent successes in the Pacific, while important, have produced in us a feeling of confidence unjustified by the realities of the...
...All the others lack suitable harbor and other facilities for good naval bases...
...The opinions and assertions expressed above are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large...
...hardly more than sentry boxes in the vast system of defenses Japan has erected...
...When we take all of the Marshall, Caroline, Mariana, and Bonin Islands we still will not be in a position to give Japan any critical cause for concern...
...The inescapable fact is that we must reach the China coast—preferably between Shanghai and Hong Kong, but in any case not far south of Hong Kong— and make contact with the Chinese armies, before we can make serious trouble for Japan...
...And since we are attacking, and Japan is only defending, we must always have much more power and strength at every point of contact than the Japanese have...
...The only islands of the many thousand we are now trying to retake from Japan that will be of any particular value to us as final bases of operations are: Luzon, Mindanao, Borneo, Java, and Sumatra...
...This may result in a let-down in our war effort if not counterbalanced by some cold facts...
...But the Japanese are almost certain to try to hold their Japan-Formosa-Luzon-Borneo-Java-Sumatra-Rangoon line at almost all costs...
...Guam is the largest of all of these islands and it is only about 20 miles long and eight miles wide, far too small and otherwise unsuitable, for an .effective base of operations...
...However, we are yet a long way from that line...
...Whatever is necessary to establish that bridgehead and make that contact must be done at any cost...
...And of these only Luzon and Java can be made into important military-naval bases in time to aid us in this war...
...C. S. SEELY OUR recent successes in the Pacific, while important, have produced in us a feeling of confidence unjustified by the realities of the situation...
...We have, it is true, taken a few—and attacked some other— islands, but they are mere outposts...
...This ratio will be progressively reduced as we move closer to Japan's strong defense lines...
...It is not likely that we will meet with strong resistance until we reach Mindanao or the Celebes, and even then the Japanese may continue only "rearguard" operations...
...Another thing we should note is that in our successes, especially those in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, we had,' at the "point of contact," at least 20 times the strength and power that Japan had...
Vol. 8 • March 1944 • No. 13
