The New U.S. Policy in the Middle East
DIODOTUS
PLAYING TO THE PLO The New U.S. Policy in the Middle East BY DIODOTUS WASHINGTON ADRAMATIC and far-reaching shift in U.S. Middle Eastern negotiating strategy is fast gaining favor in the State...
...The position paper was noteworthy both for its length (three large printed pages compared to the usual few paragraphs) and its substance...
...Emphasis mine-D...
...The first was a trial balloon released November 12 before a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Saunders...
...One cannot help being struck by a feeling of deja vu, particularly as the strategy applies to the sphere of tactical bargaining accommodations...
...The prevailing view is that the choice was between expiration of the mandate and agreeing to the compromise removing mention of the PLO from the resolution itself...
...There is reason to fear that beneath the gossamer cloak one will find little beyond a false sense of accomplishment that has hidden, ever so briefly, the fact that the mechanics of a settlement have been substituted for the substance -to the detriment of everyone vitally concerned...
...But this precondition is seen as imposing a serious political handicap upon the fedayeen leadership because of its increasing vulnerability within the Palestinian milieu...
...The U.S...
...will not deal with Yasir Arafat's organization "until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel...
...Most of those expressing such opinions do so not from ideological positions, but from the stance of the political realist prepared to deny all except the most pragmatic philosophical moorings in the quest for tactical success...
...Impetus for the change has been provided by the belief that the step-by-step approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute has outlived its usefulness, and that standing still now could very well result in a loss of the limited gains it achieved...
...Syria, it is argued, would accept nothing less, especially since it had the USSR's support and was determined to follow up its condemnation of the Phase II Egyptian-Israeli Sinai accord with another demonstration that it had assumed Arab world leadership...
...In his public statements, Kissinger has always insisted that the U.S...
...Middle Eastern posture, Washington could maintain credibility only to a point -the point demarcated barely three weeks early by the Deputy Assistant Secretary...
...stand, and they sought a clarification...
...He further observed that "changes in position" would be announced by the President or the Secretary of State, not by a deputy assistant secretary...
...Such conditional participation would allow Arafat to cope with the most extremist elements inside and outside the PLO, for the conditional circumstances would only be operative if the negotiations reached a "successful" conclusion...
...But subsequent study made them realize that the statement was uncomfortably far from the official U.S...
...DIODOTUS is a pseudonym for a social scientist and author who specializes in Middle Eastern affairs...
...To meet the difficulty, a formula that would obviate the PLO's objections and avoid the granting of symmetrica] concessions to Israel is likely to be proposed...
...After declaring that "the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict," Saunders went on to say that "there will be no peace unless an answer is found for the problem of giving Palestinian interests expression in a final settlement...
...The formula surfaced very recently when a highly influential person at the State Department (not Kissinger) indicated to a group of visiting American scholars that the PLO must agree to negotiations that may have as one of their outcomes the recognition of Israel's legitimacy...
...has been criticized for failing to veto the resolution, requiring the Council to reconvene January 12 "to continue the debate on the Middle East"-for it was also the sense of the majority, as plainly expressed by the Council president, Soviet UN Ambassador Yakov Malik, that the PLO is to participate...
...negotiating strategy for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict...
...To achieve success in any bargaining situation one must offer credible proposals and counterproposals...
...The second development involved the November 30 Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of the UN peace-keeping forces...
...did, of course, dissociate itself from the invitation to the Palestinians...
...Saunders saw them...
...What this ignores is the climate in which the resolution was presented...
...I happen to feel strongly that many of the Palestinians' aspirations are legitimate, but that the approach Washington seems on the verge of taking will not satiate or even suffice...
...Kissinger's denials notwithstanding, several unimpeachable sources -including individuals at Saunders' level-have told me that the Secretary personally approved the carefully written paper word for word...
...Arab reaction to date has been favorable, although not definitive...
...The clear implication was that Saunders had produced the statement independently...
...In fact, their observer left the committee room while Saunders was still testifying...
...In these circumstances, it is felt, a more plenary negotiating structure is necessary...
...Thus it cannot be gainsaid that the Saunders (read: Kissinger) statement encouraged Syrian intransigence...
...Instead, following the usual pattern in the Arab-Israeli context, they would proceed through an intermediary...
...Since last November, this has been reflected in three different developments...
...Although the media were slow in reporting the "Saunders document,'' State Department desk-level officers cite it as a harbinger of the shift vis-a-vis the Palestinians...
...THE THIRD and perhaps most significant development is the talk of a move designed to make it more palatable for the multifarious PLO to enter negotiations with Israel...
...The Israelis, who received a copy of the document a couple of hours before Saunders' committee appearance, at first did not react...
...So it is rational for those responsible for policy formulation to claim that everything possible was done to gain a resolution favorable to Israel, on the one hand, and to be quite pleased with the timing and content of the compromise that was actually adopted, on the other...
...And during lengthy discussions with Washington officials, 1 found no one who thought this country had conceded more than was absolutely necessary...
...Under the plan, negotiations would probably not be the face-to-face variety...
...In any event, the State Department is now convinced that the Palestinian issue has come of age...
...All three developments reinforce the impression one gets here that the major Middle East policy shift, which may soon emerge in full view from the seventh floor of the State Department, will stress structure and format rather than content, let alone consequences...
...Just as this was true of the Paris negotiations, and is true of detente, it appears it will be true of the new U.S...
...The failure, however, was a logical result of the convergence of stepped up Arab pressures and the new American direction signaled by Saunders...
...Much more important, unlike prior position papers on the subject, this one did not summarily dismiss the possibility of Palestinian participation in negotiations until such time as the PLO recognized the legitimacy of the State of Israel...
...Middle Eastern negotiating strategy is fast gaining favor in the State Department...
...Kissinger responded by minimizing the document as "a somewhat academic exercise explaining in a purely theoretical manner several aspects of the Palestinian problem as Mr...
...Middle East policy at the moment, therefore, might best be described as an evolving diplomacy in search of a method of implementation...
...The U.S...
...With the winds of change already obvious in the U.S...
...Stripped to its essentials, this calls for accommodation to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) demands without formal preconditions...
...Numerous middle- and upper-level officials-who insist upon anonymity for fear of provoking Israeli supporters, not to mention secrecy-prone Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger-have candidly told me in recent weeks that they see the Palestinian issue as central to any Middle Eastern settlement...
Vol. 59 • January 1976 • No. 1
