Moscow's Afghan Gamble
ASPATURIAN, VERNON V.
SUPERPOWER MANEUVERS—1 Moscow's Afghan Cj3lTlblC BY VERNON V ASPATURIAN The invasion of Afghanistan once again demonstrates that the Soviet Union's past behavior is not always a reliable guide to...
...They have since learned that the Carter Administration was not bluffing at all in its threat not to use military action, because this is the one area where they have seen a consistent correlation between words and performance...
...The seizure of the American hostages again altered the range of Soviet options...
...On the contrary, the Soviet leaders envision a changing balance of power, neuvering, and it must be admitted that in spite of the move into Afghanistan, the usual characterization of the Brezhnev regime as cautious and conservative remains correct...
...For if there is any one signal that Moscow has received loud and clear, it is that the Carter Administration will not respond to crises with military action...
...But if their assessment had been more accurate, would the Soviet leaders have acted differently...
...Meanwhile, the U.S...
...The Kremlin is not averse, though, to inducing a little heightening of tensions where the prospects are good for a favorable shift that can be restabiliz-ed...
...The Kremlin watched these events with apprehension, carefully resisting pressures to fully support the survival of PDPA rule...
...Nevertheless, the overall consequences of Soviet behavior within a global context are indistinguishable from the execution of a grand design...
...Neither the short- nor the long-range opportunities created by the USSR's Afghan gamble bode well for the U. S., but to a certain degree the Soviets' choice will depend on what priority they give to immediate relations with the United States...
...For three years, they have been carefully taking their measure of Carter...
...Iran and Pakistan, its western and eastern neighbors, were contolled by conservative Moslem regimes that called themselves Islamic Republics, and a good portion of the Moslem rebels identified with them...
...unwillingness to support its local clients than of the Kremlin's maneuvering...
...Vance stated, for instance, that the Russians "will continue to pay a heavy price as long as their troops remain in Afghanistan," giving the unmistakable impression, reinforced by other Adrninistration spokesmen, that if the Soviet troops were withdrawn the reprisals would end...
...they see no contradiction in detente based on a balance accepting Soviet strategic superiority, as long as the weaker power adjusts to the situation...
...But, again, Moscow has never accepted this...
...One reason for this was their conflicting perceptions of detente and sait II...
...the use of Cuban troops in Africa...
...On the surface, the Soviet move into Afghanistan would seem to be highly risky and adventurous...
...Actually, Soviet policy amounts to something less than a grand design and something more than taking advantage of targets of opportunity...
...What it feared was not so much the trouble this might stir up among the Moslems in Soviet Central Asia...
...Although the April 1978 coup that catapulted Nur Mohammed Taraki and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power was not Soviet engineered, it blessed the USSR with a new recruit...
...This is no less true in Moscow, where Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev and his experts appear to have been taken aback by President Jimmy Carter's response—particularly his cancellation of grain exports and other commercial sanctions...
...First, Moscow believes that a fair amount of sentiment exists in the United States for putting Iran and Afghanistan on the back burner and resuming normal relations with the USSR...
...On the other hand, to allow the PDPA regime to collapse internally and have the rebels form the third Islamic Republic on the USSR's southern borders was, as I have noted, alarming to Moscow...
...performance, can reasonably assume that once the situation in Afghanistan is stabilized, the United States will accommodate itself to the new realities provided no threatening gestures are made elsewhere...
...and Western condemnation...
...If Iran descends into chaos under the impact of an American sponsored embargo or blockade, or if ethnic tensions threaten to tear the country apart, it can be assumed the Kremlin, in its present pugnacious mood, will not stand idly by...
...Even the taking of American diplomats as hostages in Iran had not prompted Carter to act decisively...
...Some mitigation of the Iranian-American conflict...
...And one can hardly blame Moscow for the upheaval in Iran...
...In any event, the danger of Soviet envelopment of the Middle East and Persian Gulf region from the south is real and has to be seriously resisted...
