Soviet Brinksmanship at Belgrade

...Soviet rigidity and bluster have also had an effect on the non-Communist participants...

...To find the answer, one has to go back to the original Helsinki convocation...

...And stressing an atmosphere of freedom is a basic component of this country's effort to improve relations with the West—and attract more of its tourists...

...Having thus been practically isolated, the Soviets have settled down to what most observers view as a two-stage tactic...

...Consequently, the Soviet delegates have been rather cool to the entire Mediterranean angle...

...The Maltese and the Yugoslavs, for example, are again peddling the idea of involving non-European Mediterranean countries in the conference by creating a special Mediterranean committee...

...Yet support of the Yugoslav-Maltese suggestion would imply acceptance of the general principle of separate committees—something the USSR desperately wants to avoid...

...Now, faced with the Western plan, they presented a counterproposal that was as simple and vague as expected...

...THE HELSINKI FOLLOW-UP Soviet Brinksmanship at Belgrade BY ELIAHU SALPETER Belgrade On the opening morning of the current agenda phase of the Helsinki follow-up conference, foreign diplomats and journalists gathering in the elaborate yet dreary Yugoslavia Hotel lobby watched the police unceremoniously arrest 15 women (subsequently all deported) who had come to demonstrate for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate...

...The gap was underscored, again on the first day of the conference, when Britain, in the name of the nine Common Market countries and supported by the other memEliahu Salpeter, a regular New Leader contributor, is currently European correspondent of Ha'aretz...

...At the same time, Belgrade wants to play a mediating role between East and West...

...The reason the Yugoslavs felt compelled to risk the bad publicity (if one ignores the unlikely theory of overzealousness at some middle level of the security apparatus) would seem to be that they see the conference as an important occasion for strengthening their position vis-avis the Soviet Union...

...Basket I, concerning relations among the signatory nations, included the declaration on the inviolability of borders that was so much desired by Brezhnev...

...Evidently, anything that might threaten its total authority seemed more dangerous than the deterioration of links with the governments or Communist parties of the West...

...Demanding that their government honor its word, they even set up an unofficial (and therefore, by the Kremlin's precepts, illegal) group to monitor its implementation...

...Upon discovering that everybody at the meeting (except for the Warsaw Pact countries—and even they without Rumania) wanted a genuine review, the Russians turned to their usual blusterings, "privately" telling diplomats and journalists that there would either be a Moscow-style agenda or none at all...

...Sixth Fleet and nuclear submarines...

...They then watched happily as the "neutrals," led by Austria and including the grand powers of Lichtenstein, Andorra and San Marino (which are all full voting members of the conference), caucused to work out a compromise...

...As for the controversial Basket III, it is unlikely that the Soviets took its promises any more seriously than they have taken their obligations under the UN Charter of Human Rights...

...Since the Kremlin must have anticipated hostile reactions from its Spanish, Italian and possibly French comrades, it was obviously signaling its determination to put a halt to the spread of dis-sidence...

...It is an urgent question, for it involves both the immediate issue of the Belgrade conference and the complex web of relations between Moscow and the Eurocommunists...

...But once the West proves it will not dance to the Russian tune, it is believed that Moscow will go along with the principle of a separate review of past observance of Basket III—which it will then concentrate on watering down...

...What is more, no one could suspect the Belgrade government of an overabundance of love for the Kremlin...

...They are expected to maintain a tough line (with insignificant "moderations" occasionally proposed by their satellites), and perhaps threaten to break up the conference...

...Discussions should be carried out in three committees, each corresponding to one of the Baskets of the Helsinki Final Act (to make sure the talks will be about specifics, rather than merely a prolonged "general debate...

...seemed less eager to hit the point, but in recent months the roles have been reversed...

...The action was perplexing, for the Yugoslavs subscribe to the proposition that human rights—including emigration and the free exchange of information—are among the principles whose implementation should be examined here...

...Basket II had to do with cooperation in the economic, technical, cultural, and educational spheres...

...second, to strengthen detente, perceived by Moscow as "an irreversible process" leading to the erosion of the North Atlantic Alliance...

...The sharply worded criticism of Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo last month in the Moscow journal New Times also included a sweeping attack on Eurocommunism as such...

...Among the Europeans themselves, attitudes and evaluation had differed somewhat as well...

...Instead of wooing the "neutrals" with sounds of sweet reasonableness, the Soviets felt obliged to enter into conflicts with them, too, thereby pushing them closer to the Western side...

...During the discussions within the European Community and nato in preparation for Belgrade, some disagreements became noticeable...

...Unfortunately for the host country, the division between the two positions was too deep to be bridged by such oratory (which was, in any event, not very much appreciated by Moscow...

...Only after a complete consideration of compliance with the measures already agreed to, and of ways to improve it, should new proposals be entertained (to guarantee that grandiose plans for European cooperation will not be used to deflect attention from human rights violations ). The Soviets had let it be known before the meeting that the kind of Helsinki follow-up they preferred would consist of individual explorations of possible joint European undertakings to develop energy resources, protect the environment and expand transportation...

...For a third time, the Kremlin had to choose—between tolerating Carter's "interference" in what it has always claimed to be "entirely internal matters," and starting a dispute with a new American President...

...They are determined not to let anything detract from this aim—least of all a side show that would give Moscow a chance to criticize its unpredictable ally...

...Perhaps worse, he went so far as to point out that for those who had signed the Helsinki document, human rights ceased to be an exclusively domestic affair...

