U.S. Policy Assessed

...The Korean action may have been taken through the U.N., but every major decision reflected the complexities of the international power struggle...

...Such a proposal seems sensible, but its implementation will take a good deal of persuasion both in Washington and New Delhi...

...Clearly, we need to rethink our psychology of negotiation...

...To accomplish this, he declares, first priority in all defense spending must go only to that kind of force most likely to prevent the Russians or Chinese from launching an atomic war...

...The history of the past twelve years unfortunately does not bear this out, but suggests that positions of strength are more liable to result in stalemate rather than in successfully negotiated agreements...

...Here he feels we need to take a much stronger offensive, not in a military sense, but in a political and ideological sense, to develop a cordial understanding with the Asian peoples based upon the ideals of individual freedom and the elimination of war...

...Given the destructiveness of the latest nuclear weapons, we have reached a point where warfare has become intolerable and where no policy can be adequate unless it deals effectively with this scourge...

...But the psychology behind a powerful armed force is so different from the psychology required to negotiate mutually acceptable agreements that it is doubtful if the two approaches can be pursued successfully at the same time...

...He also suggests that we urge India and other Asian countries to take seriously the threats of war and subversion from the Communist powers and work out a program in which the initiative for the defense of Asia will come from the Asian countries, with the West taking only such a share as is agreed upon with Asia...

...Our action in the Korean War is cited as an example of a multilateral policy based on the principles of the United Nations, whereas our policies regarding Formosa and Indochina represented bilateral actions without international approval...

...Reviewed by Elton Atwater T^his is a trenchant, stimulating ap-praisal of American foreign policy since World War II by a man who was Secretary of the Air Force for nearly three years under President Truman...

...When one is strong, he feels he doesn't have to make concessions, and when he is weak, he is afraid to make them...

...Yet it seems to be based on the very questionable assumption that mutually advantageous agreements can be negotiated from positions of strength...

...A purely defensive policy against the Communists will not do," he says, "and just beating the Russians once again in the air atomic race is not the answer...

...In sharp contrast to the official American policy, Finletter suggests that we modify our Formosan policy to the extent of letting the non-Communist peoples of Asia, including the Formosans, have a share in deciding the future status and defense of Formosa...

...He seems to suggest that supporting the Israeli side is a matter of "principle," while supporting the Arab side is "power politics...

...decisions are not taken in an atmosphere of power politics...

...The author feels that American foreign policy has been overly defensive since World War II in its reaction to the constant challenges and pressures from the Communist world...

...At a time when everyone from President Eisenhower down to the man in the street is taking stock of our position in world affairs, studies of this sort are extremely useful...

...With regard to the latter question, the important thing, he feels, is for the NATO powers to consult more closely and seek common agreement on their policies outside the NATO sphere toward areas like Suez, Algeria, Communist China, and Formosa...

...Finletter lays much emphasis on rebuilding America's military force (especially its strategic air power) to the point where there can be no doubt it would deter the U.S.S.R...

...Our procedures in the latter cases cost us much of the good which had come from our multilateral action in Korea...

...Something better must be sought for the good of man, and it must involve more than improved economic and social standards, important as these may be...

...We would do much better, according to Finletter, if we made multilateralism, the United Nations, and principle the bases of our policy, rather than what he calls "traditional power politics...

...But Finletter's discussion illustrates the difficulty of defining "principle" and "power politics" in objective terms...

...Finletter's suggestions include some which might be expected from a former Air Force Secretary, such as rebuilding America's strategic air power and strengthening NATO, the "Grand Alliance of the West...

...No Western policies for Asia will succeed, he argues, unless they are agreed to by the Asians, and, in too many cases, the United States has acted on an independent, go-it-alone basis in this part of the world...

...While rebuilding this force, he suggests that we indicate clearly that we are doing so not just to deter war but to negotiate peace...

...The development of cordial understanding between America and the Arab Middle East has been hampered by the differences regarding Israel and the old dilemma of "principle" versus "power politics...

...In his judgment, nothing less will suffice than a frontal attack on the problem of war itself...

...A position of strength, whether it be held by us or by our rivals, constitutes too great an incentive to insist on 100 per cent of one's objectives, rather than settling for meaningful compromises acceptable to both sides...

...or China from making war...

...civil defense) should be in second priority...

...The advantages of the U.N., it would seem, lie not in being divorced from power politics, but in providing a permanent multilateral framework where the conflicts of power can sometimes be harmonized more successfully than through traditional bilateral diplomacy...

...This, it would seem, could be argued either way, depending on one's own personal evaluation of the situation...

...It may seem theoretically possible to develop a powerful deterrent armed force and then sit down and negotiate in terms of genuine compromise...

...This is official doctrine which has been reiterated many times by both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations...

...Other proposals, particularly regarding Asia, reflect a fresh and imaginative approach which, if adopted, would lead to significant changes in our present policies...

...While Finletter is basically sound in preferring a multilateral approach to a go-it-alone policy, it is doubtful if one should imply that major U.N...

...All forces for other purposes (e.g...