Washington's China Card

...In the south, unified Vietnam constantly shows its teeth...

...An arrangement with the Chinese may be a very useful addition to this effort, but it cannot be a substitute...

...At the same time it must be wise and modest, not expecting to manipulate Moscow and Peking in a kind of American-controlled poker game...

...These illusions made the Cold War awakening particularly shocking to U.S...

...Under the best possible circumstances, China and Russia may decide one day that while a return to the past's close association is impossible, the current hostility is inadvisable...

...One of the most delicate problems Washington faces in its relations with Peking is how to handle the Chinese taste for educational activities—specifically their growing temptation to teach the Vietnamese another lesson...

...Helping the People's Republic modernize its Army is priority Number One...

...Its growing international assertiveness and insensitivity to both American and Chinese concerns pushed Washington and Peking into their current semi-alliance...

...China, on the other hand, has tended during recent years either to support American positions or to avoid openly challenging them...

...It may well be tempting to use the China connection as a kind of quick fix for dealing with the Soviet global offensive...

...In addition, it is important to recognize that the advances of the Soviet Union and its clients cannot be arrested exclusively, or even primarily, through the relatively weak leverages available in the sphere of bilateral relations...

...It is apparently prepared to encourage Western European arms sales to China, though, and seems positively disposed to U.S...

...In short, the Chinese themselves prefer to walk in the same direction as the United States but on a separate path...

...The Kremlin is in an ugly mood these days, trying to demonstrate to both the U.S...

...Should Peking's lesson to Vietnam cause Soviet retaliation, the United States undoubtedly would be sympathetic to and supportive of China—short of an American military response to counter a Soviet attack...

...The fundamental visions of the Chinese and Dimitri K. Simes is the director of Soviet Studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Affairs in Washington, D. C. American leaderships are quite different...

...Increasing Moscow's insecurities may have some costs and risks, yet a far greater danger today, as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan indicates, is Moscow's contempt for the willingness of its rivals to stand up to Soviet advances...

...Similarly, where strengthening the Soviet Union would hardly contribute to the United States' sense of security, the opposite is true in the Chinese case...

...Consequently, there are no major contradictions between the short-term interests of Washington and Peking, and Secretary Brown was in fact quite correct in describing them as parallel...

...SUPERPOWER MANEUVERS—2 Washington's China Card toim™k simes The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not only destroyed the bridges of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, at least temporarily, it has probably also put an end to Washington's policy of treating Moscow and Peking evenhandedly, for a long time to come...

...standpoint, so long as Communist leaders, following in Hitler's and Stalin's footsteps, did not choose to forget their differences and focus on a crusade against the West...

...China is probably correct in feeling that Hanoi's disregard of the United Nations and of Peking's regional interests should not go unpunished...

...The Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea continues and is expanding...

...disassociation from China on this sensitive issue...

...Succession in both countries could create new opportunities and incentives for a limited reconciliation...

...tilt toward the People's Republic...

...Nor is there any substitute for American determination to stand up and defend its basic international positions and values...

...Naturally, confrontation on the ground has an inherent escalation and miscalculation potential...

...Now there appears to be little choice but to put more emphasis on an effective opposition to Moscow's boldness...

...The Carter Administration is still reluctant to allow direct sales of American weapons to Peking...

...Mobilizing international opinion, while useful, is not a panacea either...

...But Soviet complaints should not be allowed to have a veto power over U.S...

...What may project the image of paranoia is Moscow's propaganda, full of dire warnings about the great threat to peace China allegedly represents...

...In the north, they are confronted by superior Soviet forces stationed along on the Sino-Soviet border and, since the mid-'60s, in Outer Mongolia, for all practical purposes merely another Soviet republic...

...This brings us to a number of specific areas where the United States can and should cooperate with China...

...Under these circumstances, continuing a policy of even-handedness would be equivalent to treating adversaries no differently than allies of convenience...

...In the 1970s the United States, traumatized by the Vietnam War and frustrated by a decline in its power, constantly attempted to find simple and cheap ways of protecting American interests in a changing world...

...On the one hand, there is a danger in offering the People's Republic any encouragement to punish arrogant Hanoi...

...If anything, the Chinese have even more serious cause for concern...

...public opinion, with the result that excessive friendship and trust were quickly replaced by an almost equally excessive hatred and fear of the Russian bear...

...to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry...

...In this sense, the Chinese resolve to restrain Hanoi is an important service to the West...

...During World War II, even Stalin, a bloody despot, was usually portrayed in this country as toughminded yet fair and wise "Uncle Joe...

...Furthermore, available evidence indicates that only about 10 per cent of the overall Soviet defense effort is connected with China...

