Meanwhile, Back in the Kazakh SSR...
MOTYL, ALEXANDER J.
Meanwhile, Back in the Kazakh SSR... BY ALEXANDER J. MOTYL The recent riots in the Kazakh Soviet Republic probably surprised Mikhail S. Gorbachev as much as they perturbed him. Sparked by his...
...The last time they proved to be a problem was in the early 1930s, when their resistance to col lectivization brought abouta famine that tookan estimated 1.5 million lives...
...Together with his inexplicably delayed reaction to Chernobyl, the Kolbin appointment raises questions about whether Gorbachev is quite the brilliant leader Western observers would like him to be...
...The centerpiece of his vision is efficiency...
...Moreover, the Soviet State has managed its nationalities remarkably well in the past and there is no reason to think that its capabilities will diminish in the foreseeable future...
...Not only did Gorbachev underestimate Kazakh sensitivities, but his commitment to a Great Leap Forward apparently impelled him to downplay affirmative action and engage in what the Soviets call "confusing wishes for reality...
...Soviet officials expect unruly behavior from the nationalistically inclined Baits, Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, and Jews—but not from the Moslem Kazakhs...
...Of course, the fact that Kazakhs reacted to a Russian's appointment as the local Party first secretary by insulting "townspeople" (read: Russians), burning cars, and destroying a store does not herald an incipient nationalist rebellion or an impending Islamic Holy War...
...As he is rapidly finding out, radical change is no easy matter in a multiethnic state...
...The temptation to follow in his footsteps may become irresistible for Gorbachev...
...Muddling through, as Brezhnev knew, is...
...Gorbachev will now have to reassess his goals...
...Sparked by his decision to replace the native Kazakh Party boss with a Russian, the disturbances suggest that ethnic political assertiveness among the non-Russian half of the USSR's population is sufficiently intense to pose a serious obstacle to the General Secretary's plans for restructuring the country...
...Second,inthe 1970s Kolbinservedas second secretary in Georgia, where he and his boss, Shevardnadze, gained a reputation for fighting corruption...
...Kunayev may or may not have been loved by his countrymen, yet as a local boy who made good he apparently had become a source of ethnic pride...
...If he decides to stick to his guns, he risks alienating large segments of the non-Russian population and thereby subverting his own plans...
...If today even they are infected by some nationalism, it's a good bet the virus is flourishing in other seemingly quiescent non-Russians...
...There is little room for ethnic concerns and ethnic rivalries here...
...Ideal in Gorbachev's terms, that is...
...Asan efficient manager possessing extensive experience with non-Russians and good connections to a highly placed official, Kolbin wasan ideal replacement for a local apparatchik who had reputedly turned Kazakhstan into a personal bailiwick in the 25 years he had been in power...
...The importance of the Kazakh events lies, rather, in their implications for Gorbachev's reform program...
...If he decides to give ethnicity its due, he will have to sacrifice some efficiency by using ethnic criteria for making economic choices and political appointments...
...Seen in this light, Gorbachev's choice of a Russian, Gennadi Kolbin, to replace Leonid I. Brezhnev's Kazakh crony, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, comes as no surprise for two reasons: First, it caps over a year of personnel changes that violate the traditional pattern of recruiting primarily Slavs to the central Party-State apparatus, while reserving symbolically important positions at the republican level—and especially Party first secretaryships—for locals...
...His ambitious plans for modernizing the economy and streamlining the political system are contingent upon the initiative, creativity, hard work, and discipline of all Soviet peoples...
...Eduard A. Shevardnadze's promotion from first secretary of Georgia to Soviet foreign minister, and the appointment of Slavs as Party chiefs of Alma-Ata and of the Uzbek capital Tashkent, are typical of Gorbachev's color-blind approach...
...Damned if he does and damned if he doesn't, Gorbachev could soon be in a no-win situation...
Vol. 70 • February 1987 • No. 2
