Preserving South Korea's Stability

...between Park and his people, his regime produced little of lasting value in terms of political institutions Its cornerstone-the widely hated Yushin Constitution-is being dismantled rapidly, to be replaced by new political guidelines that are expected sometime later this year...

...A second immediate factor accounting for the relative lack of trauma experienced by the public was the nature of the assassination plot If it had been a well-defined Rightist or Leftist coup, emotions would have been far more strident But Park's death at the hands of a disgruntled political ally, KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu, backed by a few followers apparently settling a score with the President and a key aide, was not the stuff of which high emotions are born The bulk of the people viewed the incident as an aberrant outbreak of infighting among the palace guard, it was not the public's affair Hardly any serious resentment has been expressed against Kim Jae Kyu for his act Were South Korea a freer society, popular sentiment might actually sponsor "Free Kim Jae Kyu" bumper stickers Nevertheless, Park is considered somewhat of a "father of his country" and Kim is certain to receive his just deserts for his crime...

...Now that Park is gone and the nation's economic framework is the key to its well-being, business decisions have willy-nilly assumed great political importance Moreover, by virtue of their institutional clout and their ability to grant or deny financial support to politicians, the leaders of industry and labor are carving out a place for themselves in Seoul's hierarchy It is no accident that the two men who head the military-sanctioned interim civilian government, acting President Choi and acting Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwak, are former economic ministers...

...Nonetheless, in shaping the economy as he did Park left one legacy of lasting importance Notwithstanding temporary setbacks caused largely by rising oil prices, this remains the foundation of the institutional framework supporting Paik's successors, in fact the economy today is the key to political stability in Seoul...

...Evidence supporting this assertion can be found on many fronts The martial law authorities who are playing a major role during the interregnum, for example, appear to have been dissuaded from attempting to entrench themselves because of the enormity of running a sophisticated socio-economic system The personal gains the generals might have made by reasserting power that had declined in recent years as a technocratic middle class emerged were distinctly offset by the reality that imposing direct military rule might ruin the economy The generals faced two dangers First, that their managerial inexperience would not augur well for continuing prosperity Second, that the resulting economic unrest, coupled with political resentment certain to arise after a military takeover, would cause societal chaos...

...Kim's history of high-handedness and intraparty intrigue makes it especially surprising that he is operating the DRP in a relatively open manner While this may also be self-serving, it nonetheless has resulted in Kim's moving to establish a dialogue with opposition politicians, in his ousting Park's unpopular National Assembly speaker, Chung II Kwon, and in his cultivating prominent military, business and labor leaders This new attention to larger factional interests is instructive, for it signifies their heightened importance...

...Within South Korea as well the overall smoothness of the interregnum has been a surprise At first authorities and critics alike were reluctant to comment, as though their speaking out in public might break a fortuitous spell of some sort Fear of the unknown was palpable Before long, however, inhibitions were shed Persons from all walks of life and across the political spectrum began to express considerable pride in what they saw as evidence of their nation's new-found maturity Although they generally recognize that it is too early to be truly confident about avoiding political or economic disaster, an enormous feeling of satisfaction has permeated the country-tempered only slightly by the uncertainties that lie ahead...

...The consequent need to preserve economic continuity is the key factor holding together disparate political interests in Seoul This has been particularly evident among the opposition figures Despite some symbolic protests initiated by elderly ex-President Yun Po Sun-an obdurate partisan of immediate and thoroughgoing political reform-most of South Korea's dissidents and opposition party leaders appear willing to work with the Choi government Even New Democratic Party (NDP) chief Kim Yong Sam, who earlier this month demanded a speeding up of the process leading to elections, has toned down his usually obstreperous behavior and appears willing to meet the government and ruling party half way Perhaps more important, former NDP head Kim Dae Jung, a victim of Park's repression and the hero of South Korea's dissident community, is exerting a statesmanlike moderating influence over the most impatient reformers...

...Park clearly was respected for what he accomplished in rebuilding the country materially, but the high cost paid by the people in terms of their freedom and liberties left a bitter taste...