...advance pledges would, of course, take them out of its pocket...

...The Brit-' ish and Dutch, for instance, favored a tougher stand than did the West Germans, who were worried lest renewed tensions be detrimental to the (meager) expansion of family contacts being permitted East Germans...

...Moreover, they undoubtedly expected that the world at large would continue to accept the special Soviet "interpretation" of these matters, and that Washington, instructed by a "political realist" such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, would not permit its relations with Moscow to deteriorate over what was essentially a "domestic affair...

...This development stemmed less from the Carter Administration's firmer stand on the issue than from different evaluations of possible Soviet reactions: Washington apparently felt that Moscow's vested interest in the survival of Helsinki pushed the Soviet breaking point back farther than the Europeans thought...

...One concerned human rights: At Helsinki, the West Europeans pressed for inclusion of as many such clauses as possible and the U.S...

...These were the very "prizes" Moscow had hoped to dangle before the West as rewards for "good behavior...

...Designed to bring about a thorough review of adherence to the Basket III human rights obligations, the Western proposal contained three main requirements: ?No predetermined cutoff date for the conference should be set (to preempt a possible Soviet-bloc filibuster...

...With a naivete that could hardly be called disingenuous, Moscow interpreted it as requiring Western governments to make enterprises do business with the USSR—whether or not their customers wanted Soviet books, cars or caviar, and whether or not their managers (who, according to Soviet mythology, are all-powerful in the West) wanted to invest in Communist countries...

...bers of nato, submitted a detailed program for the substantive stage of the meeting, expected to start some time early in October...

...However, if one counts the overall expansion of trade —and specifically the volume of Western credits to Communist powers—Moscow certainly has no cause for regrets...

...Yet with Moscow having chosen the stick over the carrot, all these splits in the Western camp became less critical...

...It was the idea of Soviet Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev, and its purpose was twofold: first and foremost, to give international sanction to the Soviet empire's postwar frontiers...

...That desire was evident in the welcoming speech of Foreign Minister Milos Minic at the initial session of the conference on June 15: Carrying out the Helsinki Final Act, he said, was "a long-range process" (i.e., don't demand too much too fast of the Soviets), but the meeting "should provide an excellent opportunity to review what has been achieved" (i.e., there should be a discussion of compliance to date with the provisions of the agreement, as the West has been insisting...

...With that scenario more or less set, the hundreds of diplomats from the 35 participating countries, and the scores of journalists in attendance, are occupying themselves with what has become one of the main topics of the local tennis-and-cocktail circuit : How did the Russians get into this mess in the first place...

...In all three cases, Moscow opted for confrontation over flexibility...

...In 1975, as soon as the Soviets signed the Final Act it was embraced by dissidents...

...As a result, the Soviets came to Belgrade determined to repair the damage caused by what they probably now see as mistakes or weaknesses on their part in Helsinki...

...In terms of electronic supercomputers or other ultramodern technology purchased from the West, Moscow is probably disappointed with Basket II...

...Indeed, the rest of the participants have braced themselves for an exhibition of Soviet brinks-manship that has not been witnessed for some time...

...But in 1975 that seemed a small price to pay, particularly since the rest of the Final Act was highly favorable to the Soviets...

...Their motive is to promote the Soviet-Libyan gimmick of "demilitarization" of the Sea (i.e., the withdrawal of the U.S...

...As the first stage of the Belgrade conference—scheduled to last some six weeks in all—continues, it has become quite apparent that Moscow's rigidity is closely related to the problem of dissent in the Communist camp at home and abroad...

...It stated that the 35 Helsinki signatories should be permitted to discuss, in any order and in plenary sessions, past and future implementation of the accord, plus suggestions of new fields of mutual endeavor...

...Once again, the Kremlin was presented with an unappealing decision: It could accept the Eurocom-munists' backing of the dissidents, or it could exacerbate disputes with the comrades to the West...

...The Soviet attitude has led to some ironic twists at the Belgrade meeting...

...In 1976, riding the crest of Eurocommunism and reminding the Kremlin of Basket III, the Communist parties of Spain, Italy and France made support of East European dissidents one of their expressions of independence from Moscow...

...In 1977, Jimmy Carter entered the White House and, to Moscow's great confusion, stuck to the human rights stands he had taken during his campaign...

...But several unexpected things happened to Brezhnev on the way to the Belgrade follow-up conference called for in the Helsinki agreement...

...To get what he wanted, Brezhnev had to accept the human rights directives of Basket III...

...Meanwhile, Moscow's tactics have at the very least postponed the surfacing of differences within the Western group...

...But if the group emerged somewhat closer to the Soviet position on one point (that both past and future be dealt with), its ideas on others?to Moscow's surprise and chagrin?proved more troublesome than the West's: In addition to supporting separate committees on each basket, it urged advance commitments on a final joint communique and on the scheduling of further follow-up conferences...

...This left the Kremlin with the not very happy choice of either relaxing its domestic totalitarian control a little, or openly violating a charter on which its signature had barely dried...

...It also contained a clause forbidding the signatories from interfering in each others' internal affairs—later cited repeatedly by Moscow to answer any criticism of its nonobservance of human rights...

...And the fundamentals —where there was no disagreement —received better than expected support from the neutral nations...

...If this evaluation is correct—and many diplomats in Belgrade seem to believe it is, despite a later New Times article softening the line?then Soviet inflexibility here could run much deeper than mere conference tactics...