Reagan's Two-Track Policy in Central America

...TIME FOR A CHOICE Reagan's Two-Track Policy in Central America BY PAUL E SIGMUND ONLY 18 MONTHS ago, I published an article in Foreign Affairs arguing that during its first year in office, the Reagan Administration had been forced by public opinion, Congress and the realities of Latin American polities to "climb down" from the bellicose position that former Secictary of Slate Alexander M Haig and other officials had initially pursued in Central America In fact, despite his slightly different rhetoric, Reagan seemed then to be following a policy similar to that of the Carter years Again, the cornerstones were economic assistance (the Caribbean Basin Initiative), support for the democratic center, and conditional military aid to El Salvador (the strings being attached thanks to Congressional pressure...

...Paul E Sigmund, a previous contributor to the NL, is Professor of Politics and Director of the Latin American Studies Program at Princeton...

...As for the United States, the 1973 War Powers Act still imposes constraints on the use of military force Although the Supreme Court's nullification of the legislative veto last June negated the provision of the Act that allowed Congress to order a withdrawal of American troops as soon as the President has committed them, a dispatch of men at arms continues to require the approval of both houses within 60 days The process of allocating the defense budget for fiscal 1984, beginning next October 1, provides Congress with another opportunity to rein in the Administration in various ways A House refusal to extend financing for the contras into the coming year, for instance, would be binding, unlike the basically symbolic action that was taken with respect to the few months left in fiscal '83...

...Recent changes in personnel and strategy, however, indicate that the White House may be returning to the hard line Thomas O Enders has been removed as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, allegedly for considering the possibility of a political solution to the war in El Salvador The President's National Security Adviser, Judge William P Clark, appears to have assumed the direction of Central American affairs, assisted by UN Ambassador Jeane J Kirkpatrick...

...The alternative is what we have now a civil war in El Salvador that neither side can win, and escalating U S military and economic pressures on Nicaragua that seem to have no clearly thought-out purpose or potentially desirable outcome A negotiated settlement could prepare the ground for the re-emergence of a democratic center in Central America that has been almost eliminated in the past few years of heightened tension...

...Further, the mysterious possible suicide in Managua of Cayetano Carpio, the most avid opponent of compromise among the principal Salvadoran guerrilla leaders was favorably, if guardedly, remarked by the Reagan camp A cautiously approving response emphasizing the need for a verification system also greeted the public declarations by Cuba's Fidel Castro and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega that they would support negotiations on ending outside arms shipments to El Salvador Finally, Secretary of State George P Shultz told a Senate committee "Our adversaries' options, which have so far stressed force, must be narrowed toward negotiation and dialogue I believe it is the responsibility of the Administration and Congress to make certain that nothing is done to weaken the tools that can bring this about ". What worries many observers, including Latin Americans I talked to on a trip this summer, is which of Reagan's "two tracks" reflects his real intentions Is the military pressure being used to expedite a comprehensive political accord, or are the various parleys, and the appointment of a commission charred by former Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger to evaluate U S options, merely a smoke-screen for overthrowing the Nicaraguans by force...

...Among the Sandinista leadership, there are still pragmatists like Jaime Wheelock who might steer their colleagues back toward the pluralism, mixed economy and nonalignment that was promised immediately after the revolution in 1979 In Honduras, a moderate democratic faction exists within the Liberal Party that won the Presidency and control of the Congress in 1981 (even though recent events and internal squabbles have weakened its more progressive wing) In El Salvador, the Christian Democrats remain the largest party, and they could regain power in alliance with the Center-Right or—if it quits the battlefield and instead fields candidates-the Left In short, it is time for those who are conducting the Reagan Administration's two-track policy to consider giving greater weight to the improved possibilities of the diplomats option, and to link U S endeavors with those of the Contadora group This choice ma\ not satisfy Administration cold warriors, but it would reflect the wishes of both Congress and the American people Moreover, it would at this point best address Central America's need for peace stability and development...

...Clark has prevailed over the State Department in securing the appointment of ex-Florida Senator Richard B Stone as the President's special en\o\ to the area He has increased CIA support for the contras lighting Nicaragua's Leftist regime from Honduras And he has overseen a considerable expansion of U S military involvement...

...Managua, of course, in the face of concrete evidence of policy coordination and (limited) shipments of arms and supplies, doggedly insists that it is lending no more than moral support to the Salvadoran rebels But beneath the disingenuousness of both sides lies the reality that if a broad regional solution is to be enacted, the guerrilla opposition in El Salvador and Nicaragua must be denied the covert arms, strategic assistance and safe havens they have been reverse the arms build-up among Central America's competing factions...

...Some believe that by strengthening its links with the contras and stepping up the American armed presence, the Administration aims to set the stage for a border incident initiated by, or at least attributable to, the Sandinistas that would justify direct intervention Others are inclined to take the word of the US ambassador in Managua, Anthony C E Quainton, that the new activity is intended only to "modify the Sandinista behavior," particularly their support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and their importation of Soviet bloc weapons...

...Actually, the factors weighing against an outbreak of full-scale fighting-whether involving the U S or not—are substantial Honduras is unlikely to attack a Nicaragua that can field several times as many men and, except in the air, equip them better The Nicaraguans, for their part, are aware that the U S and the Organization of American States (OAS) might very well act to repel any invasion of Honduras, and that their counterattack might not stop before it reached Managua...