...THE ECONOMY IS THE KEY Preserving South Korea's Stability BY EDWARD A OLSEN Like most dictators, South Korea's Park Chung Hee cultivated a myth of his indispensability So it came as a surprise to friend and foe when the country calmly accepted Park's assassination last October and went about its everyday business with minimal disruption Allies and trade partners breathed a cautious sigh of relief, hoping the calm would not be short-lived All evidence suggests Seoul's antagonist to the north was genuinely caught off guard by both the event and the South Koreans' equanimity Pyongyang's current wait-and-see attitude seems to be based on the belief that evolutionary change will produce either a more cooperative regime beyond the 39th parallel or new instability from which it could benefit...

...The same fear of instability is motivating the politicians who fell heir to Park's rule, the members of the majority Democratic Republican Party (DRP) Kim Jong Pil, leader of the DRP and top contender for a full Presidential term, has adopted a significantly new manner In the past, the DRP mirrored Park Chung Hee's authoritarian ways, it was less a grass-roots party than the President's personal clique Kim Jong Pi), too-for all the stones about his being a liberal at heart-was an authoritarian personality Some who knew both men in their prime consider Kim the mastermind behind Park's excesses His supposed liberalism surfaced after Park indicated his distrust of Kim as a possible successor, and seems merely to have been a way for the DRP leader to make the best of an adverse development...

...Short-term appeals for Washington's support will reemerge periodically as South Korea faces future political pressures In that sense the American prop is also a quasi-institutional one But the major institutional factor tor stability is purely indigenous the economy...

...In retrospect, several factors that divide into two categories-immediate and institutional-stand out as having combined to bring about the present state of affairs The primary immediate factor was psychological shock in the wake of Park's death It is not an idle play on the traditional description of the country to say that in the days following the murder South Korea was "The Land of the Mourning Calm " But during the week prior to Park's funeral the atmosphere changed dramatically Despite the accoutrements of elaborate formal mourning, remarkably little personal grief was manifested by the public or their leaders Instead, the profound sense of a burden having been lifted was almost tangible...

...In the case of South Korea, it is difficult to deny the justness of the militant dissidents' cause In an ideal world they clearly would deserve to define the shape of their country's next government There is no doubt that the people would benefit from such a development Unfortunately, the conditions prevailing in the Republic of Korea are far from ideal...

...To many Koreans, he was a man who had outlived his usefulness and become an embarrassment His murder instantly resolved the question of how to deal with an anachronism Once the shock of his passing was absorbed, the predominant reaction seemed to be a mixture of gratitude and sympathy...

...Foreign economic pressures (embargoes, protectionism, recession, etc) are an ever-present danger, too But South Korea's economic whiz kids have enjoyed great success in the past coping with overseas threats to economic growth and prosperity If the domestic situation can be kept reasonably under control, South Korea should not face any unusually difficult foreign challenges Further, to the extent that foreign problems arise, the United States' interest in regional stability probably will assure Washington's intervention in search of solutions...

...The final immediate factor contributing to stability was the instantaneous reaffirmation of United States support The American presence-military, political, economic, and visceral-had a tremendously reassuring impact on South Korea's new leaders as they confronted the vacuum they inherited Not since the early 1950s has Washington and its representatives in Seoul-led now by an astute career diplomat, William Gleysteen-enjoyed so much direct influence Had the United States wavered, it is questionable whether political accommodation and public order would have ultimately prevailed...

...As the more moderate dissidents and opposition party leaders seem to recognize, there are very substantial vested interests-civilian as well as military-that are likely to deny radical change Superficial reforms are almost certain to be forthcoming Some meaningful reforms may emerge But any effort to push a total political overhaul that jeopardizes the grip of South Korea's elite on the country's political, economic and strategic destiny is almost sure to be rebuffed...

...This raises the specter of confrontation The potential is high for new unrest in the streets that could quickly lead to more serious political instability By severely disrupting routine domestic activity and weakening the confidence of foreign trading partners in the Seoul government, the militants could easily undermine the economic continuity that is the mainstay of South Korea today...

...Edward A Olsen, who recently left the U S Department of State after serving for five years as an analyst of Korean and Japanese affairs, is currently completing books on the assassination of Park Chung Hee and on Japanese defense...

...The opposition's cooperative attitude can be attributed to a mixture of political maturity, pragmatism and opportunism But whatever the case, opposition figures cannot at this stage afford to jeopardize either their careers or the prospects for peaceful reform by instigating serious civil unrest and thereby threatening the economy Only if they face the total rejection of their proposed reform measures, and therefore conclude that they have nothing to lose anyway, are they likely to pursue so drastic a course...

