Peace Strategies

...For readers unfamiliar with the peace-war landscape, Herzog's hasty tour may be a useful introduction...

...Scholars in research institutes and universities critically examine American defense and debate possibilities and postures...

...Concluding his quest, Herzog joins this group, which recognizes, for the time being, "the contradictions of the nuclear age as . . . insoluble"—the agreement to keep nuclear weapons and the near-universal rejection of their use...

...Of course, it could be used for a first strike, its only likely use, but that would be suicidal...

...Herzog, a former magazine editor and now full-time journalist, suffers from what he calls "nucleomitphobia," the fear of atomic attack, which inspired his quest to understand the great debate over peace and war...

...America's vulnerability made it unlikely that any President would risk national destruction to save Europe...

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...and "radicals," like Paul Goodman, who advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament...

...For the "analysts," like Herman Kahn, the dread of thermonuclear war and fear of long-range Communist ambitions are approximately balanced...

...Together with the peace movement and its sympathizers, these, strategists constitute what Arthur Herzog calls "the War-Peace Establishment...

...the snippets of thought are tantalizing, and the trip is spiced with such visits as joining Kahn while he drinks his Metrecal and explains that he thinks like a businessman...

...hence, it offers no effective second-strike capacity and is an ineffectual deterrent...

...hence, the nuclear umbrella was no longer effective and America's promises were no longer credible...

...Aron's recommendations may eliminate some of the disruptive issues, but the Atlantic alliance will probably continue to crumble under the assault of rival national self-interests...

...Perhaps the ultimate solution will be a program of disengagement, which Aron dismisses...

...Because France's President Charles de Gaulle has little faith in American deterrence and considers dependence on American strength a blow to French prestige, he wants a French nuclear force...

...territory, at the risk of allowing small wars in which only Europeans will die...

...Realists," like Hans Morgenthau, place decreased reliance on nuclear weapons...

...Government idealists," including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as well as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, represent a group Herzog loosely defines, with emphasis on good intentions...

...Fragmented into numerous parts, the movement is conveniently divided by Herzog into two camps: "survivalists," such as Erich Fromm, who seek potentially acceptable programs...

...At the other extreme from the "deterrers" is the "peace movement," which regards military power not as a symptom of international hostility, but as a major cause...

...Ever since Soviet nuclear weapons could reach the United States, an W...a milestone in the sturfy of y V National Socialism, m J American nuclear response (against Russia) to Soviet aggression in Europe has entailed retaliation against America...

...Aron, scornfully attacking the proposed French plan, calls it useless at best, dangerous at worst...

...it is "a fatal rehash of the [U.S.] massive retaliation concept...

...in turn, America must abandon its theoretical approach to defense problems, communicate more effectively with allies, and learn not to concentrate "exclusively on the strategy of use and ways to avert escalation...

...it neither offers new information nor useful ways of organizing familiar thought...

...Doubleday...

...In part the multi-lateral nuclear force (MLF) was devised to answer European doubts about the doctrine of graduated response...

...Reviewed by Bart Bernstein Qtrategy today is no longer the ex-^ elusive province of military men...

...By financial necessity, even after the shift from bombers to submarines in about ten years, the force will be very small and probably would not survive a first strike...

...However, unless some similar plan is implemented or disengagement wins converts, independent national deterrents probably will multiply and nuclear weapons will proliferate, as new nations join the club...

...In contrast, Raymond Aron, distinguished French sociologist, philosopher of history, and commentator on international politics, has contributed a serious volume —The Great Debate—to clarify the misunderstandings over nuclear strategy disrupting American-European relations...

...But for students of contemporary affairs, the book is unnecessary...

...a miniature version ten years behind the times...

...This strategy, which restores credibility by American tests, seems to many Europeans to be directed primarily at minimizing the likelihood of war involving U.S...

...In investigating these issues, he has embarked upon a chatty, quick survey of the dominant groups of thought within this "establishment...

...To make the threat credible, French leaders must convince the Soviets they are prepared to sacrifice France, for their small first strike would entail Soviet destruction of all France...

...Until disarmament is achieved, lectures Aron, nations must learn to use nuclear weapons on the diplomatic level to avoid their employment on the battlefield...

...But fears of a German finger on the trigger, burdensome cost, France's refusal to join, MLF's use exclusively for counter-city (usually second-strike) attacks, and America's retention of a veto—all these conspired to halt, perhaps permanently, the creation of the fleet, which even MLF's supporters acknowledge was strategically weak and politically motivated...

...Deterrers" support strategies devised to stop a potential enemy from adopting certain policies through fear of consequences...

...a plausible threat is more likely to mean the avoidance of using dreaded weapons...

...Slowly, while cold war tensions ease, NATO is falling apart, and it is doubtful that President Johnson will long be able to hold it together as an effective organization...

...Indebted to Robert Levine's more probing, but conceptually unsatisfactory book, The Arms Debate, Herzog's volume divides the war-peace world into three basic, but inadequately defined, groups— "deterrers," "experimentalists," and the "peace movement...

...For years, according to Aron, Europeans comfortably believed their security was protected by the American nuclear umbrella—the threat of automatic nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union for an attack on Europe...

...While the debate over the Atlantic alliance rages, and the Johnson Administration seeks to reverse the trend, Aron pleads his case: Europe, and particularly France, must accept American strategy and relinquish the dangerous and "illusory doctrine of massive retaliation...

...Nations on the front line, like Germany, fear a strategy which, by reducing the threat of escalation, seems to increase the possibility of minor aggression...

...while all "deterrers" view the urge for power among nations and people as inevitable and consider hostility a normal part of the international order, differences over levels of arms and appraisals of the Communist menace split this group...

...Between the "deterrers" and the "peace movement" are the "experimentalists," such as Kenneth Boulding and Hans Bethe, who oppose huge thermonuclear stockpiles but want to retain some weapons (initially enough for a second strike) while the nation negotiates disarmament...

...Against de Gaulle's Magi-not Line vision, Aron argues that the strategy of graduated response is better protection for Europe (including France) and that the presence of American troops in Europe confirms America's commitment to its allies...

...At the extreme are "forward strategists," like Robert Strausz-Hupe, who demand overwhelming American nuclear superiority, stress the likelihood of Soviet aggression, and are prepared to carry the battle to the Communist bloc...

...But, if they establish credibility, they might provoke a pre-emptive Soviet attack in a period of crisis and destroy the France de Gaulle has proudly and boldly sought to advance...

...What Europeans do not understand, Aron contends, is that the American response, because it is now limited, is more credible, and therefore the threat is more effective than the out-dated promise of massive retaliation...

...To restore credibility while changing the promises, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, at McNamara's urging, adopted the strategy of graduated response—Soviet aggression will be met in stages, first by conventional weapons and then by tactical nuclear arms, so that the war remains local...

...Long ago that threat lost its credibility for most American experts (and presumably their Soviet counterparts...