Coming Down to Reality in Egypt

LIPPMAN, SYDNEY COFFIN

PEACE FEVER ON THE WANE Coming Down to Reality in Egypt BY SYDNEY COFFIN LiPPMAN Cairo The peace fever that swept this country following President Anwar Sadat's December visit to Jeiusalem has...

...PEACE FEVER ON THE WANE Coming Down to Reality in Egypt BY SYDNEY COFFIN LiPPMAN Cairo The peace fever that swept this country following President Anwar Sadat's December visit to Jeiusalem has begun to evaporate, leaving in its wake a great deal of disappointment and resentment but not despair That, in any case, is Ihe impression one gains fiom speaking to people here in all walks of hie To Egyptians, peace came to mean prosperity, a prosperity that would be realized by the allocation of defense funds to pressing domestic matters After the breakdown of the Ismailia talks and the abrupt withdrawal last month of Sadat's delegation from Jerusalem, the high hopes of material betterment have come down, along with the jubilant peace banners decorating this city's streets Just two months ago, Salah El Din El Sayed, whose bus driver's salary of $117 a month puts him squarely in this country's middle class, saw six hardy souls clinging to the toe-holds on the outside of his overworked vehicle and prophesied, "This will stop with peace " Today he no longer thinks there is much chance that money for adequate public transportation or housing or meat on every table will soon be available His gloomy outlook is shared by Karima Zaki, a school teacher "We thought if President Sadat went to Israel there would be peace in two or three months It won't come for years now " The failure thus tar, however, has had its positive effects—at least from the viewpoint of Hamdi Fuad, a diplomatic coirespondent loi 1/ ¦Miiain, the nation's most prestigious newspaper "The people's comprehension of the nature of Zionism and expansionism is clearer now," he declared during a courtside interview between matches in a local tennis tournament Some citizens offer less tempered assessments "The Israelis have given nothing, and even that they've given drop by drop," said a retired police general "The stalemate has demonstrated that Israel is not interested in peace but only in keeping Egyptian land " Others speculate that the Israelis are holding back an agreement to force Egypt into a separate treaty, instead of one acceptable to all Arab states The widespread disappointment has also revived talk of war Not that any one is seriously suggesting a militarv confrontation with Israel at this stage, but many here regard the October 1973 initiative as a great success, and so feel Egvpt could do worse than keep the option open Magda Amin, a senior resting from semester finals in a S\dnei Coffin Lippmvn, a pi eMails lonlrihttioi lo Thf Ni w Li vn-fr, is a lieelumc writer based m Cairo sunny American University courtyard, put it this way "War is certainly not inconceivable Naturally, during an impasse the odds of war have to increase " Mostafa Mohran, a broadcaster for a Cairo radio station, is more optimistic He reasons that Sadat's trip and the enthusiastic welcome the Egyptian President received in Israel proved that the people of both countries want peace "The only problem is with the governments," he said, going on to explain that negotiations by their very nature, and especially after years of hostility, take a long time Mohran thinks America should not pressure Israel now but simply allow the talks to take their bumpy course "Peace is around, just waiting for the proper chance I'm not worried about it Peace will eventually arrive, one way or another " In holding that America should stay out, Mohran is in the minority It is almost a tenet here that U S involvement in the negotiating process is the key to accomplishing anything (Sadat himself has repeatedly argued that America holds 99 per cent of the cards) Al Ahram's Fuad summed up the mood "The trip to Jerusalem was the needed psychological breakthrough Egypt was then countmg on American pressure to bring the Israelis around " Because this has not been forthcoming—Washington apparently prefers to mostly mediate between the two parties—Egyptian reaction has been a good deal more sympathetic toward Israel than toward the United States The least the White House could do, several people remarked to me, is pressure Prime Minister Menachem Begin by denying him weapons "Sadat said in his last speech that the U S was supplying Israel with more arms But if the Israelis don't have the strength for another war, maybe they will try to make peace," said Mrs Amin (Her argument, of course, overlooks the fact that Israel is already so far ahead of Egypt militarily that an arms embargo would not become a threat for years It also overlooks the fact that such a ban would probably have to be extended to the entire Middle East, and would therefore penalize mostly the Egyptians ) A retired government employe, coming closer to Mohran's position, insisted that it was foolish to count on America at all "Nasser's mistake was to depend on the Soviet Umon Sadat's is to depend on the United States This leaves us standing on one leg " THESE DIFFERING Views Would seem to indicate that public opinion is not being dictated from above, either by Sadat or by the largely government-controlled press Nevertheless, the President and the media have doubtless played a significant role in shaping the current climate They were, first, probably responsible for overinflating the Egyptian masses' expectations between the announcement of the pathbreaking visit and the Christmas Day meeting with Begin, when it became clear that an agreement of any kind was a long way off Second, the anti-Israel mood is certainly not unrelated to the press outburst that followed the breakdown of the Jerusalem talks and the hasty departure of the Cairo delegation (One example of the bitterness was the drawing an Al Ahram cartoonist made of an Egyptian telling Begin, "Stop looking for excuses We're not anti-Semitic We're anti-you ") Finally, the populace's call for direct American involvement would not be quite so loud had Cairo newspapers not started an obviously orchestrated campaign This was timed to coincide with Sadat's visit to Washington early this month, to tell the U S that its vital interests in the Middle East would be jeopardized if it did not push Israel toward agreement Still, during the Nasser era, the Egyptians developed a resilience to the government line that keeps them from being easily taken in, and recent developments have merely reinforced their suspicions that it is easier to achieve peace in rhetoric than in reality They are skeptical, too, that further travels to other countries by their leaders will prove of much use, although the arms sales announced by the Carter Administration following Sadat's latest visit—including 50 F-5E warplanes for Egypt—are being pointed to by some here as a sign that commuter diplomacy continues to be of value Diplomatic observers here say it should become clear by this fall whether or not there will eventually be a peace treaty And they agree with Sadat that Jimmy Carter must bluntly tell the Israelis that their security is not in danger, that America's commitment is not wavering, but that economic and political forces have led to a divergence of U S and Israeli interests If an agreement fails to materialize, for whatever reason, Sadat will be in a highly precarious position, both at home and among his neighbors The Egyptian economy is simply not improving fast enough on its own to sustain the masses' wish for a better standard of living With nothing for them to look forward to, there would be a real danger of civil disorders similar to those that broke out last year when a rise in the price of basic commodities was announced This may prove to be the most important factor in the present Middle East maneuvers, Western diplomats suggest For renewed riots could remove Anwar Sadat from the scene and put an end to all of the hopes for a negotiated peace—and that is something neither Israel nor the United States wants to see happen...

Vol. 61 • February 1978 • No. 5


 
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