Dealing with South Korea's New Dictatorship
OLSEN, EDWARD A.
CONFUCIUS AND THE GENERALS Dealing with South Korea's New Dictatorship byedwrda.olsen Before the South Korean people had fully assimilated last year's sudden assassination of President Park Chung...
...Arguably South Korea's most popular political leader (he received 45 per cent of the vote running against Park in the 1971 Presidential election), Kim was brought upon patently false charges of fomenting the May rebellion in Kwangju against Chun's oppression and of being a communist...
...A seriesof "purification" campaigns enabled Chun and his followers not only to remove many corrupt bureaucrats, for example, but also to swiftly neutralize numerous establishment political figures associated with the Park regime...
...In the light of the American interest in Japan and China, and in preventing a regional explosion that could only benefit the Soviet Union, the Korean question must be placed high on our foreign policy agenda while there is still time...
...On the other hand, it would probably be constructive for Washington and Tokyo to let both Seoul and Pyongyang know that North Korean restraint would be viewed very favorably, and even rewarded with improved ties...
...It used two pretexts to solidify its political power: anti-corruption and anti-Communism...
...It is, after all, because South Korea does not exist in a vacuum that we care about how it manages its affairs...
...But Park and his Yushin system at least paid pro-forma attention to traditional Confucian modes...
...Evolutionary change from the top is not likely either, Chun's new Constitution and promises of a general election in 1981 notwithstanding...
...They might well justify their actions by pointing to Chun's marginal legitimacy and his illegal seizure of power...
...South Korea's most sensitive pressure point is to be found in the economic sphere...
...The trial and subsequent death sentence meted out to the country's leading democrat, Kim Dae Jung, was the most notorious example of the junta's repression...
...It would probably spur bilateral U.S.-ROK ties, while failing to achieve its objective...
...And the effect of their rigid moralism could be the very economic and social chaos they claim to be heading off...
...At the minimum, they could be used to justify the extreme hardline positions taken by Chun...
...It is simply to say that there are other ways of exerting leverage on the new regime that might curb its excessive authoritarianism without at the same time creating an anti-American backlash...
...The fact that it failed to seize the opportunity provided by the turmoil following Park's assassination should not deceive anyone...
...In short, threats to abandon the South could be misread in Pyongyang and trigger a drive for unification by military means...
...and Japan in a fairly subtle campaign to influence the course of the new regime...
...North Korea is on the alert for any opening in the South...
...Chun's move was merely the first step in a carefully planned power grab that culminated in August of thisyear with his "election" as President of the Republic...
...Indeed, considerable dissatisfaction with Chun's exercise of dictatorial powers is believed to exist among the younger officers (majors and colonels...
...A substantial number —possibly a majority—of the ROK officers are thoroughly versed in American style civilian-military relations as a result of training in the United States and associations with Americans...
...Chun and his supports are true believers, combining a kind of moral rearmament approach with nationalist and ethnic pride and a profound distrust of Western individualism...
...The principal targets of the "anti-Communism" purges were the liberal political dissidents and human rights activists who had begun to mount an effective campaign for change during Park's last years...
...Pyongyang was simply caught off guard last October...
...Freedom has connoted a sense of licentiousness and release from socially meaningful constraints...
...Contrary to popular perception, not all South Korean military leaders are lock-step Right-wingers...
...Even the provision in the Constitution restricting the Presidency to one seven-year term is seen as a barrier that can easily be breached...
...That Chun recognizes it is important for his own well being not to antagonize this group is clear from his naming experienced economic hands to key Cabinet positions...
...All he was actually guilty of was legitimate political activities that the new regime had pledged itself to allow...
...Tempting the North and teasing the South in this manner could induce moderation in each of the Korean states...
...Rather, the expectation is that Chun will use his new powers to continue intimidating potential political rivals...
...can be enlisted by the U.S...
...Nor does there appear to be much hope of softening the situation through popular pressures...
...The Chun government seems incapable of doing this, despite the surface cosmetics being applied to quiet foreign criticism...
...And North Korea still sits poised for attack, ready to take advantage of Seoul's disarray...
...On December 12,1979, a 49-year-old Major General, Chun Doo Hwan, led an intra-militarycoup that ousted the then martial law administrator, General Chung Sung Hwa...
...In fact, given the commitment of mainstream South Korean conservatives to a stratified Confucian society, and the budding anti-Americanism of Chun's Yushin ideologues, any such effort is almost certain to be counterproductive...
...Liberty in Korea has been considered part of some larger virtue, such as wisdom and propriety...