...If the Administration's objective is negotiations, its recent aggressive moves, particularly the backing of the contras, can arguably be justified on the grounds that they lend the situation a certain symmetry The U S could stop bankrolling the Nicaraguan Rightists m exchange for the termination of Managua's support for the Salvadoran Leftists In fact, this is the only defensible rationale for continuing to foster the contras, since they are clearly engaged in a very different enterprise from the one the Administration originally promised Congress they would pursue-cutting off the Nicaragua-El...

...With no military solution in sight for El Salvador, the Administration seems to have refocused its ire on the Sandinistas in Managua and their Cuban and Soviet allies-recalling Haig's threat to "go to the source " Indeed, notwithstanding the substantial uneasiness in Congress and the country about falling into another Vietnam-type quagmire, the Administration's escalating words and deeds during the past few months have given the impression that the U S is headed m precisely that direction...

...c-and a method must be found for enforcing the denial...

...been postponed to early next year, while in Guatemala the dust has hardly settled from the latest coup on August 8 Nicaraguan leaders claim that the fulfillment of their pledge to open the polls in' 85 will depend on whether they are still being harassed by the contras...

...The Salvadoran Left, unlikely to come out on top in tree elections, would have to be satisfied with the lot of democratic opposition or coalition partner The U S would have to learn to live with a Leftist government in Managua, assuming, as is probable, that the Sandinistas won in the 1985 voting Washington would also have to trade its military clout for the additional economic leverage that would result from financing the bulk of the economic package Essentially, the solution would amount to legitimizing the status quo through the ballot box, with the Contadora force on hand to guarantee a nonviolent transition Neither the Nicaraguan nor the Salvadoran armed forces would have to be "reorganized," but their capacity for terror and repression would be sharply reduced...

...Yet at the same time, Washington has undertaken several initiatives that do not fit the hard-line pattern Stone has met with a representative of the Salvadoran opposition front (granted, the rebel leader involved was ex-Christian Democrat Ruben Zamora, who could have been approached during any of his numerous lobbying visits to New York and Washington in recent years) In a reversal of apparent opposition to Mexican mediation attempts expressed in an April 1982 National Security Council memorandum that was leaked to the press, the President has sent off a letter with his special envoy praising the efforts of the Contadora nations-Mexico,colombia,and Panama-to promote a peaceful region-wide settlement in Central America And expenditures for U S economic aid to the troubled area continue to far exceed those for military assistance programs...

...Is there any evidence that the Administration has something of this sort in mind7 So far, only the testimony of Secretary Shultz But it is possible to visualize a region-wide settlement if the desire for negotiations that all parties are at last beginning to hint at gathers momentum This would include a U S -Cuba agreement to refrain from sending any more arms to Nicaragua, Honduras or El Salvador (not El Salvador alone, as Comandante Ortega proposed on July 19), the gradual withdrawal of military advisers, limits on the size of each country's...

...Here the Contadora nations could play an important role With the UN and the OAS viewed as suspect by one side or the other, a peacekeeping force manned by the four-power group is more likely to be accepted It could be instrumental in formulating a settlement of the Salvadoran civil wat based on stripping both Leftist rebels and extreme Rightist paiarnilitary squads of I hen weapons The Contadora group could also guarantee the safety of the opposition in the event of elections in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, as well as supervise any agreement to armed forces, Contadora peacekeepers outfitted with sophisticated equipment to monitor borders, arms flows and communications, a regional development program requiring a substantial increase in outside economic aid, and, finally, acceptance of reliance on the electoral process, rather than force, by the combatants in El Salvador and Nicaragua...

...The New Leader Salvador arms traffic That Washington hasn't openly stressed such a "swap" is not necessarily an indication of its intentions, for the Nicaraguan exiles would be none too enthused about being treated as a bargaining chip...

...Inside Central America itself, U S backing has encouraged Honduran General Gustavo Alvarez to ignore the civilian politicians trying to hold together his country s fragile democratic system, and to manipulate the Right-wing National Party in preparation for what looks like a Presidential bid in I4S5 Elections in El Salvador have...

...in the Hemisphere through the construction of bases and airfields, as well as such demonstrations of might as the deployment of two aircraft carriers and a battleship off the coast of Nicaragua and the staging of Marine and Army maneuvers in Honduras All these steps were taken without consulting Congress When the House of Representatives last month voted to cut off the funds to be used for CIA "covert" assistance to the contras during the remainder of the 1983 fiscal year, Administration spokesmen expressed confidence that the measure would ultimately be killed in the Republican-controlled Senate, now adjourned until after Labor Day In the interim, the funds will continue to be spent...

...Besides this, there is the fear of "another Vietnam," expressed by certain elements in the Pentagon and a majority of the public El Salvador might be pacified by an overwhelming deployment of American power, yet the fighting would have to be followed by occupation if the gains were not to slip away In Nicaragua, given the long tradition of resistance to Yankee domination and the widespread distribution of arms, the price of "victory" would be higher still, and Washington would run the risk of drawing Cuba and/or the Soviet Union into the conflict At the minimum, big-stick tactics would have a negative impact on U S influence in the rest of the world, and would exact a heavy toll in terms of domestic division, there are important differences between Central America and Vietnam, but in this respect they are similar...