...To have acted otherwise would have meant leaving Afghanistan a prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive forces to repeat in that country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance, in Chile where the people's freedom was drowned in blood...
...Rather, they see it reflecting Carter's own awareness that he does not understand the elementary mechanics of power politics, and his realizing that to employ force without knowing how is to run the risk of inept use or abuse, which can be worse than nonuse...
...Obviously, though, the aging and ailing Soviet leaders, in their collective judgment, do not see it that way...
...On January 11, he announced on NBC's Today Show that no further punitive steps would be taken against the Russians, although a U.S...
...5. Some Third World condemnation...
...arrangement with Pakistan...
...As long as it was not under the control or influence of third parties, Moscow seemed content with a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan that consistently, if with little conviction, maintained a pro-Soviet orientation...
...When overall Soviet behavior is viewed within this context, one can begin to understand why Moscow has been eager to expand and diversify its strategic arsenals far beyond its defense and security needs...
...2. No U.S...
...they work only if you resist the temptation to reveal your intentions in advance...
...The arc of crisis is probably more the product of apparent U.S...
...economic sanctions would not be undercut...
...In the Soviet view these are separate issues...
...That is to say, in terms of risks, costs and benefits, the Afghanistan invasion has to be judged prudent and nonadventurous...
...In the Kremlin, Amin was tagged a ruthless, unscrupulous man who would not shrink from making a deal with the United States and/or China to stay in power...
...The Chinese have understood Moscow's aim for some time, as they have made clear by their use of the code word "hegemony" in speaking of their erstwhile comrades...
...This had been their experience with the salt II negotiations, the Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Angola and the Horn of Africa, and the strange controversy over the sudden appearance and disappearance of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba...
...only where and how soon are open to debate...
...Fifth, under the existing circumstances it is not likely that the Afghan rebellion will receive sustained, systematic support and will probably be crushed...
...squadrons flying with empty weapons...
...This was much too high a risk for Moscow to accept...
...or other military counteraction...
...Hungary, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Angola, Ethiopia, and now Afghanistan stand as proof that the USSR is always willing to accept such invitations...
...5. Calls for moving, postponing or boycotting of the Olympic Games scheduled to be held in Moscow this summer...
...For different reasons, Iran and Pakistan had strained relations with the United States and were moving close together...
...Thus the Soviet news agency tass, in a declaration made on behalf of the "leading circles of the Soviet Union," replied to Carter's speech invoking economic sanctions by lecturing him on the elementary principles of power politics: "On the whole the President's statement creates the impression that it lacks political balance and a realistic assessment of the international situation, that it overestimates the potentialities of the United States while underestimating the potentialities of those states against which the United States intends to take steps of one kind or another...
...The problem this creates is not confined to the USSR...
...They concluded, too, that his inconsistency, rather than hiding a sinister cunning, reflected timidity...
...One can understand, too, why it pursues a flexible ideological policy—with the Eurocom-munists in Western Europe, the do-it-yourself Marxist-Leninists in Africa, the various nationalist and revolutionary movements throughout the Third World, and the motley assembly of traditional and conservative regimes sprinkled around the rest of the globe...
...The gravity of the situation and the apprehensions of the Soviet leadership were sharply spelled out in Brezhnev's TV statement justifying the invasion: "The unceasing armed intervention, the well advanced plot by external forces of reaction created a real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on the country's southern border...
...The spread of the Moslem rebellion and the leadership's ineptitude exacerbated intra-party conflicts, resulting in the defeat of the group headed by the man most subservient to the USSR—Babrak Karmal, who was exiled into the diplomatic service and went to Eastern Europe...
...That, incidentally, accounts for the bizarre charges that Amin was a CIA agent and a henchman of the United States...
...the unprovoked attack upon Poland and its dismemberment...
...6. A Security Council resolution condemning the Soviet action, and vetoed by the USSR...