...Rumors in Seoul already suggest that Chun is fearful of precisely such a move...
...The Park regime certainly was no paradigm in this regard...
...One other Confucian trait of great importance is the preservation of group order by consensus...
...democracy...
...position throughout the Far East...
...That brings us to the question of how Washington should respond to the events in Seoul, which could prove extremely damaging to the U.S...
...But to have any chance for success, the demands of the business class for stability will have to be backed by foreign pressures...
...Some of the steps taken by Chun have made the Park era seem like the "good old days," blunting the possibility of a democratic upsurge...
...Meanwhile, the best South Korea's troubled allies can hope for is that the conservative business-bureaucratic establishment, much buffeted during the last year, will reassert itself and force some measure of return to the pragmatism that characterized the Park regime...
...cans, given what they see as the present irresolute nature of U.S...
...In addition, the breakdown in Soviet-American detente removes a vital restriction on Korean adventurism...
...policy makers with Iran and Afghanistan has tended to obscure the fact that the tinder box of East Asia is already smoldering, and constitutes one of our most nettlesome foreign policy problems...
...Initially, reaction to the system was marred by suspicion of Park's transparent political motives...
...In time, though, it caught on among many sectors of the society, especially the military...
...If the United States and Japan instituted measures that threaten to undermine its economic well being, the combined forces within the business establishment that might be dubbed "Korea Inc...
...CONFUCIUS AND THE GENERALS Dealing with South Korea's New Dictatorship byedwrda.olsen Before the South Korean people had fully assimilated last year's sudden assassination of President Park Chung Hee, they were confronted with a new set of traumatic political events...
...But it would be imprudent for Washington to attempt to compel the Chun regime to adopt standards that would go down well with the American public...
...Circumstances today are very different...
...When they work properly, the vertical relationships existing within South Korea's societal hierarchy are a two-way street...
...Rulers do not merely give orders, they are sensitive as well to the socially proper desires of the people...
...Editorial writers and human rights activists have been asking why we should continue propping up South Korea, and have raised the possibility of unilateral intervention to bring about change there...
...Chun and his followers have been widely cast simply as Park disciples, but in many ways they are emerging as "more Catholic than the Pope"—as fervent ideologues who consider the most puritanical strains of the Yushin spirit a proper guide for the day-to-day running of the country...
...This is not to suggest that Washington must reconcile itself to standing idly by as Seoul disintegrates into chaos or the Koreans inure themselves to another period of dictatorship...
...Ironically, one source of democratic ferment may be the military...
...His move to avoid a situation where the inexperienced generals might commit a blunder in trying to cope with complex economic matters is also an indication of how Korea Inc...
...Besides Chun, who resigned from the Army because South Korea's Constitution bars military men from the Presidency, the present ruling group consists of Generals Yi Hee Song, Ro Tae Wu, Chung Ho Yong, and Kim Bok Dong...
...Thus the Koreans, after a year of turbulent political upheavals and agitation, are back at square one—ruled by a Parkist military dictatorship without Park...
...In contrast, regional security requirements make threats to withdraw American troops less than fully credible...
...The preoccupation of U.S...
...Perhaps more important, the generals may ultimately find it difficult to accommodate the network of financial and personal relationships that undergird the South Korean corporate state...
...By that time all serious political opposition had either been silenced or eliminated...
...His Yushin (revitalizing) system, designed to reinculcate traditional Confucian values throughout the Republic of Korea, remains a dominant force, too...
...And they have nothing but scorn for Koreans who look to foreigners for support on human rights issues...
...Since Washington's criticism of the new regime weighs heavily with this group, it is conceivable that some of them who have access to troops and weapons might attempt a counter-coup to restore democracy...
...Historically, Confucianism has created a climate conducive to authoritarianism in Korean political life...
...despite its frequent calls for Park's overthrow, the Communist regime did not believe it would happen so soon...
...Few observers believe these measures will actually open up the political process again...
...No doubt it is in America's interest to encourage an eventual restoration of some variant of democracy in South Korea...
...For all the enemies Park made during 18 years of repressive rule, he was pragmatic enough to bend to domestic political and economic pressures if necessary...
...would surely hold Chun accountable...
...In particular, they have little use for the presumed moral superiority of AmeriEdward A. Olsen , a former State Department Asia specialist, leaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey...
...Moreover, any agitation would be forcefully countered by the Chun government on the grounds that it was an open invitation to North Korean aggression, and in the present circumstances such an assessment would, sadly, be warranted...
...The regime's ideology will never win over the militant liberal dissidents...
Vol. 63 • October 1980 • No. 19
