Correspondents' Correspondence Wooing the PLO

...Wooing the PLO Tel avrvy ad somebody told Israelis only a few weeks ago that the United States would press for a change in UN Security Council Resolution 242, and Egypt's President Anwar Sadat would kill the idea, he would have been considered a little dotty at best "ret that, of course, is exactly what happened in the second half of August when Ambassador Robert Strauss, President Carter's special envoy, tried unsuccessfully to convince Israel to agree to a new "follow-up" resolution and was told by the Egyptian President, too, that it would be risky to tamper with 242 Adopted after the Six Day War, the resolution calls for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, and for recognition of its right to live within safe boundaries It is the only document relating to the Middle East accepted by both Washington and Moscow as well as by Israel and its neighbors It is not accepted, however, by the PLO, ostensibly because it speaks of the need for a solution of the Palestine "refugee problem," rather than the Palestinians' rights to an independent state As part of the effort to reassure Israel and induce it to make its first withdrawals from Egypt after the 1973 war, the Umted States undertook in writing not to permit any change of 242, and promised not to enter into any negotiations with the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist The resolution is also the cornerstone of the Camp David accords, and thus of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and of the framework agreement under which the talks about autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza are now being conducted between the two countries Nevertheless, instead of persuading Saudi Arabia and other "moderate" Arab countries to support the peace agreement and urge the Palestinians to join the autonomy talks, the U S early this summer capitulated to Saudi demands that the PLO be wooed by changing Resolution 242 and by opening up direct Amencan-PLO contacts After some initial denials, Washington even acknowledged that it was discussing "additions" to 242, but solemnly insisted that it would not talk to the PLO Israel saw in this a clear violation of the specific American undertaking, and confirmation of its fears that Washington was further trying to back out of the 1974 commitment on the PLO As often before, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan was the man who stated in public what several of his colleagues were saying in private The Carter Administration, eager to increase the flow of Saudi oil, was trying to squeeze concessions out of Israel toward the PLO because Riyadh wanted quick "movement" on the Palestine issue Into this atmosphere of suspicion broke the Andrew Young affair It is ironic that honest friends of the Ambassador have joined pro-Arab circles in presenting his resignation as a consequence of Israeli-Jewish attacks on him Actually, what made the Israelis so angry was—and still is—their belief that Young was merely acting (perhaps somewhat impetuously and undiplomatically) in accordance with what has become the policy of the United States government Besides the oil situation, as former Israeli Ambassador to Washington Simha Dimtz recently explained, the new policy is related to the Carter Administration's basic approach to solving the Middle East crisis Under former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's "solution by stages," at each stage the direct relationship between the specific parties involved was of primary importance The Carter Admim-stration's "comprehensive settlement" approach, in contrast, gives veto power to the PLO via the Palestinians Asa result, Washington feels that without the opemng of some kind of dialogue with the PLO, no progress toward settlement is possible Yet if there is one issue on which practically all Israelis are umted, it is the refusal to talk to the PLO unless it openly abandons its official aim of destroying Israel —Elia-hu Salpeter...