Portugal, Detente and Diplomacy
ZINNER, PAUL E.
Perspectives PORTUGAL, DETENTE AND DIPLOMACY BY PAUL E, ZINNER The complexities of U.S.-Soviet detente diplomacy are not easy to fathom. That much becomes clear from a close look at how both...
...The conference was a pet project of his, one he very much wanted to see completed before turning to arrangements for the Soviet Union's Communist Party congress, scheduled to get under way on February 24, 1976...
...Giving the American version of developments there, he nevertheless acknowledged that they are rooted in Portuguese history itself...
...Did it indicate a hardening U.S...
...For the time being, it would appear, the Soviets are loath to enter into polemics with the U.S...
...The scope and vehemence of recent anti-Communist demonstrations, and the split in the Armed Forces may have come as something of a shock to Moscow...
...Secretary of State over the USSR's role in Portugal...
...It contrasted sharply, for example, with comments Kissinger made as late as July 25 to reporters who were questioning him on Soviet intervention in Portugal...
...It apportioned blame for outside intrusions to "nato circles," the Common Market and the Socialist International, but not to the White House or the State Deparment...
...and the fact that Communist tactics have been counterproductive-leading not only to a test of strength with the opposition but to the establishment of a three-man military government-may be causing it to review its policy...
...On August 19, Pravda published a critical analysis entitled "Portugal: A Complex Period of the Revolution...
...Beyond that, perhaps the only thing one can say for sure from the handling of the issue by each side in this new era of detente diplomacy is that a constructive dialogue between the two superpowers on the subject, if it is possible at all, has yet to emerge...
...might also have made its participation at the July 31 Helsinki summit contingent upon a Soviet promise to keep hands off...
...That much becomes clear from a close look at how both sides have so far handled the issue of meddling in the internal affairs of Portugal...
...Thus the Portuguese issue disappeared altogether in the interstices of Soviet-American bargaining...
...By all appearances, we did not fail to oblige...
...At that time, the Secretary first disputed reported estimates that the USSR was pouring as much as $10 million a month into the distressed nation's Communist coffers, and then launched into a lengthy disquisition on the difficulties of the situation there...
...This is hardly surprising...
...Unlike Pravda, it did concede that "H...
...But the "failures of the West" were primarily Washington's...
...In short, Soviet policy toward Portugal is currently somewhat fluid...
...We have also to consider the failures of the West to do what it can do...
...And if this was genuinely the state of things on the eve of the President's departure for Finland, Kissinger's refusal to be drawn into a condemnation of Soviet machinations in Portugal is understandable...
...One possibility that must be considered is that the speech was largely a self-serving attempt to stave off growing criticism of detente...
...How, then, is one to explain the Birmingham warning...
...Meeting with U.S...
...What is less clear, however, is why Secretary Kissinger seemed to have decided to press the matter last month...
...Kissinger also discussed the internal situation in Portugal...
...And it concluded on a conciliatory if hypocritical note-emphasizing the Soviet people's unwavering support for the principle of noninterference, and expressing the Soviet nation's profoundly sympathetic feeling toward Portuguese democrats striving to achieve unity between the Armed Forces Movement, the Communists, the Socialists, and all progressive groups...
...On August 14, speaking before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference at Birmingham, Alabama, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger solemnly warned that the Soviet Union "should not assume it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future...
...Krasnaia Zvezda, the central organ of the Ministry of National Defense, alloted the statement nine paragraphs...
...senators on June 30, Suslov urged the United States to use its influence with those West European countries that were obstreperously holding up progress by prolonging preliminary discussions on the gathering...
...What is more, the USSR has reacted with restraint, even resignation-at least insofar as one can judge by its news media...
...While the Administration refrained from extracting a concession on Portugal, moreover, a senior member of the Politburo, Michael Suslov, did not hesitate to ask for our help in bringing the security conference to a close...
...attitude toward Moscow's moves in Europe...
...Only the United States had stood silent, passing up opportunities to publicly encourage democratic sentiment in Lisbon...
...Indeed, in the week following the Secretary's Birmingham address, Soviet media totally ignored those portions of his comments critical of Russian policy, though summaries of varying lengths were published by several national dailies in their Sunday editions of August 17...
...Portuguese Socialists had found plenty of sympathy, as well as moral and financial support, in Western Europe...
...Though some Portuguese officers have Communist affiliations, an outright military dictatorship, whatever its political coloration, is the kind of precedent Communists everywhere would just as soon shun...
...For the Soviet leaders want the Army to serve as the handmaiden of the Communist party, not the other way around, as is now the case...
...Pravda managed to devote six paragraphs to the Kissinger speech without mentioning Portugal, conveying the impression that the Secretary regarded further Soviet-American cooperation as an inescapable necessity in the nuclear age...
...To begin with, events in Lisbon have taken a decidedly unfavorable turn for the Communists...
...To discourage the Kremlin from actively backing the Portuguese Communists, the U.S...
...going along on the Helsinki document, essentially on Moscow's terms, in return for some sort of Soviet commitment not to disrupt negotiations for a Sinai accord, essentially on Kissinger's terms...
...Instead, the two governments seemed to arrive at a quid pro quo, with the U.S...
...Was Kissinger engaged in a belated maneuver to counterbalance the impact of the Helsinki accord, which, to many, constituted an endorsement of both the Soviet empire and Soviet conceptions of proper political conduct in international relations...
...The Secretary further declared that "we sympathize with those moderate elements who seek to build a Portugal by democratic means...
...He ended by stressing that "it is an easy way out for us to blame everything that goes against our interests on Soviet machinations...
...President Ford was even chary about extending congratulations to the Portuguese people for holding a free election last April 25 after a half century of dictatorship, and for embarking on economic reforms...
...The statement appeared to signal a shift in America's overt stand toward the drama unfolding in Lisbon...
...The Portuguese people should know that we and all the democratic countries of the West are deeply concerned about their future and stand ready to help a democratic Portugal...
...The writer railed against Western intervention, Socialist perfidy and Fascist treachery...
...The forum Kissinger picked to discuss Portugal certainly cast doubt on the credibility of his remarks, and he may have acted on the belief that his need to quiet domestic hostility toward detente would be understood, perhaps even condoned, in the governing circles of Moscow...
...Paul E. Zinner is a professor of political science at the University of California's Davis campus...
...The article was signed "Observer," a guarantee that it reflected the Kremlin leadership's thinking...
...The principle of noninterference in another country's internal affairs is a fundamental tenet of the European security charter, and Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev was eager to have the document approved...
...Yet, despite its shrill tone and familiar invectives, the article was more plaintive than menacing...
Vol. 58 • September 1975 • No. 18
