Moscow's Next Nuclear Step
MEYER, STEPHEN M.
REACTING TO REAGAN Moscow's Next Nuclear Step BY STEPHEN M. MEYER It is hardly surprising that the Soviet government hurried to voice its categorical rejection of President Reagan's latest...
...This is the wrong time for anyone in the Kremlin to take a stand his colleagues might interpret as overly responsive to U.S...
...In contrast, the shorter range tactical nuclear systems, which must be forward deployed in the theater, play a much less important role in Soviet planning...
...President Reagan saw the situation differently...
...Moscow may consent to Reagan's desire for a "global" INF approach...
...It is also fair to assume that after an extended period of political posturing there will be a more serious Soviet response to the Reagan plan...
...Fifth, the Soviet military seems to have a particular dislike for the Pershing II, owing to the short time it requires to reach its target...
...What does all this suggest about the form of a new Soviet counterproposal...
...Pershing II launchers also host one missile (with a single warhead), but GLCM launchers host four missiles (with one warhead each...
...When the talks began in Geneva a year and a half ago, their very scope had to be defined...
...The Soviets could accept Reagan's proposed switch from missiles to warheads as the measure of equality, too...
...In his television address from the White House last March 30, the President put aside his earlier insistence that the USSR dismantle its entire force of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles in return for the cancellation of U .S...
...It should be noted that the strategic arms limitation (salt) agreements of the 1970s accorded the Russians no "compensation" for the arsenals of their non-American antagonists, because the U.S...
...Some 300 primary targets have been mapped out, requiring 100-150 SS-20 missiles...
...Moscow would lose in the short term from this redefinition, since its missiles have three warheads apiece and the Americans' only one...
...The President has suggested that he intended his address to be a test of the Soviets' seriousness on arms control...
...REACTING TO REAGAN Moscow's Next Nuclear Step BY STEPHEN M. MEYER It is hardly surprising that the Soviet government hurried to voice its categorical rejection of President Reagan's latest proposal for the reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces (INF...
...Looking back over previous U.S...
...and Soviet INF on a bilateral, global basis, with a specific proviso to the effect that the other nations' stockpiles must be taken into account in any pact emerging from the ongoing strategic arms reduction talks (start...
...But by the time the French and the British complete the Mirving of their nuclear forces, outfitting each missile with six to nine warheads, the new standard would work to the Soviets' advantage...
...and Soviet INF proposals, one can see the effect of these considerations...
...Instead, the President urged an INF ceiling to be agreed upon by both sides, with strict numerical equality measured in terms of warheads rather than missiles...
...Second, the Soviet Union is a continental land power facing hostile or potentially hostile nuclear countries in several different directions...
...argued that these were "theater" nuclear weapons and had no bearing on the strategic balance...
...The President continued to insist on U.S.-Soviet parity alone, while shifting the emphasis to warheads and calling for those not facing Europe to come under the ceiling...
...First, we must remember that the Soviet Union is still in the throes of a leadership transition, and issues of defense and the defense economy have always figured prominently in the sort of jockeying for position that is currently going on there...
...objective...
...All Soviet INF weapons would be part of the count, including those positioned east of the Ural Mountains and thus out of range of the nato countries...
...Consequently, the Soviets worry that what might be thought a minor irritant today-such as the third power question-could come back to haunt...
...The precise opposite, incidentally, is true for nato...
...On the other hand, in the present unsettled state of the hierarchy producing a major arms control agreement that appeared to satisfy Soviet security concerns could have a significant impact on one's political career...
...Stephen M. Meyer is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology...
...SS-20 launchers host one missile (with three warheads) plus perhaps one or two reload missiles...
...In other words, third power nuclear forces will soon pose a quantitative threat to the Soviet homeland, one that Moscow feels must be countered independently...
...deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Western Europe starting this December-the so-called "zero option...
...Yuri V. Andropov, Brezhnev's successor as Party Secretary, has not budged on the issue of third power forces...
...He proposed that the Soviet Union halt further deployment of the SS-20, and that Western Europe cancel its plans to install the new American missiles...
...The late Soviet chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, then attempted to set the basis for an agreement by claiming an INF balance already existed between the USSR and NATO...
...Fourth, for over 20 years Soviet military doctrine and strategy have emphasized that the pillars of the USSR's military power are its nuclear missiles...
...missiles were to go into in Europe, it appears the Russians would prefer that they be GLCMs...
...In return, however, it will demand that identical global restrictions be placed on the Pershing II and GLCM, and that China's arms now be tallied in the anti-Soviet column along with Britain's and France's to offset the asymmetry of the security problems facing the two sides...
...If new U.S...
...Although its details may be impossible to delineate at this point, we can outline some of the factors that will influence its formulation...
...A less probable eventuality is that the Russians will agree to limit U.S...
...The Reagan plan unveiled last month likewise combined firmness with some new wrinkles...
...Thus limiting the number of launchers would create an incentive for the U.S...
...Now President Reagan is claiming the exact reverse: French and British nuclear forces should be excluded from the INF talks because they are strategic...
...He could very well find them taking up the challenge, and in so doing putting his own commitment to nuclear reduction to the test...
...Alternatively, Moscow may press for a return to the salt system of counting launchers...
...Two days later, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko convened his first Moscow press conference in four years to formally declare the U.S...
...In specifying parity with nato as opposed to the U. S., Brezhnev made explicit his desire to incorporate French and British INF into the arithmetic of any agreement...
...For Washington this meant the SS-20, for Moscow the Pershing II and the GLCM...
...Nevertheless, over the long term the Soviets are virtually certain to put forward a counterproposal...
...The Chinese nuclear program, after a number of serious setbacks, is finally moving forward with both intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the European parts of the USSR and submarine-launched ballistic missiles...
...But in offering to reduce the number of Soviet missiles to the French and British total (162), he has seemed to concede for the first time that as things stand Moscow has an INF edge...
...In the regional context the most important weapons-for reasons of deterrent value, peacetime command and control, wartime battle management, and force survivability-are the longer range SS-20s that can reach enemy targets from bases inside Soviet territory...
...pressure...
...to deploy GLCMs rather than Pershing IIs-a Soviet objective-and bring about a balance in warheadsa U.S...
...The veteran diplomat asserted that the President's proposal represented an effort to achieve unilateral military advantage, not bilateral security, and that if America continued in this vein no INF accord would ever be reached...
...A tacit understanding was reached that the initial focus would be on the most worrisome weapons...
...He responded that the Soviets had a clear INF superiority vis a vis the U .S., that the balance in the theater should be between the two superpowers, and that the best balance was zero to zero...
...initiative a nonstarter...
...French and British missiles are about to be modernized by the introduction of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (mirv) warheads...
...Third, in matters of arms control, the explicit and implicit frameworks of past and present agreements form the basis for future talks...
Vol. 66 • April 1983 • No. 7
