Ignoring Washington's Mideast Script

...SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA Ignoring Washington's Mideast Script BY ELIAHU SALPETER Tel Aviv When Lebanon unanimously approved the non-belligerence agreement with Israel last May 14, many observers hailed the step as advancing Washington's scenario for the Middle East The Syrians, after all, had openly threatened any member of the Lebanese Parliament who dared to raise his hand in favor "with Sadat's fate " On the eve of the vote Syrian artillery also shelled Beirut, obliging the legislators to convene at an improvised meeting place Additional evidence of the promise held out by U S strategy was found in the actions of Lebanese and Israeli officials President Amin Gemayel sought to convince the Arab world the new pact was merely a freshened up version of the 1948 Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement It is, of course, much more than that Foreign Minister Yitzchak Shamir tried just as strenuously to persuade his countrymen that the document was, in practical terms, only a few inches shy of a formal peace treaty It is, of course, much less than that It falls far short of what Prime Minister Men-achem Begin promised the Israeli pub-he m the euphoria of the first few days of the invasion, and does not come close to what former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon claimed to have "obtained" shortly before he was forced to resign But optimism about Washington's approach in the Mideast, as events are already demonstrating, hardly seems justified In the case of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, for example, exegesis of the various paragraphs-or hints about the still-secret contents of the accompanying exchanges of letters-matter less than the following realities behind the diplomatic phrases Syrian President Hafez al-Assad can veto implementation If the Syrians remain in the third of Lebanon they currently occupy, Israel is not required to leave its present strongholds Moreover, the PLO fighters, whose departure from Lebanon is the key to any true settlement, will not go away unless their Syrian patrons decamp and leave them unprotected The Soviet Union is now much more deeply involved with Syria than it was prior to the Israel-Lebanon negotiations Damascus' acceptance of an initiative shepherded by American Secretary of State George P Shultz would inaugurate a new Pax Americana, especially repulsive to Moscow after the embarrassing rout Syria's Soviet weapons suffered from Israel's American ordnance during the fighting last year Moscow thus has a double reason to back up Syria's intransigence First, to show the Arabs-and Washington-that the USSR cannot be dealt out of any Mideast settlement Second, if proving their importance touches off a new round of shooting between Israel and Syria, the Soviets will have an opportunity to field-test their newer arms and improve their tarnished image among Arab customers (A further danger is that should Soviet hardware again be trounced, the Kremlin might be tempted to get involved in the fighting directly ) With the Syrians remaining in Lebanon and Israel reluctant to risk a new military confrontation to drive them out, a stalemate may develop Jerusalem could find itself faced with the choice of unilateral withdrawal down to the Awali River, or a more extensive retreat resulting from a negotiated political settlement In the event of a military pullback, the areas evacuated by Israeli troops would not necessarily be occupied by units of the Multinational Force, as intended Instead, PLO and even Syrian units could soon show up opposite the new Israeli positions, leading to a new war of attrition On the other hand, should Jerusalem decide to strike a deal with Damascus, it may find that the price of getting the PLO and Syrian forces to leave is giving up most or all of the nonmilitary clauses of the papers signed with the Lebanese Under Shultz' prodding, the Begin government agreed to complete the bargaining with Beirut first and worry about Damascus later Now, as winter turns to summer, Damascus is in a better position than Jerusalem to play the Lebanese waiting game Syrian soldiers are not freezing to death anymore across from comfortably heated Israeli foxholes, and Syrian conscripts are much less impatient than their Israeli counterparts to finish the whole business and go home The course of events in Lebanon pointed up another aspect of U S Middle East policy that has never gone according to the script-Washington's reliance on its Saudi Arabian "ally ' As soon as Israel accepted Shultz' Lebanese deal, the Secretary rushed to Riyadh to implore the Royal Family to "pressure" Syria into doing the same The Saudis expressed support Yet when Syrian Foreign Minister Hahm Had-dam next hastened to Riyadh, the Saudis, rather than leaning on him, put their signature on a joint communique rejecting the Israel-Lebanon accord Meetings in Pans between Shultz, American Secretary of Defense Caspar W Weinberger and the Saudis were of no use, either Riyadh made clear that it had no desire to influence Damascus on Washington's behalf To Israelis, this was a repeat performance without any surprises For a long time, the U S has been presenting the "influential Saudis" as the pacifiers of the Arab world The "extremist Syrians," it is said, "disguise for domestic consumption" how thoroughly they have been soothed by the benign Saudis Always, though, the discovery is suddenly made that the Syrians have twisted the Saudis' arms, not the other way around Then the Americans, whose Arab stars refuse to take direction, assure the Israelis that the curtain hasn't gone up on the last act of the drama and therefore they should not despair of a happy ending The Carter Administration told anybody who would listen that Saudi Arabia would fulfill a crucial role in rallying the "moderate" Arab countries behind the Camp David agreements and the Israeli-Egyptian peace Riyadh not only failed to utter a persuasive word, it quickly joined the Arab chorus in vilifying Anwar Sadat The Reagan Administration pushed through the sale of awacs to Saudi Arabia on the grounds of its leavening influence on the PLO and strategic value in the Persian Gulf The grateful recipients of American high technology did not tone down any PLO posture, however, nor would they allow the use of their facilities by the U S Air Force Later, the Saudis did not even seriously attempt to promote their original Fahd Plan, and l hey certainly were not helpful with Ihe Svruns during the fighting in Lebanon In retrospect, their much-touted impact on PLO chief Yasir Arafat during the siege of Beirut is highly questionable, too Nevertheless, Washington continues to feel that Saudi Arabia somehow protects American interests among the Arabs Besides two generations of conditioned reflexes stretching from Aram-co and the Roosevelt-Saud meeting to the Bechtel Corporation's present multi-biliion dollar desert contracts, this belief seems to stem from three basic misconceptions 1. Saudi Arabia is a moderate country In fact, it is a reactionary Kingdom that quickly squelches the slightest sign of democracy and progress Its fervent conservatism does not make it temperate, especially not concerning Israel?quite the contrary In everything touching on Moslem orthodoxy as well, the Saudis are zealots, one of the causes and consequences of their weaknesses 2. Saudi Arabia is an economic power, or at least a financial power The country is very rich, but it is not an economic power because it doesn't use its wealth constructively It can disrupt business deals and buy officials, diplomats and companies, it cannot deeply affect macroeconomic processes 3 The Saudi Royal Family wants to lead the Arab world To lead means to go ahead All the Saudis want to do is promote consensus in order to hide in the center and be protected More specifically, several hundred million petrodollars are a boon to Damascus, but not important enough to change the Syrian position on any issue of significance to its Ba'ath regime It necessary, Syria can exist without Saudi bribes Damascus, by contrast, is the center of scores of Arab extremist movements The Syrian government can rem in or unleash its activities in Saudi Arabia This ability counts more gravely than Saudi financial clout Ultimately, Washington will have to play its role as moderator and executor ot the Lebanon settlement on the basis ot its own and its traditional allies influence in the Middle East The sooner the imaginary...

...aid ot the Saudis is discounted, the faster will the realities ot American, Israeli, Syrian and Soviet power in the region be confronted Eliahu Salpeter, who regularly writes for The New Leader from Israel is a correspondent for the daily, Ha'aretz...