...4. The lopsided adoption of a General Assembly Resolution that "deplored" the Soviet drive...
...while Brezhnev anticipated the demise of salt II, he no doubt thought detente could be preserved on a new foundation...
...To be sure, given the topography of Afghanistan and character of the Afghan mountaineers, sporadic minor raids will continue for some time, but they will constitute no threat to the Soviet presence...
...No large bodies of water separate the USSR from the region's natural resources, and the threatened countries are not only small but subject to the kind of internal upheaval that produces invitations to Moscow...
...But psychological impacts are like secrets...
...Soviet initiative in virtually all parts of the arc has been distinguished for its absence...
...But at that stage the importance of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union was marginal, and the Soviet investment there was correspondingly modest...
...Moscow responded gingerly at first, in conformity with its established style, then with greater enthusiasm, but not necessarily deep commitment...
...In China Defense Secretary Brown, during his noncommittal statements about U.S.Chinese cooperation, declared several times that the U.S...
...With each step we take in our growing relationship with China, it leads to the expectation of another step...
...Moscow could decide to treat the Afghan operation as an individual event and confine itself to destroying the rebel movement and consolidating its hold...
...Overall, it can be assumed that in preparing their intervention the Soviet leaders drew up a cost/benefit sheet that had them expecting the following: 1. The end of salt II, but not detente...
...Still, Iran at least was deemed susceptible to Soviet maneuvering...
...2. The widespread assurance from other powers that U.S...
...The success of Brown's mission "should not be measured by any concrete benefits or agreements," an aide was quoted as saying, it should be judged by its psychological impact...
...The miscalculation here was Brezhnev's, of course, but his open threat of counterreprisals must be taken seriously and highlights a basic weakness of post hoc measures to influence future behavior...
...In clearly delineating the costs of inaction, Brezhnev prudently refrained from trumpeting the gains expected from the action...
...What is more, the opportunities that have been inadvertently and fortuitously created may induce the Soviet Union to adopt such a design so that it can take systematic advantage of the current chaotic-situation...
...This would be particularly true of countries like Pakistan and China, who could be dangerously exposed to military attack if their support of the Afghan rebels inconveniences the Soviet Union...
...This should not be confused with the crude ideological approach of earlier years that sought to stimulate world revolution to achieve world Communism...
...The anti-American position of both countries was considered transitory...
...As Soviet commentators concede, almost immediately the Taraki regime was beset by an uprising among Moslem tribesmen and factional division...
...Washington and Moscow, for example, had warned each other of the serious consequences that would flow from intervention in Afghanistan (and the United States had clear evidence of an unusual military build-up on the Soviet-Afghan border well before the actual invasion took place...
...Some limited measures designed to aid the Moslem rebels in cooperation with Pakistan and China...
...A move into Iran unopposed militarily by the United States would finally make the Soviet Union the paramount power in the international system...
...In the absence of compelling circumstances, a poverty-stricken country devoid of natural resources, struggling to move into the 14th century, was hardly a suitable candidate for absorption into the Soviet sphere...
...It recognized that Qum saw the United States as its principal enemy, with the Soviet Union viewed as a lesser Satan...
...The United States finds it so cumbersome to react militarily even when treaty commitments are involved, they reason, that it will hardly come to the defense of countries with whom it does not have treaties or that it is at odds with...
...The Kremlin confronted a difficult dilemma...
...response concerning future Soviet military action, the Soviet success in Afghanistan will create a new dynamic with its own momentum that will present the Soviet leadership with irresistible temptations...
...carrier task forces moving from point A to point B, or spinning around in the Indian Ocean...
...Once the Shah was ousted from Iran and the fundamentalist Moslem regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was installed in power, the significance of Afghanistan was radically enhanced...
...Last March 23, in an official note to the Kremlin, the Carter Administration cautioned that it would "regard external involvement in Afghanistan's internal problems as a serious matter with a potential for heightening tensions and destabilizing the situation in the entire region...
