Looking to April in the Mideast

...CAMP DAVID TENSIONS Looking to April in the Mideast BY ELIAHU SALPETER TEL AVIV FOR DECADES, when American administrations changed there would be a honeymoon between Washington and Jerusalem while the new White House occupant viewed the Middle East through lenses still tinged by morality and election rhetoric Then, around the end of the first year big business, petropolitics, the professional bureaucracy, Middle East "experts,' and superpower pressures would regain their positions of influence The honeymoon would usually turn into a less enjoyable yet steady and responsible relationship Traditionally, too, toward the end of a new administration's first year the Secretary of State would visit the Middle East to try his hand at peacemaking and shoring up the American position in the area More often than not, he would return home convinced that not too much could be done, except hope the situation did not get worse President Ronald Reagan's Administration, heir to the Camp David accords and the Israel-Egyptian peace treaty, has pretty much followed this pattern...

...Initially, the President decided to keep a low profile, apparently persuaded that matters of contention would somehow sort themselves out But as the April 1982 date for Israel's final evacuation from the Sinai approached without any agreement between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy in sight, Washington abandoned its nonchalance Sure enough, Secretary of State Alexander M Haig Jr , was dispatched to Jerusalem and Cairo in an attempt to get the autonomy talks going again Two flying visits by the Secretary failed to budge the parties from their almost diametrically opposed views on the form and content of autonomy Indeed, it seemed that both sides were digging in their heels Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was engaged in currying the favor of the Arab world, including the PLO, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was displaying great tolerance toward violent opponents of the Sinai withdrawal, a stance suspected to stem from his desire to show that concessions on the West Bank were out of the question Thus the three issues that divided Cairo and Jerusalem before Haig's trips continue to stymie the autonomy talks ?Cairo wants assurance that no more Jewish settlements will be established on the West Bank Jerusalem refuses to promise The Israelis say that, as a matter of fact, the "map of settlement" already is practically complete and requires only some "fleshing out" of the populations of existing settlements But on principle, it is maintained, an Israeli government cannot countenance that although Jews can live everywhere in the world, in Palestine there should be areas "out of bounds for Jews " ?Egypt envisages a 60-80 member Administrative Council governing the West Bank and the Gaza Stnp Israel insists that there should be no more than 20 members Haig proposed a compromise of 40 At issue here is the nature of the Council's authonty The Israelis see it as an executive body, composed solely of those responsible for the administration of autonomy affairs They fear that a large Council would shortly becomea Legislative Assembly, providing the autonomous regions with one of the pnme attnbutes of national sovereignty Even the assassinated Anwar Sadat made no secret of his belief that this was exactly one of the options Israel agreed to when it acceded to a five-year transitory autonomy period ?Egypt argues that along with the rest of the Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the 80,000 or so Arab residents of East Jerusalem should have the right to vote for the Administrative Council Israel says this is completely out of the question, since it would imply that the Old City is not part of the Jewish State—which is, of course, precisely what all the Arabs claim Despite the lack of substantial gains, Haig, Begin and Mubarak all sought to create the impression of accomplishment, if for no other reason than to suggest that the Camp David process is not completely dead Cairo and Washington are eager to avoid any hitches that might jeopardize the completion of Israel's withdrawal And Israel has no interest in hastening a deadlock in the autonomy talks that would lead to the revival of a Geneva Conference of Palestine, with Soviet and (indirect) PLO participation Papering over the abysmal gap on autonomy also fit nicely into Begin's tendency to see only the things he wants to see when he wants to see them With rare exceptions, no meeting between the Prime Minister and a foreign leader is less than "the best" he has ever had, no message from another head of state is short of being "the most cordial" he has ever received Begin's phenomenal capacity for self-deception (or pretended self-deception) has been amply revealed in his handling of the deterioration of Israel-U S relations Angered by the exaggerated American reaction to Israel's making its control of the Golan Heights official, he let go with an outburst unprecedented between nations having correct, let alone friendly, relations Yet when President Reagan prefaced his tough answer with expressions of friendship, and reportedly addressed it to "Dear Menachem," Begin practically disregarded the content of the message and exulted over the introductory sentences as proof that all is sunshine again The dark clouds that have lately been hanging over relations with the new Administration in Washington could not be ignored even by Begin, however, when Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, returning last week from a Mideast tour that excluded this country, proposed selling Jordan sophisticated weaponry and won President Reagan's readiness to entertain such a request from Amman Earlier, Beginseem-ed determined to turn a deaf ear to reports of Israel's image eroding in the West, particularly the U S , and of its worsening international isolation Just a day before the UN General Assembly voted to recommend that its members cut all ties with Israel because of the Golan move, for example, he blithely declared that world understanding for Israel's position was growing After the Weinberger whack, politics were set aside and the Pnme Minister put over a bipartisan resolution expressing "deep concern" about "the serious danger to Israel's security" posed by the U S Defense Secretary's proposals ISRAEL'S relations with Egypt are far from what they were before Sadat's assassination, too President Mubarak is pursuing de-Sadatrza-tion at a much faster pace than had been expected And although he keeps reiterating that the normalization process between Egypt and Israel will continue at full speed beyond the April withdrawal, he has a tendency to "forget" (to quote his own explanation) the Camp David agreements This was notable even when he read prepared statements and speeches during his recent official visit to Washington, and should certainly worry Jerusalem But Begin faces a dilemma here He is not ready to risk the consequences of refusing to complete the Sinai withdrawal, yet he is probably aware by now of the probability that peace with Egypt will become a purely formal matter if there is no real progress on Palestinian autonomy A further complication for him is that Mubarak's view of autonomy is closer to the PLO's than was Sadat's, which he found unacceptable On a broader scale, it seems evident that Mubarak has a different order of political prionties than his predecessor had For Sadat, prionty number one was reonenting Egypt toward the United States and reaping the full benefits in economic and military aid as well as in political support His second goal was to foster the peace agreement with Israel, both to assure completion of the Sinai withdrawal and to coax Begin into greater flexibility on Palestinian autonomy Third in order for Sadat was to reestablish Egypt as a major African power Restoring Egypt's preeminence in the Arab world would follow later—by itself, almost—as the Arabs saw that Sadat's way of dealing with Israel was more effective than confrontation For President Mubarak, on theother hand, the first priority is reacceptance into the "Arab family", this reinforces his inclination to back "the cause of the Palestinians,' the only issue all Arabs agree upon Second for him seems to be increasing Amencan economic and military aid, while at the same time disengaging himself from too deeply entwined political relations with the U S Third comes improved relations with the Soviet Union, to restore Egyptian membership in good standing in the "nonaligned" Third World bloc, where Mubarak feels more at ease than the late Sadat did Sadat seemed to understand Israel's Holocaust-rooted anxieties, and to realize that drawing concessions from it involved the slow process of building up its confidence in Arab intentions Mubarak has yet to learn this Until he does, it will not only be impossible to prv Begin from his trenches, but the maionty of Israelis will be alongside their pugnacious Prime Minister ELIAHU SALPETER, a regular NL contributor, is a correspondent for Ha'aretz...