When Shamir Blinked

...There will be many similar arguments to overcome before the first session of the peace conference convenes...

...Their eastern limits are a mere 20 miles from Damascus, though, providing a strong incentive for Syrian restraint—and for a deal with Jerusalem...

...3) the PLO must have the right to pick the Palestinian delegation...

...Whatever the case, after getting his OK from Shamir, Baker went to meet three members of the small group of Palestinian representatives he has put together...

...Eliahu Salpeter, a regular NL contributor, is a correspondent for Ha'aretz...

...What made these conditions troubling was not that they contained anythingnew...

...Baker came, got his affirmative reply on August 1, and promised that all of Israel's procedural worries would be addressed in ajoint Israeli-U.S...

...Quite the contrary, it was that the PLO's demands were being repeated —and in more uncompromising language—despite the fact that Israel had presented exactly the opposite positions and there had been indications of promised U.S...

...In the next two months, Israel will do its utmost to nail do wn as many guarantees as possible in the promised memorandum of understanding with Washington...

...True, were Assad to become the second Arab leader to arrange a peace with Israel, he would not face the complete ostracism by his brethren that Sadat suffered...

...memorandum of understanding similar to those signed in other situations where Jerusalem was obliged to accept unpalatable compromises...

...Hawks argue that if Israel sticks to the conditions Secretary Baker is said to have accepted verbally, the Palestinians will stay away from the peace conference and be responsible for its collapse...

...However, Syria is not Egypt, Assad is not Sadat and the Golan Heights are not the Sinai...

...The Shamir government's small far Right coalition partners threatened to quit if the Prime Minister consented to the peace conference...

...Others have said Sharon and company were privately convinced by Shamir that going to the conference did not mean a change in his rigid refusal to consider any territorial concessions...

...The stance of Baker's Arab interlocutors, therefore, was viewed here as being aimed at extracting contradictory promises from Washington or simply sabotaging the conference before it begins...

...support on some points, at least in the preparatory phase of the October conference...

...Arab leaders, including President Hafez al-Assad of Syria and King Hussein of Jordan, have echoed Israel's call to the Palestinians not to miss out again by letting the peace train get under way without them...

...Some politicians and commentators have attributed his uncharacteristic action to two factors: the recognition of the hawks, including Housing Minister Ariel Sharon of Shamir's own Likud Party, that they would be roundly outvoted—as they subsequently were, 16-3, in what amounted to Cabinet ratification—and the Labor Party's promise to support Shamir in the Knesset if the hawks attempted a no-confidence motion...

...On the other hand, the need to do so underscored the grave—and perhaps irreconcilable—difficulties confronting Israel and its would-be bargaining partners...

...Interestingly, a number of Israeli observers have said they would not put it beyond Shamir to compromise on the Golan in order to rid Israel of the danger of a war should it refuse to budge on the West Bank...

...These Israelis are willing to take the unquestionable risks involved...

...The Golan Heights occupy a far smaller area and look straight down on scores of vulnerable Israeli towns and settlements...

...Shamir did make some concessions on matters he earlier had said were not negotiable: He agreed to the presence of a UN and a European Community (EC) representative at the opening general session of the peace conference that is to precede direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and its various Arab adversaries, and he went along with having the full body reconvene occasionally to hear progress reports on the bilateral meetings if all parties approve...

...They believe Shamir's instinctive reading was right: The peace conference is an offer Israel cannot reject...

...Yet unlike Egypt, Syria lacks the self-assurance and the weight in the Arab world that would incline it to give its own national interests priority over the Palestinian issue...

...Things began moving in mid-July, when Syria unexpectedly declared it was ready for face-to-face negotiations with Israel, without any preconditions—i.e., without Israel promising in advance to return the Golan Heights, occupied since the 1967 Six Day War...

...If there is any basisfor Washington's expressed belief that a "window of opportunity" for an Arab-Israeli peace has been created by Iraq's defeat, it can only be the grave international and intra-Arab damage done to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by the unequivocal support its leader, Yasir Arafat, gave Saddam Hussein...

...Israelis also knew the UN and EC presence was being sought by the Arabs because of their previous success in enlisting the support of both organizations...

...4) residents of Jerusalem are not to be excluded...

...It is true as well that for Israel the Golan Heights do not have the historical and religious significance attached to the West Bank, so in one important sense their abandonment probably would be less emotionally burdened than the evacuation of the Sinai was...

...Those steps may seem minor, yet Israelis knew from experience that it was crucial to deal with their neighbors oneon-one, rather than at a round table where they would all be present and competing among themselves to appear "the most pro-Palestinian...