...had no intention of supplying the Chinese with military equipment because this might render a resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue more difficult...
...Yet it is merely because of the Soviet presence throughout this area that the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the anxiety of Saudi Arabia and the nervousness of Turkey all misleadingly serve to reinforce the notion of Soviet political and diplomatic engineering...
...Before turning to the larger prizes the Soviet Union may reach for in the wake of its Afghan gamble, a number of interrelated factors need to be delineated...
...8. Minor economic, cultural and educational reprisals by the United States...
...Besides being able to satisfy its own and its satellite's energy needs, it would control the oil spigot that Japan, Western Europe and a large part of the Third World depend on...
...To have acted otherwise would have meant to watch passively the origination on our southern border of a seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state...
...Yet from the Kremlin's standpoint they were reactionary, clerical, anti-Communist, and potentially anti-Soviet...
...Seemingly oblivious of any relevant connection, he soon complained that Brezhnev had lied to him on, the Hot Line, but at the same time stressed that he favored the eventual ratification of salt II...
...Actually, many milestones in Soviet foreign policy have been without precedent: the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939...
...Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance engaged in a similarly counterproductive exercise at home...
...So while such sanctions will surely inconvenience the Soviet Union, the short and long range complications for the U.S...
...Even the Administration realizes this, and it has sought a remedy by resorting to military symbolism or what might be called the invocation of pseudo-force: Marines storming the beaches...
...By contrast, the Kremlin considers itself quite adept at international mabalance of power is more or less stable and heightening tensions would not produce a shift in Moscow's favor...
...could be equally damaging...
...To them it means, quite literally, the relaxation of tensions during periods when the or correlation of forces, going from parity to Soviet superiority, with detente preserved merely by moving the fulcrum...
...Not everything worked out quite as planned, leaving Moscow to be surprised by: 1. The strong U.S...
...Although the United States has not threatened the use of military force, and this is clearly welcomed in Moscow, Brezhnev nonetheless probably feels that he was misled by Carter...
...Moscow replied through Pravda that dire consequences would ensue if the Moslem rebels continued to receive outside support...
...The prospect of a solid bloc of Islamic republics on the periphery of Soviet Central Asia was not exactly congenial to the Soviet Union, and the defeat of the PDPA would inevitably produce another Islamic state that would associate itself in some fashion with Iran and Pakistan...
...As that conflict wore on without showing any sign of resolution, the likelihood of Iran functioning in concert with the U.S...
...The Soviet leaders fully expect detente to survive not only the Afghan action but additional Soviet moves in the Middle East and elsewhere...
...But it is by no means certain that the Soviet leaders will choose this course...
...the effect is cumulative...
...The Soviet leadership apparently expected an Amin defection or overthrow, and timely intervention was believed necessary to prevent either development...
...economic reprisals...
...If the Soviet takeover now of a nonaligned Third World country has come as something of a surprise, it is because analysts are more comfortable basing their projections on previous patterns than predicting possible departures from them...
...The President himself, despite his remarkably naive admission after the invasion that his "opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically," reaffirmed his faith in detente...
...9. Vague threats to increase U.S...
...lead if they fear being left high and dry when Washington decides to resume normal relations with Moscow...
...Whether or not the Soviet Union will realize its ambition will depend in large measure on how determined (he United States is to prevent the expansion of Soviet power...
...Revolution and Communism will be supported and promoted only in areas where they are supportable and promotable...
...Brezhnev undoubtedly was relying upon the self-interest of the farmers and grain dealers to reinforce the promise during a Presidential election year...
...It has never accepted the parity formula as a normative goal to be sought by both sides, or as a permanent equation supporting detente...
...A third aspect of economic reprisals, as Brezhnev has reminded us, is counter-reprisals...
...The salt II treaty is considered an entirely separate matter by Moscow —of much lower priority than the exploitation of opportunities that could achieve substantive Soviet objectives, or the prevention of actions that could block or diminish them...
