The Hard Questions About Eurocommunism
SALPETER, ELIAHU
AFTER THE U.S. WARNING The Hard Questions About Eurocommunism BY ELIAHU SALPETER The Italian and Spanish protests, and the French outburst of self-righteousness that followed last month's...
...Nevertheless, manv observers in Europe are not convinced that sheer coincidence explains the virtually simultaneous occurrence ot these events in the two Communist parties spear-heading the Eurocominunist movement and a third one steadfastly faithful to Moscow Once more there is considerable speculation as to whether the French and Italian Communists' independence from the Kremlin is fundamental, tactical or perhaps plain deceptive Certainly the apparent absence of any major policy debate inside the French party, and the subdued nature of the Italian party's discussion of such essential tenets of Eurocommunism as freedom of dissent, reinforce suspicions that monolithic and authoritarian elements in both are still much stronger than democratic ones Whatever the extent of the Soviet Union's involvement in confrontation, the possibility that with or without its blessings Communists might soon hold Cabinet seats in an Allied country has caused some nervousness at nato headquarters here High-ranking officials repeatedly tell iour-nalists that such a development, bad as it would be, would not mean the collapse of the Alliance or its defenses, but the dangers are obvious The most immediate one concerns the protection ol milium secrets n\io alread\ has contingency plans toi placing prompt rcstticlions on the How ol sensitive intormation to the Biusscls icpresentaliNCs and capitals of countries where Communists come to power These were adopted following the fall of Portugal's Salazar regime, when Communists briefly held posts in the government A repeat of that situation in Rome, however, would create much more serious complications To begin with, Italy is a permanent member of the Alliance's super-secret Nuclear Planning Group—which, among other tasks, must decide in advance on nuclear retaliatory targets in Warsaw Pact nations Moreover, the Portuguese post-Salazar government never tried to test the restrictions imposed by nato, in Italy's case, this could not be taken for granted As for France, it has not participated in the military organs of the Alliance since General de Gaulle's walkout, but it remains a member, and is therefore privy to highly confidential politico-military information No one in nato wants this to reach Marchais or his colleagues—in Pans or in Moscow Yet guarding defense secrets is not the gravest problem a Commumst presence would pose The most important issue would be political For not a single Communist party in Western Europe—not even the Italians, whose leaders have occasionally talked about nato's usefulness in providing some "balance" vis-a-vis the Russians—is unequivocally committed to continued nato participation should it come to power And if a Commumst party that achieved office in an Alliance country urged staying on, other members would have to wonder about, first, the credibility of a nato whose decisions depended on Commumst approval, and second, the deterrence effect such an organization would have in Moscow's eyes...
...The confrontation tactics first became discernible last September in France, when the Union of the Left —consisting of the Communists, Socialists and Left Radicals—met to discuss updating Us five-year-old Common Program in preparation for the upcoming elections Communist party boss Georges Marchais demanded sweeping changes involving the nationalization of French industry and the banks, and revision of the social welfare system Then, just as his Socialist counterpart, Francois Mit-terand, appeared ready to offer concessions to preserve the united front, Marchais hardened his position It was soon clear that he wanted to dissolve the partnership—at the very moment public opinion surveys indicated the Union had a good chance of winning at the polls Subsequently, Marchais even refused to continue the "noncompetition" agreement stipulating that none of the three parties would run candidates in districts where they had no possibility Eliahu Salpeter, a regular NL contributor, is currently a European correspondent for Israel's Ha'aretz of making a creditable showing if that would merely take away votes from one of them having a chance to win Communists, Marchais declared, would appear on every district's ballot Much the same thing has happened in Italy A year and a half ago, the Communist party there took its initial big step toward a progressive ascension to power through constitutional means Christian Democrat Gmho Andreotti had formed a minority government on the basis of a program tailored to be at least tacitly acceptable to the Communists, and in exchange they promised to abstain from Parliamentary votes of confidence Communist party chief Enrico Berlin-guer declared that such a pact was preferable to an outright grab at the reins of government It was speculated at the time that Salvador Allende's experience in Chile played a major role in cooling the Party Secretary's ardor for a rapid take-over But the arrangement fell apart in early January, with the Communists' call for a broad emergency coalition that would include them When the Christian Democrats flatly refused, Berlinguer withdrew his backing and Andreotti was obliged to announce his Administration's resignation Similarly, a month earlier in Portugal, Socialist Prime Minister Mario Soares' minority government was brought down by the Communists' withdrawal of their half-hearted support Charging that Soares' policies were "antiworker," they joined Right-wing parties in a no-confidence vote After weeks of tightrope walking the Prime Minister finally managed to work out a balanced deal, with concessions to the Left and the Right Yet just as he was about to announce his new Cabinet, the Communists again pulled the rug from under him, saying they could never countenance a deal that would give power to Right-wing forces They had to know this would leave Soaies no choice but to lean more lowaid (he Right to create a viable government, and thai is exactly what eventually happened Ostensibly, each of the three Communist parties had its own reason for suddenly changing its course In Pans, for example, Marchais was said to be worried that the Socialists were getting stronger at the Communists' expense—a fear that had been confirmed by recent regional elections Perhaps he felt that underlining the differences between his party and Mit-terand's would help him regain some ground at the polls next month In Rome, Berlinguer was faced with growing criticism from Communist trade union officials and party hardliners, they complained that the policy of cooperation was unpopular with workers, who saw themselves bearing the brunt of the Christian Democratic efforts to heal the economy In Lisbon, Soares never had the Left solidly behind him, and the measures needed to prevent economic collapse were opposed by the Communists from the outset They may simply have decided it was time to throw him to the wolves...
...WARNING The Hard Questions About Eurocommunism BY ELIAHU SALPETER The Italian and Spanish protests, and the French outburst of self-righteousness that followed last month's American warning against Communist participation in the Rome government are still being echoed by Western European politicians and editorial writers Yet observers possessing even a modicum of memory view their indignation with understandable cynicism Angry reactions ill befit those who not very long ago scarcely hid their ire at the rumor that the new American ambassador to Rome might meet with local Communist figures Declaiming against "interference in the domestic affairs of others" may look like smart politics to the hard-pressed Italian Christian Democrats To the French centrists, busy catering to Gaulhst chauvinism with Parliamentary elections due in March, this may seem clever, too But the rhetoric could ultimately prove dangerous For in trying to out-protest the Communists, free Europe's mainstream politicians are playing into their hands by helping to shift attention to Washington's admittedly clumsy pronouncement, and away from the legitimate sources of its anxiety Specifically, the outcry has deflected attention from three related questions (1) Why have the French, Italian and (less noticeably) Portuguese Commumst parties lately adopted a more aggressive, "confrontation" stance9 (2) How deep and how genuine is the process of democratization among the Eurocommunists9 (3) What will happen to the Continent's defenses if the Communists become participants in the government of a nato country...
...These issues were certainly clear as well to those in the French and Italian governments who hastened to protest Washington's warnings Interestingly, they apparently are understood by the Communists themselves, who feel that the American pronouncements did effectively delay, if not prevent, the emergence of a Popular Front government in Italy...
Vol. 61 • February 1978 • No. 4