...Factionalism is endemic in South Korea, but until recently it was almost solely confined to political parties Today, although factions still are politically motivated, they embrace far broader areas of the society The change began in Park's final years, when the economy grew at too fast a pace for the President and his cronies to facilely manipulate it As the economy blossomed, its entrepreneurs, managers and technocrats inherited subtle political power Yet under Park they were reluctant to express their views on issues that were not at least implicitly economic...

...President Park was sharply criticized by human rights activists m Korea and the United States for putting economic progress ahead of social welfare and political rights There is no question that the charges leveled against him were correct He was an authoritarian conservative who valued prosperity and nation-building far more than what he considered to be Utopian democratic ideals His Confucian and anti-Communist values led him to consider almost subversive the Wilsonian liberalism espoused by his most militant critics Because of the frictions existing...

...Once set in motion, there is no guarantee the Seoul government, or its American allies, will be able to halt the process of decline The very strong convictions and suspicions held by the reformers and their hard-line opponents means there is a thin line between continued calm in South Korea and a snowballing into chaos That line was approached in the December military coup, but was not broached As the episode suggested, however, almost any small incident in the coming months could trigger such a discontinuity...

...And since the economic bond is holding together the vested interests that make up South Korea, it is not surprising that a major preoccupation at present is preventing its being undermined in any way One external threat, of course, is posed by North Korea, which could attempt various sabotage strategies with the aim of triggering the widespread instability it had long predicted would follow Park's downfall But Pyongyang's behavior since the assassination has been surprisingly restrained Unless the Party Congress reportedly going on there adopts a more aggressive attitude designed to take advantage of Seoul's current weakness, the North should prove little more than the ever-present danger requiring constant surveillance that it has always been...

...Such concerns, if anything, seem to have prompted the younger officers to assume the task of assuring that the interim government of acting President Choi Kyu Hah is able to achieve an orderly transition culminating in the end of martial law and new elections Thus the shake-up last December led by 49-year-old Lieutenant General Chon Too Hwan, forcing out some 40 senior officers The military emerged with new behind-the-scenes power to approve or veto civilian policies, but has taken pains to demonstrate its desire to avoid an upsetting overt presence on the political scene Its sanctioning of Choi's Cabinet, containing a woman and a former opposition party assemblyman, is a hopeful sign Still, it is obvious that the military will not let its inhibitions about running a complex society preclude a takeover should any of Park's successors prove incapable of preventing major recurrences of the instability that contributed to the President's downfall...

...The best hope for South Korea's continued political peace and economic progress is a recognition by the disparate forces on all sides of the reform issue that a substantial degree of national consensus is required If a basis for that consensus is not found, no one should harbor hopes that South Korea can avoid decline So far, the South Korean people and their leaders ha\e demonstrated considerable political and economic acumen, but the remaining obstacles make it foolhardy tor them-or their allies-to be sanguine about their future Much hard work and good will on the part of all involved will be required it South Korea is to escape the pit tails that he ahead...

...In short, the real threat to South Korea's economy-and, by extension, to the nation's overall well-being-is not external It is to be found within its borders This is not a matter of mismanagement Despite scattered bankruptcies and scandals in 1979, the domestic economy is essentially sound The internal threat to the economy is political After years of political repression, many of Park's most strident former opponents are extremely impatient to implement reform Rightly or wrongly, they are convinced their unrelenting anti-government agitation was directly responsible for the President's downfall Having expended so much energy and kept alive their hopes for true demociacy all this time, the ultra-militant reformers are in no mood to be told by Park's hens, or even then own more modeiate counterparts, "tiust us,' "be patient," and "we are doing the best we can " They have exhausted their reservoir of good will They were beaten down for too long In a sense, they feel cheated and want action fast There is the nub of the problem The most militant reformers, obsessed with the correctness of their cause, are certain they shall overcome Precise parallels with the fanaticism of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini are misleading, South Korea's Christian-led reformers do not command the religious loyalty of more than 15-20 per cent of their countrymen, nor do they have theocratic ambitions Yet similarities exist Both feel God backs the righteousness of their cause, and both are intensely preoccupied with the need to start with a clean slate-to eradicate every vestige of the dictatorship and call to account those responsible for political offenses...