Egypt's Israel Problem

...But the Egyptians have made certain fundamental miscalculations in pursuing their new course With respect to Israel, they believed that an embargo on cultural and commercial exchange would deal Begin a blow severe enough to precipitate basic alterations in his scenario for the West Bank This assumption was faulty on two counts First, Mubarak and his advisers failed to foresee that a "tough" stance would fuel the arguments of Israeli hawks who had all along opposed giving up Sinai Second, they did not grasp how unimportant trade and cultural activities were in Begin's eyes compared to Israel's right to erect settlements in the lands he calls Judea and Samaria...

...Many Israelis both within and outside of Prime Minister Menachem Be-gin's government feel that Egypt is at present in clear violation of the peace treaty An exchange of ambassadors was stipulated, and 12 months far exceeds the limit on the legitimate use of "consultations" as a diplomatic expression of ill will Officials here stress, however, that Egypt has not wavered in its basic adherence to what the late President Anwar Sadat called "the strategy of peace"-a supposedly irrevocable choice of negotiations over war as the proper, and most effective, means of settling differences with Israel Moreover, in practical terms the diplomatic representation controversy is essentially a symbolic matter The main channel of communication between the two countries since '79 has been Israel's embassy in Cairo, and there Ambassador Moshe Sasson still finds all the necessary doors open to him, up to the highest levels...

...Nevertheless, if Cairo cannot be faulted on the "macro level," it has undeniably frozen almost all "micro level" cooperation Trade and tourism are flowing exclusively in one direction-Egyptian oil to Israel, Israeli tourists to Egypt Cultural and athletic interchange is virtually nonexistent, except for the Tel Aviv University Research Institute's extremely low-profile presence in Cairo...

...Nonetheless, Israeli political circles express confidence that the Egyptian leadership will soon recognize and rectify its mistakes Once the Lebanese situation is normalized, it is thought, the Israeli-Egyptian relationship will follow suit, ending up somewhere between the current cold peace and the warm neighborly arrangement most Israelis desire...

...President Hosni Mubarak had declared on several occasions that normal relations would be resumed right after Israel concluded an accord with Amin Gemayel's government in Beirut concerning the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon Now that the agreement is in hand, though, Foreign Minister Boutros Ghah has announced that no envoy will be sent to Tel Aviv until the Jewish State reforms its "aggressive attitude " Aside from the obviously hostile nature of this formulation, Ghli's remarks are seen in Jerusalem as a sign that Cairo will henceforth tailor its dealings with Israel to fit its propaganda needs...

...But the slight sigh of relief that could be heard in Jerusalem proved premature The trading licenses were an exception, not harbingers of a trend Sales of Israeli goods to Egypt remain at a complete standstill, while Israel continues to purchase large quantities of oil from the Sinai wells relinquished under the terms of the 1979 peace treaty As for Mourtada, the hope that he would be back to make his farewell calls before reaching the mandatory retirement age was soon dashed by Cairo's new pronouncement on restoring the ambassadorial link...

...Eliahu Salpeter, a regular NL contributor, is a correspondent for Ha'aretz...

...Egypt also has taken to calling for Palestinian " self-determination" in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, ignoring the wording carefully hammered out at Camp David Palestinian "participation in the determination of their own fate" And Mubarak is trying to maneuver the U S and other Western powers into putting pressure on Jerusalem a tactic especially resented by Israelis, who believe "friendly" neighbors should treat with each other directly...

...Mubarak's efforts to bring Western influence to bear on Jerusalem have similarly had negative results Sadat's thesis was that close day-to-day interaction between both the governments and peoples of Egypt and Israel would ultimately compel Begin, or perhaps his successor, to be more flexible on the Palestinian question If this tack holds no guarantee of success either, at least it would not arouse the anger that has resulted from the new Egyptian President's strategy...

...MUBARAK'S REARABIZATION Egypt's Israel Problem BY ELIAHU SALPETER Tel Aviv AT ONE point earlier in the summer, the cool relations prevailing between Israel and Egypt seemed about to thaw a little Reports from Cairo predicted the imminent return to Tel Aviv of Ambassador Saad Mourtada, who had been recalled toi "consultations" following the Phalangist massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon a year ago this month In addition, two import licenses (worth a total of a few thousand dollars) were issued by the Egyptian Commerce Ministry for the first time since May 1982...

...The Egyptian diplomats remaining in Tel Aviv and their colleagues in Cairo naturally blame the chill on Israel They cite the invasion of Lebanon and an intransigently narrow interpretation of Palestinian autonomy as the Begin government's principal offenses Several secondary irritants are mentioned as well, such as the dispute over possession of the Taba Strip just south of Eilat, and Israel's support for the Ethiopian Church in its longstanding haggle with the Egyptian Coptic sect about some rights in the Old City of Jerusalem...

...In the case of the Arab family, there has been no warm embrace in return for Egypt's cooling its Israel connection The hard line states, it turns out, will accept nothing less than abrogation of the peace with Israel as a quid pro quo for extending their fraternal hands Among the "moderates," attitudes toward Cairo are dependent upon what might be gained practically or politically Iraq's need for Egyptian weapons and diplomatic support in its war with Iran, for example, has furthered Cairo's rehabilitation in Baghdad more effectively than any of Mubarak's own initiatives Meanwhile, his communicating Egypt's reformed attitude to the Islamic world by encouraging an anti-Israeli stance in the government-controlled press has only egged on domestic extremists, Left and Right, who condemn the concord with Jerusalem-and so imperiled the core of the strategy of peace...

...The weakest point on Cairo's list of reasons for the deterioration of relations is the war Certainly the combat in Lebanon had a souring effect, since Egypt regards itself as the foremost Arab power and therefore responsible for the fate of all its "brothers " Yet it should be remembered that Ambassador Mourtada was called home in response to the slaughter in the camps, not the Israeli strike itself over three months earlier More significantly, Egypt made no moves toward reconciliation once the fighting in the north ended, or-despite Mubarak's promise-after Jerusalem and Beirut signed their pact on Israeli troop withdrawal...

...It is thus hard to escape the impression that Cairo has seized upon Lebanon as a pretext for advancing its political aims in the Arab world Until Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982, Egypt's number one foreign policy priority was assuring that the desert peninsula would be returned according to plan Afterward, its primary objective became a "return to the Arab family"-i e , normalization of contacts and re-establishment of the diplomatic ties that most Arab states had severed in response to Sadat's accord with the "Zionists ". The shift did not greatly surprise most Israelis, it was in fact widely predicted during the hectic weeks when the government was trying to evacuate Yamit, the last of the Sinai settlements, in the face of resistance from a group of determined nationalists Equally predictable, given the larger objective, was Cairo's insisting on implementation of the "second half of the Camp David document, dealing with autonomy for the Palestinians...

...Less concretely, the Egyptians assail what they view as Israel's unnecessarily brazen style, evidenced most egregiously in its persistent reminders to the rest of the world that it has formally annexed East Jerusalem They contend, too, that it was Begin who in the early months of Mubarak's tenure prevented top-level discussions on outstanding issues by insisting that if the Egyptian President made an official visit, he must come to the Israeli capital Even Sadat, they note, refused to set foot in Jerusalem once Israel had passed its annexation legislation...