...2) it must agree to implement UN resolutions 242 and 338 (interpreted as requiring the return of all territories occupied in 1967...

...Faffing back on a proven technique for bridging differences was, in a way, a reassuring indication that events were following a recognizable pattern...

...In the past, Assad always affirmed that Syria would not even talk about the Golan Heights before Israel retreated from the West Bank...

...But there are also a great many Israelis —some say they are already the majority—who see the present situation as a real chance to negotiate with the Arabs...

...At the same time, Saddam Hussein's robust survival and a good deal that has now been learned about Washington's handling of the Iraq War act as a disincentive for Israel to make compromises under an American umbrella...

...But nobody doubted that such a demand would head Syria'sagenda at the talks, and Shamir made it abundantly clear that he would not give up the Golan or any other occupied territory...

...asked him to pick the delegation, he alone controlled its composition, and Israel was prepared to leave all the occupied territories...

...But there is a very big strategic difference: The Sinai is a huge area whose demilitarization under American-sponsored international supervision created a significant buffer zone with adequate warning time shouldtherebeanEgyptianattack...

...But to hundreds of Israeli and foreign correspondents, the week before the July 30-31 Moscow summit looked more like the start of a game of chicken between Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir and Secretary of State James A. Baker III...

...now, suddenly, he is willing to talk peace without preconditions...

...Nor is Shamir a latter-day Menachem Begin...

...President Bush's decision—reportedly at Saudi Arabia's behest—to stop the fighting before Saddam's war machine was irrevocably smashed, the enormous intelligence debacle that has come to light, and the failure to compel Baghdad to fully disclose, let alone destroy, its inventory of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, all have raised questions concerning the U. S.' ability or willingness to force another Arab leader, Assad for instance, to live up to his promises...

...Indeed, when Baker met at the American consulate in Jerusalem with Faisal alHusseini, Hanan Ashrawi and Zakaria al-Agha, they behaved more like victors than petitioners...

...Demilitarizing the Heights would afford minimal security...

...Nevertheless, at the moment a majority of Israelis still suspect (or perhaps hope) that Shamir will find an escape route from the conference table...

...It is questionable, too, whether a post-Iraq Bush and Baker are more credible than a pre-Watergate Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, or a post-Vietnam Jimmy Carter...

...Some Arab commentators have nourished Palestinian fears that President Assad, like the late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt who retrieved the Sinai, will make his separate peace with Jerusalem and recover the Golan Heights, leaving the West Bank in Israeli hands...

...Those questions are stressed by Rightwing politicians, who in addition point out that a year ago Saddam was just as naively trusted by the State Department as Assad is now...

...The PLO should now have to double-bend in order to squeeze through the small hole left to it, but still wants to appear standing tall carrying the flag," one of Israel's top Arab experts remarked...

...The second suspicion was reinforced several days later by Arafat's threatening in a New York Times interview that there would be no Palestinian participation unless the U.S...

...In that event, or if the talks with the Palestinians become intractable at a later stage, Assad might part ways with them and conclude a separate agreement that would leave the West Bank issue in limbo—where the far Right would be happy to keep it...

...The contest ended when, inevitably, Shamir blinked first after President George Bush announced at a joint press conference with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev that the peace talks would begin in October, and that Baker was returning to Jerusalem "to get Israel's response...

...Shamir insists, for example, that the Palestinian team cannot represent the PLO (officially regarded as a terrorist outfit), and cannot include Jerusalemites (since this might suggest the future of Jerusalem is negotiable) or representatives of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza (which would imply recognition of the refugees' right to return to their former homes in pre-1967 Israel...

...and 5) Israel must stop building settlements in the territories...

...The Prime Minister realized this was the proverbial offer one could not reject...

...And in contrast to some other hawkish arguments, this one seems to be having an impact on the Israeli public...

...Theyrepeat Ariel Sharon's sarcastic question: "How did Assad suddenly change from Saddam's younger brother into Sadat's prodigal son...

...ASSAD'S NEW ROLE When Shamir Blinked BY ELIAHU SALPETER Tel Aviv As Foreign Minister David Levi told it on television, the Middle East peace conference scheduled for the fall was all arranged in advance among friends: Israel gave its OK and agreed that the details should be worked out later...

...They presented five conditions for joining the peace talks: 1) Israel must recognize the Palestinians' "right of self-determination" (read statehood...

...But when he had to give a quick yes, he did not even bother to secure formal approval from his Cabinet...

...The Arabs were equally firm in reiterating that the principle of Israel trading "land for peace" provided the sole basis for any agreement...