...Fourth, the ability to wage a protracted guerrilla war in Afghanistan from Pakistan depends not merely on the U.S...
...Does the sum of these individual factors add up to Afghanistan serving as a springboard for further Soviet action...
...It should be remembered that the American hostages had not yet been seized in Teheran, and Moscow was convinced that Washington would welcome an Iranian-Pakistani invitation to re-establish a military presence in the two countries...
...Detente, they remember, was inaugurated after the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 on the basis of a balance that clearly acknowledged the strategic superiority of the United States...
...Other high voiees in the Administration have already indicated a preoccupation with business as usual...
...Even without a move into Iran, the process set in motion in Afghanistan may earn the Soviet Union de facto if not de jure recognition as the paramount power in the world...
...Brezhnev's observation in his January 12 TV statement that "it was no simple decision for us to send military contingents to Afghanistan," strongly suggests that a sharp factional discussion may have preceded the decision...
...failure to act promptly, and Washington's repeated rhetorical renunciation of the use of force to protect its interests, further lowered the risk/cost threshold, making the venture quite attractive...
...Perhaps what has been least appreciated amid the search for patterns is the powerful Soviet ambition to supplant the United States as the paramount international power—to become not the hegemon of the globe but, following in the footsteps of the United States, its principal manager and regulator...
...If all that were not enough, the disintegration of the PDPA regime, now under the intractable Hafizullah Amin, started to take place at an opportune moment...
...Moscow is much more likely to go after the prize of the Middle East, Iran...
...As White House National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has pointed out, there is an "arc of crisis" stretching along the western edge of the Indian Ocean from Mozambique to Pakistan...
...the attempt to establish missile bases in Cuba...
...The Middle East is adjacent to Soviet borders and close to the centers of Soviet power and lines of communication...
...reaction to a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan...
...It has never agreed to a freeze of the balance at a particular point, nor has it ever acepted the notion that detente means freezing the political, military or ideological status quo...
...Finally, in the absence of a strong U.S...
...In the absence of clarifying explanations or clearcut specifications, the Kremlin, on the basis of past U.S...
...The answer is yes...
...More concretely, unlike the mild verbal backing Iran gave the Moslem rebels, Pakistan served as a sanctuary and base of operations...
...Should none happen to arrive, Moscow under certain conditions might invite itself, citing cause majeure...
...They were confident the pattern could be counted on in the case of Afghanistan: The President would express indignation at the Soviet invasion, allow a decent interval of time for the dust to settle, and re-establish normal business relations with Moscow...
...The unexpected adverse reactions, when combined with real expenditures in terms of human and physical resources, make the price of the Soviet military undertaking quite high...
...For another clear signal the President had sent out was that food and trade would not be employed as instruments of reprisal...
...4. Chinese condemnation...
...In other words, the time came when we could not but respond to the request of the government of friendly Afghanistan...
...the Soviet invasion of Hungary...
...That this did not prove to be the case obviously upset the Soviet leader...
...They merely had to hold out long enough, the Soviet leaders discovered, and Carter would come around...
...Amin's unpopular rule had created rifts in the Afghan leadership and contributed to the growth of the rebel movement...
...He also said the Soviet invasion "required a very strong and very resolute response," and the punitive measures will remain in effect "as long as necessary, and I believe it would be a protracted period...
...After all, the President had reassured American farmers he would never use food as a diplomatic weapon, and that has generally been the case with the U.S...
...if sufficiently severe, they could nullify whatever future deterrent effect the original reprisals were intended to have...
...President Carter has gone so far as to call it the most serious threat to world peace since World War II...
...The entire psychological and geographical balance of power would shift toward the Kremlin...
...I think not...
...But the unprecedented is not necessarily unpredictable...
...A premature or ill-timed military move into Afghanistan might be sufficient to impel Khomeini toward the United States and open up the possibility of a U.S.-supported guerrilla movement operating out of Iran and Pakistan against Soviet troops...
