Strategies for Survival

...Writers & Writing STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL BY BARRY GEWEN Moral posturing frequently befogs sensible debate about national defense, and these days the miasmas are rising thicker than usual On one side we have an anti-nuclear movement that has turned its justifiable anxieties into an untenable demand for an arms freeze On the other is an Administration apparently dedicated to scaring the bejabbers out of anyone who does not share its quasireligious fervor for an anti-Communism crusade On both sides slogans prevail Thought is a victim The sheer complexities of the issues have not helped matters Few laymen are willing or able to master the intricacies of arms control or weapons development Indeed, it sometimes seems that the nomdeological middle ground where genuine discussion should take place has become a thicket of incomprehensible, somniferous particulars only experts can fathom For this reason, Harold Brown's Thinking About National Security Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Westview, 288 pp , $17 95) is a valuable contribution toward public enlightenment The book might be called a partisan primer It is partisan because Brown, Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter, almost invariably reaches conclusions that were policy in the previous Administration Better than any memoir, Thinking About National Security provides the rationale behind the decisions for a mobile MX, cancellation of the B-1 bomber, creation of a Rapid Deployment Force, and Presidential Directive 59, announcing the counterforce targeting of Soviet missiles Fundamentally, however, this study aims to describe the essential requirements of U S global strategy through solid, concise analyses Limitation, restraint, interdependence, and unpredictability are key words in Brown's vocabulary, and he begins by dampening any hopes t hat we can ever again return to the immediate post-World War II days of absolute American supremacy "The threat of nuclear destruction means that U S national security has deteriorated markedly and probably irreversibly since the early 1950s " Economically, too, the nation is more dependent on other countries than ever before, and it has even lost some control over its own borders Security must be defined more modestly than by the ideal of total safety that once was possible for Americans By any definition, the Soviet Union remains the dominant threat to our national interest, and will continue as such at least for the rest of the century As a younger and more sophisticated generation of Soviet leaders comes to power, it will face a host of monumental internal problems The new men in the Kremlin may choose to concentrate on their domestic economic, social and political difficulties, or they could turn aggressively outward through frustration and fear "There is no way of knowing, "Brown writes, "whether they will be easier or more difficult to deal with " Thus the only appropriate course is to temporize, keeping up military strength to avoid possible intimidation while eschewing a policy of superiority that would merely aggravate Soviet paranoia "Seeking to walk that narrow line (if it exists) will challenge U S leadership skills to the maximum " Hawks will bristle at Brown's abandonment of the goal of military advantage, doves will squawk at his specific recommendations for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent against Soviet attack In opposition to those strategic thinkers who believe the U S need plan only tor all-or-nothing massive retaliation...

...Brown argues for the ability to make selective and graduated responses in case of a limited nuclear assault This was the basis tor the much-discussed Presidential Directive 59, issued in 1980, and Brown's reasoning torn seems incontrovertible "There is a good chance that any U S -Soviet nuclear exchange would escalate out of control The possibility of such a total disaster is a significant element in overall deterrence But it would be highly irresponsible to say that, because we cannot predict how such a war would happen, the United States should make no plans for how it will be fought ' Less convincingly, Brown continues to push for mobile basing of the MX missile to strengthen the triad of land-based Minuteman ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and manned bombers that currently provides us with our nuclear deterrent After the Soviets developed the capacity to wipe out one foot of this triad, the stationary ICBMs, President Carter proposed stationing movable MXs in a net work of tunnels to conceal their location The Reagan White House rejected mobile basing, primarily for economic and political reasons, opting instead for crowding 100 of the missiles in a "dense pack," on the untested and untestable theory that some would survive an enemy attack When this concept was turned down by Congress, the President appointed a commission, which has now recommended basing 100 MXs in existing silos as part of a package of defense proposals Brown, a commission consultant, supported the group's suggestions, yet declared that "they are not ideal and do not provide an immediate solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability " He still thinks the original mobile basing plan is the best answer If our ICBMs, either Minutemen or MXs, are open to attack, why not abandon the triad entirely and rely on a dyad of submarines and bombers7 Brown calls this idea a "plausible alternative deterrent," but advises that there is greater safety in diversity By the 1990s, our submarines could themselves become vulnerable, especially if the Soviets, no longer faced with the need to worry about countering American ICBMs, were able to concentrate more of their resources on antisubmarine technology Brown believes, moreover, that discarding our ICBMs or not trying to protect them would be perceived as "a peacetime military defeat of major magnitude and an international political defeat as well " Like so many other debates about national security, these conclusions turn finally on judgment calls, on trying to balance imponderables and predict the unpredictable Elsewhere in his book, Brown writes that finance ministers tend to draw best-case scenarios on strategic threats, while military leaders use worst-case scenarios So, one suspects, do ex-Secretaries of Defense, as he presents his arguments for mobile basing, it is hard not to feel that a worst-case mentality has taken charge Brown is at his most incisive in his crisp cataloguing of those regions where U S national interests are at stake Europe is perforce the center of American concerns as well as a source of considerable frustration Sometimes the Atlantic allies seem like Catholics in an unhappy marriage, stuck with one another and obliged to make the best of it If only the partners would accept once and for all that there is no realistic substitute for mutual dependence, says Brown, "the detailed issues of sharing responsibilities can be painfully wrestled with until an agreement is reached " East Asia offers a more satisfying picture Despite two wars, including the Vietnam defeat, the U S position in the area is the best in 30 years Japan is strong, the smaller Asian allies are prospering, and China is becoming a partial counterweight to Soviet influence Problems exist, of course, such as South Korea's uncertain political future and finding the right balance between Peking and Taipei, but U S prospects appear bright whereas the Soviets, when they look east, see the potential for a nightmare The situation is almost the reverse in Southwest Asia, where the nightmare is America's This region "is probably the most difficult current challenge to geostrategic and military planning for the United States, and to its international political skill " American policymakers must worry about the disruption of oil supplies, either by Soviet expansion or by internal upheaval Although Soviet attack is unlikely, the danger is real enough to require precautions, and Brown usefully, if gloomily, details U S military options Domestic turmoil, especially the possibility of a coup in Saudi Arabia, is more probable and more difficult Brown abjures invasion, both on moral and pragmatic grounds, declaring "A quick Western intervention before such a coup succeeded, in response to a request from what was seen as a legitimate authority resisting such a change, might be the only way to save the situation " No subject brings Brown into more direct conflict with the present Administration's policies than relations with Third World countries in Africa and Latin America He is unwilling simply to sacrifice human rights to anti-Communism Pointing out that the United States has developed working relationships with Communist governments like China and Yugoslavia, he insists on examining each case separately "There have been and will be Rightwing regimes so oppressive that the proper US stance is to let them go under, despite their professed pro-U S and anti-Soviet stance, and take the chance" on what might follow Anastasio Somoza's Nicaragua, for example, did not satisfy Brown's criteria for legitimacy, and he harbors doubts about Roberto d'Aubuisson in El Salvador, notwithstanding the restricted election that brought him to power These views are significant because they underline a sincere commitment to justice as well as pragmatism Brown is realist enough to operate within a framework of national interest, yet neither so ideological nor so cynical as to ignore the uncomfortable requirements of morality Similarly, Brown stresses that a strong foreign policy is only possible in the context of economic equity at home Implicit throughout Thinking About National Security is a critique of the Reagan Administration's conduct of foreign affairs The book also recalls the very different perspectives of the Carter years, a period, it must be said, that is coming to look better as each day passes...