Taking On Reagan in Congress

...Washington-USA TAKING ON REAGAN IN CONGRESS BY ANDREW MOLLISON WASHINGTON RONALD REAGAN triumphed in Congress last year by assembling the strongest conserva-tive bloc in more than a quarter of a cen-tury Ranged against mostly non-Southern Democrats, the President's forces, consisting of a majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats, won a resounding and unprecedented 92 per cent of the showdowns on the floor Yet the fabled Reagan coalition is better at slamming on the brakes than at accelerating economic and social change—what the President would like to do Moreover, it is fragile, as early responses to the Administration's proposed 1983 budget and past historical experience clearly demonstrate Besides Reagan, since World War II only Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955 and Richard M. Nixon in 1970 were able to draw consistent, simultaneous support from the GOP-Southern Democratic combination in both houses of Congress Nixon's glue was a racism-tinged "Southern strategy" spread by Vice President Spiro Agnew that dissolved even before Watergate In any case, George Bush is no Agnew And Reagan's blundering explanations following his Voting Rights and tax-exemption gaffes have indicated that he refuses to race-bait When Eisenhower made a similarly admirable decision, submitting a Civil Rights bill to Congress in 1956, Southern Democrats opposed it and Ike's year-old Congressional voting majority came apart Not being in a position to simply wait for Reagan's coalition to unravel, though, Democrats are reaching into history and adapting a proven four-pronged attack this will blame economic hardship on the Republicans, cry to the heavens for a balanced budget, expose the regional inequities of the Administration's New Federalism, and speak kindly of Reagan as a person while attacking his allies Such tactics have succeeded in splitting the Capitol Hill coalitions ol Republican Presidents in non-Presidential election years going as far back as 1930 In fact, they would have worked in 1970, were it not for the temporary effectiveness of Nixon's Southern strategy That persuaded Congressional Democrats from all over the country that the President and his programs were too popular to combat, and more often than not they went along with him Admittedly, the Democratic leadership is taking an essentially negative approach But as Mr Dooley said, "Politics ain't beanbag " There is no surer way of wooing the Southern Democrats in Congress back to the fold Nor is there time, with November looming large on the horizon, to take the high road—to develop a carefully thought out, modernized version of the Great Society whose attractiveness would prevent Reagan from wrecking the institutions created by the New Deal The necessary new ideas still haven't really surfaced Further, the daily rough and tumble of Congress would be the least likely avenue for inserting them into the Democratic mind A party needs the Presidency for that Congress is not a debating society It is a power-allocation arena where presidential, party, regional, ideological, and economic interests collide and are reconciled Coalitions, by definition pragmatic partnerships between people with different points of view, constantly shift An examination of House and Senate votes since Eisenhower's inauguration in 1953, compiled by Congressional Quarterly, reveals how enduring the players are and how fragile alliances among them can be The President has always been the central figure Every Chief Executive has won more controversial votes than he has lost each year Nixon, crippled by Watergate in 1973 and earh 1974, and Gerald Ford—in late 1974 as a non-elected President who had just pardoned Nixon—were the onh ones to lose more than one-third ol the floor votes thev took a clear-cut stand on Presidents have received the most consistent backing from their own party, but the nature and extent of that backing has varied according to the locale, ideology and economic interests an issue involved, as has the number of bolters lured across party lines The regional differences are easiest to measure and the most telling They show that Republicans from the East and Democrats from the South have almost always been the ones to tip the balance of power, while the rest of their colleagues voted along party lines in the last 29 years In the Senate, Republican Presidents were supported or Democratic Presidents opposed on a majority of votes by Republicans from the South (all but one year), West (all but two years) and Midwest (all but four years) The corresponding stand was taken by Democrats from the East (all but two years), Midwest (all but one year) and West (all but one year) In the House, the same pattern holds Republican Presidents were backed and Democratic Presidents opposed on a majority of votes by Republicans from the South (all but one year), West (all but one year) and Midwest (with no exceptions) This was mirrored by Democrats from the East (all but five years), Midwest (all but seven years) and West (all but seven years) The two swing blocs, currently identified in self-parody as the boll weevils and the gypsy moths, have exhibited the opposite tendencies During those 29 years, Presidents of both parties received support most years from Eastern Republicans (23 years m the House, 25 in the Senate), and were opposed most years by Southern Democrats (23 years in the House, 14 in the Senate) Part of the disparity is due to ideology—boll weevils in the past have not been quite as fiscally conservative as gypsy moths Part of it is style—the organization man'spreppy respect for the man at the top vs individualistic redneck hostility to the boss But the two blocs now have enough potential discontent with Reaganism in common to make trying to win them away worthwhile, even if lifestyle issues like abortion, sex, prayer, gender would have to be soft-pedaled this year So Congressional Democrats have wheeled the time-tested four-point strategy into place They are making a half-hearted play for Eastern Republicans and an all-out pitch to Southern Democrats, proceeding on the assumption that neither group believes deeply in the "supply side'- con The Southerners also are especially suspicious of innovation and susceptible to pork barrel appeals An opening salvo was the nationally televised Democratic response to Reagan' s January 26 State of the Union address, harping on the Republicans' role in creating our present economic malaise No alternatives were offered Some young Democratic members of Congress, sitting around a conference table, skated past a minor amehatory proposal or two and avoided the tricky task of presenting a coherent substitute Correctly anticipating Reagan's telling the world that his plan would overcome someday, the Democrats taped ordinary Americans observing the obvious It hasn't worked yet Anonymous men and women, outdoors or m living rooms or unemployment offices, testified one after the other to that Pious cnes for a balanced budget have hardly needed to be prompted, given the horror of the boll weevils and gypsy moths over the prospect of the Administration's projections being exceeded and the nation experiencing its first 12-digit deficit This has tied Reagan into knots He alternates between a neo-Keynesian tolerance for big deficits during a recession—noting proudly that tax cuts are scheduled to go into effect as it ends—and supply-side hints that tax cuts are more important than deficits anyway Hitting at the regional inequities in Reagan's New Federalism comes quite naturally to Congressional Democrats Their Great Society programs were designed to alleviate regional disparities in resources, and to a certain extent they did In 1960, per capita income in the Far West was 16 per cent above the national average Today, although the region is still the nation's wealthiest, the figure is only 11 per cent above average, which is one reason Westerners like Reagan think of the Federal government as taking away more than it gives back In the same two decades, per capita income in the poorest part of the country, the Southeast, rose from 27 per cent below the national average to only 14 per cent below, statistics that should lead Southerners to look more skeptically at Reagan's back-to-the-states movement Fortunately for the Democrats, point four in their battle plan, speaking kindly of the President as an individual, is not difficult to follow because of his pleasant manner This is important to them because Reagan is popular at the polls But as Democratic pollsters keep telling their party, and as voters showed in dumping a Republican Congress in 1954, the people are perfectly willing to make a distinction between a man they like and a party whose candidates they will support The Democrats pulled off their straddle in 1954, with ex-President Harry Truman telling some people "It seems to me that President Eisenhower should be secretly wishing for a Democratic Congress and hope that we can save him from the misdeeds of his own party " House Democratic Leader Sam Ray-burn declared "The situation is such between the President, who has embraced much of the Democratic legislative program, and the Republicans m Congress, who have resisted it, that the country will be better off if it returns a Democratic Senate and House " Ray-burn's assertion was absurd Republicans in Congress backed Eisenhower nearly twice as vigorously as the Democrats Nonetheless, the ploy worked Congressional Democrats would of course be grateful if the President would help them undo his coalition by committing a few blunders Indeed, they take heart from the fact that some recent missteps—such as his abandoning the Southern Christian separatists after learning that their real objective was to maintain racially segregated schools—suggest he may trap himself in lifestyle issues But the loyal opposition is fully prepared to do battle on its own, and even shows signs of believing it will prevail ANDREW MOLLISON is the White House correspondent for the Con Newspapers...