...Instead of opposing the Khomeini regime, Moscow was encouraging and largely ignored the Ayatollah's sporadic anti-Soviet statements...
...Second, the Soviet leaders are convinced the U.S...
...Some think the place will be Pakistan, but that is improbable as long as Pakistan does not become an anti-Soviet guerrilla base...
...7. Submission of the same resolution to the General Assembly, prolonged debate, but failure to pass by the necessary two-thirds majority...
...The real worry was that the reactionary, fundamentalist Islamic leaders would eventually all mend their fences with Washington and the Soviet Union would face a solid phalanx of theologically based, anti-Communist countries linked to the United States...
...Moscow's commitment to detente and salt II was more important than its concern about Kabul...
...Third, since the Carter Administration, for whatever reason, appears in any case to have decided not to be provoked into using military force, the Soviet leaders may feel they have at least a year to exploit situations that in the past would have been, and could again become, too risky to pursue...
...Given the course events in Afghanistan were taking and the Soviet calculation of losses, the Kremlin leadership would probably have gone in there whether salt II was on the verge of ratification or already had been ratified...
...Economic sanctions in particular usually cut in both directions, and it is never clear in advance whether the self-inflicted wounds will be worse than those inflicted upon the transgressor...
...willingness to supply its local surrogates with logistical aid and equipment, but also on its readiness to defend Pakistan should the Russians come in hot pursuit—and Washington does not seem ready...
...Almost immediately, however, he eviscerated his remarks by speculating that "it was possible that the Soviet Union might take actions that would lead to an early resumption of normal relations between Washington and Moscow...
...Indeed, both countries have tended to develop mind-sets that interfere with the reception of even clear signals...
...Once the Kremlin decided he was capable of going over to the United States, whether or not he had actually done so was irrelevant...
...Entire formations of the Afghan Army were deserting to avoid defeat at the hands of the rebels or strangulation by Moscow...
...Soviet troops would not be withdrawn completely for a long time, if ever, and their total withdrawal would not be subject to negotiation, the overwhelming General Assembly resolution calling for the departure of all foreign troops from Afghanistan notwithstanding...
...withdrawal from the Olympic Games was possible...
...As the paramount global power, the Soviet Union would make appropriate adjustments to both the developed capitalist world and the underdeveloped Third World—and although the Kremlin would coordinate and manage all three worlds, it would pursue separate policies with respect to each...
...And, in fact, alongside Carter's strong reactions (still to be implemented, for the most part) the Soviet leaders have received confusing signals from the Administration...
...But there is no evidence at present that Brezhnev was overruled, as some news reports have speculated...
...Perhaps of equal significance, America's allies and client states, as well as nations in the Third World and elsewhere, may hesitate to follow, much less move ahead of, the U.S...
...the forcible establishment of Communist regimes in territories outside the boundaries of the former Russian Empire...
...For some time now, Soviet behavior in the Third World, Africa and the Middle East has been debated within the context of whether the Soviet Union is executing a "grand design" or responding to "targets of opportunity...
...The timing will probably be determined almost entirely by the pace of events in the region itself...
...Its quarrel with the United States was not so intense, and the PDPA regime was perceived by Islamabad as the greater threat...
...And since no one expects the sanctions to alter Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, they are in fact directed at some future unspecified Soviet action without our being able to know if they will prove appropriate...
...In the American view these are inextricably linked, and it was believed that V'KRNON V. A-SPATI'RIAN IS tvail Pllgll Professor of Political Science at Peniml-vania Stute and director <»/ its Slavic and Soviet Lunxttave and Area Center...
...military capabilities, plus some military posturing...
...Should it opt for this short-range approach, though, the Kremlin would not be averse to negotiating the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops over a specified period to encourage those in the United States who wish a quick return to business as usual with the Soviet Union...
