Shifting Relations in the Middle East

...AFTER IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN Shifting Relations in the Middle East BY ELIAHU SALPETER Tel Avtv Events in Iran and Afghanistan are having an impact on practically everything happening in the Middle East these days They explain Saudi Arabia's new cautiousness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as well as its insatiable appetite for gold, they have fostered Egyptian-American military cooperation and made President Anwar Sadat even moi e outspokenly critical of other Arab leaders, and some suspect they may inspire Moscow-sponsored hostilities against Israel to divert American attention from the Persian Gull They also tin eaten to bring about an estrangement in U S-Israel relations Indeed, among the absurdities attributable to the two crises are the multiplicity of role reversals on the part of virtually all parties directly or indirectly involved Moslem religious fanatics consider the U S their number one enemy in Iran, but see the USSR as their chief enemy in Afghanistan The Soviet's have vowed to "protect" Iran against American intervention, but Khomeini has vowed to aid the Afghan fighters against Moscow Sadat has warned the Moslem Brotherhood against subversive activity in Egypt, but their mam target at the moment is his most virulent opponent, Syria, where so far they have murdered at least eight Soviet officers and "advisers " Israel is vitally interested in the stability of the Sadat regime, but opposes the huge amount of military assistance offered by Washington to Cairo The most significant and pervasive effect of the developments in Iran and Afghanistan, though, has been the steady decline of American prestige in Middle East capitals This actually began with the failure to heed the warning signals sent up bv the Shah of Iran over two years ago, when the monarchy in Kabul was overthrown It was accelerated by the Shah's ouster and Washington's role in preventing his generals from mounting a last-ditch effort to save the Peacock Throne Following the damage to the U S reputation for political acumen and reliability as an ally, there came the blows to its military prestige Had a way somehow been found to respond with force to the takeover of the embassy in Teheran, it would admittedly have triggered widespread anti-American demonstrations in many Moslem countries and denunciations from some Third World governments Yet what might have been lost in love would have been more than gained in respect—and, sad as it is to say, the latter is more important these days in the Middle East The ultimate blow, of course, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan To Middle East leaders this demonstrated two interrelated facts that the USSR was able to move huge numbers of soldiers and materiel quickly by air, and that the U S was unable to deter such action Among the less stable pro-Western Arab regimes, questions began to be asked about the wisdom of reviving on American friendship for survival As time passes, concern deepens Moscow's well-organized consolidation of its influence in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan takes on added dimension, while Washington's lack of the military means to intervene becomes magnified beyond the real measure of its weaknesses It is in this context that one must judge Saudi Arabia's public reluctance to offer facilities for American forces, although their main mission would be to defend the oil-rich kingdom Riyadh, despite its total dependence on U S protection, finds it more politic to put some distance between itself and Washington According to authoritative evaluations, this reflects the fact that the Saudi regime is less stable than is generally assumed The attack last November on the Kaaba in Mecca, it is noted, was not the work of a few score of wild fanatics but a well-orchestrated operation that brought together Right-wing Moslem fundamentalists and Leftist Arab extremists, including Palestinian terrorists In these circumstances, Washington's policy of pouring still more arms into Saudi Arabia seems odd, to say the least There is a patent danger that, as in Iran, billions of dollars worth of sophisticated U S weapons will fall into anti-American hands What is more alarming, the policy not only suggests that the U S hasn't learned much from the Iranian lesson, but is an indication that it has not really worked out any effective new way of countering the threat to pro-Western interests in the region The conflicting statements coming out of the White House accentuate this impression A few days after President Carter proclaimed in his State of the Union address that America would use force, if necessary, to stop further Soviet moves toward the Persian Gulf, he was widely quoted as having told a group of editors that America does not now have the necessary conventional military means to stop Soviet aggression As for the announced plans to build up a fast-strike force within three years, they seem rather irrelevant given the pace of events in the Middle East Observers here are less enthusiastic than their counterparts in Washington, too, about the denunciation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at last month's Islamabad Conference of Moslem foreign ministers True, the fact that even some pro-Soviet Arab countries joined in the criticism did not boost Moscow's prestige on the international scene, yet one may wonder whether their participation was a boon or a trap Having failed to prevent broad participation in the conference, the PLO, Iraq, Lybia and others did the next best thing for the Kremlin by exacting a heavy price for the unanimity of the call for Soviet withdrawal First, they kept the resolution purely declarative, with the proposed severance of diplomatic relations directed at the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul, not Moscow The one practical measure against the Soviet Union—boycotting the Olympic Games—was couched in vague conditional language, and even so 11 of the 34 conference participants disassociated themselves from the recommendation Second, they managed to water down the overall impact of the resolutions on the Afghanistan invasion by insisting on the simultaneous denunciation of the American-sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty Thus, much to the delight of the Soviets, the impression of two equivalent evils was created Only Egypt and Israel continue to stand unequivocally by America's side While in the case of Israel this reflects the overwhelming popular sentiment, in the case of Egypt it is primarily a matter of President Sadat's choice, and of his unquestionable personal courage at the cost of almost complete isolation from the Arab world Nevertheless, Washington's multi-billion-dollar military aid reward to Sadat poses a difficult dilemma for Jerusalem Clearly, Israel has an interest in strengthening America's allies, and Egypt has become one of them Moreover, President Sadat must have Western replacements for the Soviet arms he decided to forgo after the Yom Kippur War Yet Israel cannot forget —even if it cannot say so publicly?that since Egypt is not a democracy, there is no guarantee of the permanence of either Sadat or his peace policy Should there be a change of regime or of heart in Cairo, huge quantities of modern U S weapons in Egyptian hands could prove more dangerous to Israel than Soviet arms But the most perilous consequence of the Iranian and Afghan events for Israel is the Carter Administration's curious notion that the creation of a solid Islamic block against the Soviet Union depends on the "solution of the Palestine problem ' It is beyond understanding here how such a "solution" would add a single barrel to the West's oil supply, or why Washington believes that Arab interest in self-defense against Russian aggression is dependent upon Israeli concessions to the Palestinians This, however, is the message coming from Washington (which seems more anxious to speed up the autonomy negotiations than the Egyptians), and it appears to have resulted in a new hardening of the PLO's opposition to any Palestinian participation in the autonomy talks Israel is bracing itself for heightened American ardor in courting the Arabs, accompanied by increased pressure on Jerusalem to yield to Palestinian demands But even dressed up as part of the new Carter "doctrine," in Israel's eyes this cannot compensate for American military weakness and the absence of a coherent policy to meet the Soviet challenge in the Middle East ELIAHU SALPETER a regular NL contributor is a correspondent for Ha'aretz one of the leading newspapers...