...It needs to be handled with great care...

...But quick fixes do not work...

...Therefore, it would not hurt to make the Kremlin feel a little more insecure...

...That the Kremlin is unhappy about this is understandable...

...unilateral effort to rebuild its military arsenal and redress trends in the arms competition favorable to the USSR...

...But parallel does not mean identical, especially in the long run...

...Both superpowers, for instance, share a common interest in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons...

...What the Chinese seek is greater American vigor in combatting Soviet international expansionism and Western aid, notably in the military area...

...Moreover, Peking is not offering it to the U.S...

...It is remarkable how little the Kremlin gerontocracy has been deterred in its international exploits by a fear of encouraging closer ties between Washington and Peking...

...There is no substitute for a U.S...

...and China that it will not be pushed around...

...In this context it is crucial to remember that the Soviet Union is not the only country worried about encirclement...

...So are the basic values of the two societies...

...policy makers would be compelled to question whether maintaining essentially the same stance toward Russia and China made sense...

...This would not necessarily be a bad development from the U.S...

...Just consider how the United States would feel if Mexico had a population of 1 billion, accused the U.S...

...To the west, a puppet Soviet regime has been installed in neighboring Afghanistan...

...of being the main threat to peace, increasingly allied itself with the Soviet Union, and made territorial demands on Washington...

...And it would be irresponsible of Washington to give Peking a false sense of security as long as it is unprepared to assure assistance against a possible military move by the Kremlin...

...coupled with the smashing victory in India of Indira Gandhi, an old China opponent, the Kabul takeover has to alarm Peking...

...Their friendship cannot be taken for granted if Washington does not follow up its loud condemnation of Soviet aggressiveness with specific deeds...

...Finally, to the east, the Soviet Pacific fleet is being built up continually and has become increasingly bold about making its presence felt...

...For a number of years the United States preferred to try unilateral restraint, despite the Angolas, African Horns, and so on...

...At this stage, the Carter Administration wants Peking to be sufficiently powerful to serve as an effective counterbalance to Soviet adventurism in the Far East-Southeast Asian region...

...And since China has its hands full with the Russians and their Vietnamese clients, it seems to lack the ambition and ability to play for the role of a global power...

...Some form of rapprochement could develop, particularly when new leaders come to power in Moscow and the last of the Chinese old guard leave the scene...

...The lessons of history and common sense require avoiding a repetition of such wide swings in American attitudes toward China...

...The self-serving nature of these prophecies is all too obvious...

...If the United States wants to deal effectively with Soviet global assert-iveness, it has to increase the costs and risks for Moscow on the ground...

...American diplomacy has traditionally had difficulty distinguishing between true friends and allies of convenience...

...Peking's leaders are not philanthropists...

...high technology transfers to the Chinese, including those suitable for both civilian and military uses...

...Of course, any American-Chinese accommodation, no matter how cautious, is going to be denounced as threatening and provocative by Moscow...

...Thus, although Peking is continuously lecturing the United States about the need to stand up to the Soviet challenge, it would be counterproductive from the American standpoint to become so good a pupil as to forego opportunities for cooperation with the USSR—simultaneously our chief rival in geopolitical maneuvering for influence and resources, and our inevitable partner in efforts to prevent the international process from going totally out of control...

...A full-scale alliance between the United States and China, in other words, would serve little useful purpose...

...But to avoid such a development, too, the United States must be strong enough not to look like an easy target...

...Nor would either benefit if Third World nations were successful in exploiting the superpower rivalry for their own advantage...

...diplomacy...

...On the other hand, there is reason to question the wisdom of too firm a U.S...

...Yet in the final analysis Moscow has no one except itself to blame for the closer relationship between its two principal rivals...

...As for those who caution that Moscow is paranoid about China and may easily overreact in despair, they are contradicted by actual Soviet policies of the last decade...

...The Soviets reacted to the first Chinese incursion in Vietnam with little more than a propaganda offensive, but it is hard to be sure of what they would do the second time...

...The Kremlin too frequently disregards basic American interests and sensitivities not to expect the U.S...

...The unprecedented visit of Defense Secretary Harold Brown to China earlier this month was a symbolic manifestation of the U.S...

...The question that must be faced at this time, though, is whether it would be more dangerous to overprovoke the Kremlin or to allow it to believe that growing reliance on brute force does work...

...On the contrary, a refusal by the United States to take the necessary steps to put its security house in order could seriously effect the Chinese readiness to invest in the American connection...

...It was probably inevitable, however, that at a certain point U.S...

...After all, the USSR has been perceived more and more as a serious threat to American global interests...

...The China card is a powerful and potentially explosive weapon...