Thinking About an Oil War

...Obviously not Ten years ago...

...To be sure, arrangements have been made for some Arab states to invest their capital in the U S and Europe But this could give rise to a state of affairs in which key sectors ot the Western infrastructure are controlled by foreign powers on an unsettling scale The swiftness ot the change of ownership as well as the tact that the policies of Arab nations are incongruent with those ot the industrial democracies pose untold difficulties of instability and conflict The cartehzation ot economic power in the hands ot a few Middle Eastern states would make earlier Western plutocrats—the Kru-eers Rockefellers, Sassoons, Rothschilds—fade into paltry insignificance To their credit...

...A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL Thinking About an Oil War by paul seabury I sometimes wonder whether a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of those prelustoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin He lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment, he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed, but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat —George F Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 Perhaps because of the difficulty of establishing a plausible chain of causation, there so far has not been an extreme public reaction m Europe, Japan and the United States to the implications of the oil price rise, the energy crisis and the monetary squeeze Inflation, for instance, cannot simply be explained by the drastic oil price increase—it was well under way before the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec) acted Similarly, the energy crisis cannot be placed exclusively at the door of the energy-exporting nations—it was bound to come some day in any event, and, as the Shah ot Iran is pleased to point out, it is due to the notoriously high consumer habits of Western nations But the course of developments on the international monetary scene promises to drastically alter the current climate of opinion As opec members accumulate wealth in astronomical amounts, as the political power of Arab states grows in seemingly inordinate fashion, as industry falters, unemployment rises, depression spreads, and one after another industrial nation goes bankrupt, a systemic crisis the likes of which have not been known in this generation appears inevitable Unless some change occurs, the merciless chain of events will drive countries to acts they thus far have refrained from considering openly Indeed, when words like "the fate of civilization" slip from the tongues of statesmen, and are echoed even by politicians, something already is afoot This will be no ordinary crisis, for short of threat of force the major democratic powers will not be able to resolve it No amount of resource-pooling, no concerted crash programs to develop alternative energy sources, no wage-price controls, no public appeals for "belt-tightening" will change the reality of an oil cartel of unprecedented power endangering the vital interests of the advanced world That this cartel is made up principally of so-called fourth-world non-Western nations, that its spokesmen will cry foul when its actions are opposed, that it may appeal to the Communist bloc and to underdeveloped nations—all this may be assumed The measures of the Western countries will also undoubtedly expose them to charges that the imperialists are again commencing their depredations against the non-Western world, that the chief victims of today's oil piracy are poor and non-Western will be forgotten with the first ultimatum A moment ot historical reflection will suffice to explain how the Western world happens to find itself in Paul Seabury is a professor of political science at thee Berkeley campus of the University of California its present peculiar condition Would this kind ot piracy have been conceivable 40 years ago...

