Enhancing the Debate

...In his Preface, Walter LaFeber outlines four major themes The first is that "contrary to prevalent belief, Panama did not magically materialize at Theodore Roosevelt's command " This is an important matter, for some of the arguments against the treaties revolve around the belief that the Republic of Panama is an artificial entity, that it simply would not exist were it not for U S intervention in the 1903 struggle As LaFeber correctly notes, although it is true that Theodore Roosevelt's involvement was ln-stiumental in assuring Panama's freedom, it does not follow that the country would never have achieved independence on its own Panamanian insurrections against Colombian control had been going on for a long time, and would have succeeded sooner or later regardless of America's behavior...

...Enhancing the Debate The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective By Walter LaFeber Oxford 248 pp $10 95 Reviewed by Steve C. Ropp Associate professor of government, New Mexico State University DURING THE next few weeks, Congress and the American people will decide what to do about two new Panama Canal treaties And whether the treaties are ratified or rejected by the Senate, the final decision will have a powerful impact on future relations between the United States and the Republic of Panama Yet despite the importance of the issue, it has been difficult for the concerned citizen to find in one place reliable information on the history of our predicament and on significant aspects of the current negotiations With the publication of this book the void has largely been filled The author is primarily known as a student of the early Cold War period, but in bringing his broad historical perspective to bear on the Canal question he has made it possible to upgrade the quality of the debate now under way...

...LaFeber discusses whether the U S possesses full sovereign powers within the Canal Zone—the question in the present debate that has generated the most heat and the least light The record indicates that the American people have never agreed on an answer Even when they did not directly say so, early court cases and congressional acts implied that the Canal Zone was an integral part of the United States, for example, the ports within the Zone were once considered by Congress to be domestic shipping points The latest proponent of this position is Ronald Reagan, who argues that our claim to the Zone is legally the same as our claim to the Louisiana Purchase or Alaska On the other hand, many statements of major American participants in the 1903 treaty talks reveal a belief that the U S was granted only the power to act as if it were sovereign LaFeber holds that the ultimate authority on this question should be the Frenchman responsible for negotiating the original treaty, Philippe Bunau-Var-llla, whose position was that the document did not grant full sovereignty to the U S The author himself holds that "the U S did not buy the Canal area in 1903 and does not own it " Third, LaFeber suggests that the new negotiations cannot be adequately understood unless they are placed in a broad context As an historian, he is very much aware that international power shifts can often pretty much determine what will happen in bilateral dealings And since in his view the situation is now characterized by "the relative decline in United States power to deal with a fragmented world," he believes Panama has been able to successfully pressure America for treaties it might otherwise be hesitant to push Finally, LaFeber addresses "long-term developments within Panama itself " The sections of his book devoted to this subject are perhaps the most valuable, because too often Panama has been presented more as a legal abstraction than a dynamic social entity LaFeber explains how the U S -aided destruction of the Panamanian Army in 1904 left Panama's oligarchy totally dependent on the United States for support in the struggle against various domestic challengers This, in turn, meant that the commercial classes could not afford to appear too nationalistic about the Canal without risking the loss of American backing Establishment of the National Guard during the 1940s and '50s put an end to part of the oligarchy's fears, and eventually produced leaders like General Omar Tornjos—who were willing to directly, if not completely, challenge the United States A similar discussion of internal changes in U S politics might have been a helpful supplement to The Panama Canal It is interesting to note, for instance, that the two new treaties are being opposed by a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats somewhat similar to the coalition that succeeded in assuring ratification of the 1903 treaty There is, however, this difference In 1904, Republicans were solidly behind Theodore Roosevelt's attempt to portray the treaty as an act that would benefit the entire civilized world In 1978, the Republican party is split on the issue, with conservative members arguing against ratification and liberals arguing for it—mostly because the commercial and banking interests they represent feel a revised relationship with Panama may improve the business climate throughout Latin America So for the Republicans the debate is in a sense a "crisis," since the outcome will perhaps determine which wing will emerge victorious in future elections Clearly, the Panama Canal question will be with us for years to come A new treaty will not lay Panamanian nationalism to rest, nor will a Senate rejection convince Panamanians that nothing further can be done Given the future volatility of the issue, it is incumbent upon Americans to improve their understanding of the historical and contemporary forces involved And Walter LaFeber's book will be an immense help to anyone embarked on that task...