...3. U.S...
...The revolutions in Mozambique, Ethiopia, North Yemen, and Afghanistan were the result of indigenous activity to which the Soviet Union responded, usually following an invitation either from a new regime or one of the factions in an internal civil struggle...
...against a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only vanished, but Iran's increasing isolation rendered it more vulnerable to Soviet power as well...
...conspicuous searches for new naval facilities in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions...
...Complicating the situation is the return to power in India of Indira Gandhi, who has reached new heights of ambiguity in her comments about the Soviet invasion and clearly would be angered by any U.S...
...Moscow appreciated this primitive application of the lesser evil, or primary/ secondary enemy approach that it has always practiced with consummate skill...
...The Soviet move in Afghanistan must be linked with earlier and continuing Soviet/Cuban moves in Africa...
...That could be managed...
...Then they reached the conclusion that his rhetoric was rarely a reliable indicator of his behavior, that it concealed a personal aversion to confrontation and conflict...
...Pakistan posed a different problem...
...The United States, preoccupied with the trials and tribulations of being at the apex of the international system, has been content with seeing the world in terms of the old parity formula, which at best recognizes an informal condominium of the two global powers...
...Nevertheless, Washington miscalculated the Soviet determination to prevent the overthrow of its shaky client regime, and Moscow miscalculated the character of the U.S...
...It is fully in conformity, too, with persistently stated Soviet ideological and political goals—i.e., assisting movements of national liberation and pro-Soviet regimes, and expanding Soviet power and influence...
...Since military force is the ultimate reprisal, its renunciation by the United States in advance allows other states to estimate the possible costs and risks of their policies with less apprehension and doubt...
...Initially, they were baffled by his quixotic goals, moralistic pronouncements, unconventional political style and, above all, by his enigmatic inconsistency, which they viewed as duplicity...
...SUPERPOWER MANEUVERS—1 Moscow's Afghan Cj3lTlblC BY VERNON V ASPATURIAN The invasion of Afghanistan once again demonstrates that the Soviet Union's past behavior is not always a reliable guide to its future actions...
...The Carter Adrninistration conducts altogether too much of its policy brainstorming in full public view...
...A variety of scenarios are possible, including an indigenous Left-wing coup that invites the Soviet Union to provide military support, or one orchestrated by Moscow for the same purpose...
...Should they perceive still bigger fish to catch in the region, they may decide instead to accept prolonged and even greater verbal abuse in the pursuit of those opportunities...
...As for President Carter's reluctance to use force either as a deterrent or a reprisal, the Soviet leaders apparently do not believe it stems from sincere moral repugnance (the President's widely-propagated self-perception), or lack of courage (the Ayatollah Khomeini's apparent view) or limited capabilities (the opposite being obvious...
...In a lengthy statement delivered in his name on Soviet television the evening of January 12, he warned that "the unilateral measures taken by the United States are tantamount to serious miscalculations in politics," and "like a boomerang, they will hit back at their initiators, if not today, then tomorrow...
...The costs of such actions must be calculated against those of inaction, as well as the costs imposed upon third parties, and these are considerable...
...In situation after situation, the President would express moral or political outrage, resort to exaggeration, issue vaguely ominous threats, but ultimately adjust to what he had defined as intolerable...
...To be sure, differences of opinion appear to have arisen within the Soviet leadership about the costs and benefits of action or inaction...
...He goes on to say that "the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet Government acted in full awareness of their responsibility and took into account the entire total sum of circumstances...
...3. The degree and extent of condemnation by Third World and non-aligned countries...
...The Administration's constant reiteration of this point in crisis after crisis has frequently assumed a vehemence usually reserved for threats, and there was a time when puzzled Kremlin leaders treated these statements as a "reverse bluff—as pious intonations of self-virtue not to be taken seriously...
...will make no military response to their activities in Russia's rim lands and in Afro-Asia...
Vol. 63 • January 1980 • No. 2
