Dear Editor
Dear Editor The New Leader welcomes comment and criticism on any of its features, but letters should not exceed 300 words. The Battle of Peking In his article on China's prospects following...
...Yet in recent years the Chinese have deployed an intermediary missile system that can reach European Russia and could present unacceptable risks to the Kremlin...
...In retrospect, the post-Cultural Revolution rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping and his rise to the rank of deputy premier appears to confirm the validity of the Lin analogy: Potential compromisers, hiding behind the official anti-Soviet rhetoric, could still attain high positions in the Chinese government...
...The capacity of Mao's loyal heirs to resist Moscow's machinations within their ranks will to some extent depend on their ideological skill and resolve, as well as their ability to quash any Soviet sympathizers in their midst...
...With Mao gone, they may act soon to modify Communist China's traditional anti-Soviet policies...
...In short, whether the pro-Communist compromisers or the Maoist radicals emerge on top in Peking, the Chairman's death will undoubtedly prove to have momentous consequences...
...These men—deemed "right-deviationists" or traitors by radicals—are simply worried politicians who have lived under the nightmare of a possible Soviet preemptive strike for too long...
...Peking announced it had conducted its latest successful nuclear test in what seemed "message to the USSR of its resolve...
...With the removal of his awesome presence, the Kremlin could well manipulate the emergence of another Lin...
...Lin Piao's aborted effort to flee to Soviet territory dramatically demonstrated that even among the highest ranking and most vocal supporters of Mao there was profound disagreement with his venerated thoughts and policies...
...Teng's fall again, following Chou's death, on the other hand, showed that Mao (tormented by the suspicion that his perpetual revolution would not survive his passing) had intensified the "class struggle" against real or imagined revisionists...
...The reason behind the Kremlin's deliberate nonaction, or perplexed hesitation, may have been more dialectical than ethical, however...
...Indeed, if this uncompromising line is not relaxed or toned down—at least until after Peking has built a sufficiently strong nuclear deterrent—it could cause an all-out conflict with the Soviets, and an almost instantaneous loss of millions of Chinese lives...
...China's nuclear capability could tilt the balance in favor of Chinese radicals, who would argue that they are strong enough to defy the Soviets...
...New York City Laszlo T. Kiss...
...Now that (he moment has arrived, the Soviets are alert and ready for action—as Leonid Brezhnev's elevation to the rank of Marshal at the last Party Congress signaled...
...But the most important factor in ultimately deciding this conflict's outcome will be China's nuclear-rocket strength...
...Should Moscow in fact be unable to break up the Maoist power structure, this could have far-reaching effects on its priorities and cause drastic changes in its basic strategy...
...As defense minister, he had to face and deal with the realities of the vast Soviet nuclear superiority more than any other of China's top leaders, and thus fully recognize its devastating implications...
...Bui if it does move in that direction, its chances of succeeding and of reestablishing Stalin's monolithic authority cannot be ruled out...
...The country would, of course, be crushed in an all-out nuclear war with the USSR...
...And last month, 17 days after Mao's death...
...Unlike Mao, they are unwilling to commit collective suicide for the sake of ideological abstractions or nuances...
...And Stalin's "revisionist" heirs had, to be sure, displayed an uncharacteristic restraint in reacting to Mao's fierce, heretical challenge—so much so that it could have been taken as a sign of scruple...
...Soviet leaders would have to prepare for a long and increasingly heated confrontation with Peking, necessitating the full concentration of their armies in the Far Eastern frontiers...
...He apparently counted on the Kremlin leaders' reluctance to use extreme measures against his regime...
...And while most members of this faction share Mao's anti-Soviet passions, they shrink from the dangerous and provocative way he expressed them...
...The Soviet leaders may have decided to postpone the showdown with Peking until after Mao's death when—by putting pressure on an unsettled leadership—it was likely to be easier to try to defuse China as an historical time bomb that threatens Soviet security as well as its ideological hegemony...
...In defying this looming threat of disaster, Mao had taken an enormous but calculated risk...
...Their existence and shadowy maneuvers were the hidden causes of the political tremors that shook the capital this year...
...The Battle of Peking In his article on China's prospects following Premier Chou En-lai's death ("China After Chou," NL, May 10), Frank Ching suggested that the influence of moderates might he on the ascendant in Peking...
...the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung has placed the spotlight on a group of potential compromisers within the Communist hierarchy...
...It obviously remains to be seen whether Moscow will attempt a rocket-rattling, bloodless coup...
...The vision of such a national holocaust must especially have haunted the late Lin Piao...
...The trend would inevitably drain their forces in Central and Eastern Europe and would compel them not only to end their pressure on the West, but to seek a lasting compromise—through genuine liberalization—with the peoples of their satellite regimes...
Vol. 59 • October 1971 • No. 20