...Western societies tamed the activities of the original 'robber barons" by subjecting their enterprises to regulation But the modern robber barons lie outside the reach of legal structures Under the guise of international law they claim immunity from control and demand their sovereign rights What is more, they have a strong case The West has long respected private property, protecting foreign investments from nationalization and extortive taxation That tradition, though, should not blind us to the peculiarity of our present predicament It hardly can be said that the jesuIts of Western investment in underdeveloped countries were patently extortive and punitive Whatever the social side-effects, in general that investment was devoted to the economic development of those lands This is not true of Arab investment imperialism, which entails stripping the West of its own capital, either to withhold it or to teed it back into the same societies Whatever it is, Arab money is not productive It involves only a transfer of power and control, with no possibility of anything significant being added Oil-producing states are essentially misnomered They do not produce oil, rather, they remove it from the ground Western industry provides the technology, the pumps, the refineries, the shipping facilities No toiling masses sweat in subterranean mines, adding the value of their harsh, demeaning labor to the product (as is true for the coal industry) Could the Arab rulers, emulating robber barons ot the past, acquire a humane streak allowing them to alleviate the plight of their victims9 II we take the Shah at his word, the predicament of the West leaves him indifferent We are the ones who have supposedly despoiled and plundered We now shall pay, so that others, a tiny minority of historically less fortunate persons, may cheaply reap the benefits of gigantic wealth The Shah carefully identifies his targets as giant corporations and ignores ordinary citizens Yet his meaning is clear To further understand the effects of the oil crisis, let us imagine that (I the enormous flow of riches and power from energy-consumers to energy-exporters hypothetically had gone to a congregation ot small nations resembling Switzerland Staggering questions of equity, and of the domestic effects of this transfer, would remain Still, Switzerland is Switzerland The wealth would have entered a country characterized by prudent politics, relative tranquility, a reasonably fortunate geographic location, and a benign albeit selfish foreign policy Unfortunately, none of the opec members—except possibly Venezuela—can begin to claim Switzerland's attributes The Arab countries pursue policies pointing to a revision, by great violence if necessary, of the Arab-Israeli status quo Persian Gulf states have generally been more restrained in their actions toward Israel than Syria and Egypt, yet time and again they have shown their willingness to wage war That the capacity of all these countries to indulge their belligerency has now grown to truly astonishing heights must be observed with meticulous care Nor should it be forgotten that these feudal regimes —out of pace with modem political developments, either Communist or Western—rest on precarious bases Lacking a tradition ot democratic civility, they are remnants of dominions that, elsewhere in the Middle East, have been overthrown by revolutionary movements Ironically, in the recent past they owed their survival, in large measure, to aid from their current victims, especially from the United States (It was the 1953 Anglo-American intervention in Iran, remember, that ousted Mossadegh and restored the popular Shah to control ) Proximity to the Soviet Union, combined with fragile domestic conditions, should be a reminder to the leaders of these governments of the need for prudence One might even leasonably expect that they would regulate their hubris in their own self-interest, but they have not done so Consequently, Europe, the United States and Japan must begin exploring, in the most realistic and careful terms, the use of force?whether to employ it at all, or under what circumstances it might be employed This subject requires examination immediately, before we advance much further down the road Admittedly, to raise this prospect, even in a reflective article of this kind, is to risk an uncertain reception, since Western-style political communities today recoil from the idea ot using force m their international relations How they have been led to this pacific stance differs greatly Europe, an American strategic dependency for more than a quarter-century, has quietly relinquished the reins of its overseas responsibilities, at the same time rising to unparalleled heights of prosperity The majority of Europeans have chosen to disregard the fact that their culture (often viewed as the direction in which all societies should move) has developed man ambivalent global environment outside their control Otherwise, they might earlier have attempted to safeguard themselves To be sure, in nato most European nations have grown used to forms of cooperation against the enormous power of the Soviet Union—although as detente proceeds they are becoming less concerned about their safety from the East, too The new threat, however, comes from another direction, and this quintessentially civilian society is simply unaccustomed to thinking about security, tranquility and prosperity as things that have to be vigilantly defended America's recent experience has been different, but the results have been remarkably similar No matter how divided they were on the Vietnam war, both the Left and the Right in this country were happy to be out of it Moreover, the former President's words were warmly received by all segments of society when, m enunciating the Nixon Doctrine, he proclaimed that an era of "negotiation" was replacing an era ol "confrontation " Congress, for its part, has abetted this disposition by weaving constraints around the White House, and the military, mindful of its public ordeal during the '60s, no doubt fears being called upon in the existing atmosphere Haunted by the immediate past, tormented by the ravages of Watergate, no Administration—including the one we happen now to have—would eagerly choose a course ot action entailing the use of force except in the most desperate circumstances Yet it is precisely such circumstances that prudent policy has to prevent, by appearing credibly committed to protecting vital interests We should make clear, for instance, that the political collapse of one, or more, of our most necessary and valued allies because of the monetary-foreign-exchange crisis would be intolerable It must be universally understood that any menace to the delicate network of commercial relations linking advanced Western societies would not be permitted But as things stand, we see a reversal of Theodore Roosevelt's axiom If the U S through its President speaks loudly today, it carries a small stick What seems evident to the world is an absence of will and authority Tamed American leaders, aware ot their predecessors' destinies and wishing to avoid similar fates, conceivably could choose to wait until affairs deteriorated to a point where it would be politically feasible for them to act Catastrophe might be necessary to cope with a gloomy sequence of events The only question then would be whether ive had passed a point of no return In America, the realities are especially clouded by a growing myth of potential selt-sufficiency Many believe that the nation can withstand the shocks of the oil crisis, that serious political and social dislocations in Europe and Japan would not have parallels here This makes it possible to imagine a less-than-catastrophic scenario —in tact, one where the U S economy might ultimately profit Such an inference of insulation, though it might be argued abstractly, ignores the incalculable psychological stresses that would inevitably radiate from Asia and Europe as the crisis deepened The possibility of Western democracies collapsing would unquestionably have vast impact within the United States, and would surely be mirrored in American politics Besides, it should be remembered that the closed Communist states?with a high record of massive repression—will be better able to retain their authority m economically troubled times Whatever political moves the Kremlin might decide to make, the inner disruption of Western Europe would decisively tilt the balance ot power eastward, possibly irreparably Within official circles, these considerations must be familiar Yet governments are understandably loath to express such ideas, to do so would be to risk further angering the oil-producing countries Doubtless quiet diplomacy is already at work, seeking to impress upon adversaries the long-term cataclysmic consequences that would result from a continuation of existing policy It is important in all political affairs carefully to distinguish what one would wish to do trom what circumstances might compel In dealing with the Middle Eastern opec countries, this distinction must be made particularly clear Their own viability, after all, depends upon a viable international system —indeed, the very one their policies are now shaking the foundations of This is true irrespective ot what policies the Western nations may devise It is also important that the people of the Western democracies ponder the unpleasant scenarios that now he ahead George Kennan's dinosaur need not metaphorically apply to a public able realistically to prepare in advance for future adversities and hard choices But it should be cautioned that ostriches cannot easily transform themselves into competent dinosaurs When their heads come out of the sand, their protection is only to be found in their ability to run at great speed from their predators This talent is not appropriate to present circumstances...

...With European and American oil companies jostling among themselves for concessions Boundaries had been established by Europeans during World War 1 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was actually constructed from the bottom up by the British, who furnished an unknown Bedouin chieftain with an army, deposited him m Amman and drew a line around his and domains Those parts of the Middle East not explicitly under European control were Europe's dependencies It is not necessary for us to reflect too long on the iniquities of such a situation For the inhabitants of the region, the end ot Ottoman domination meant the beginning ot European rule But the mam point here is simply that any Arab uprising threatening the vital interests ot Europe would have been unthinkable Divided discordant and beset with many fundamental problems, the Europe of the pre-World War II period was nevertheless the center of the society ot nations It no longer is And though its very survival depends upon access to Mideast oil, it lacks the authority and the institutions for a collective foreign policy that would guarantee this The October War amply demonstrated its impotence Today the Continent is at the mercy ot princes who preside over less than 1 per cent of the earth's population and seem determined to possess all of the world's monetary wealth These rulers have shown their ability to use oil as a political weapon, they have the capacity as well, and perhaps even the will to use it as a deterrent by threatening to destroy it Through actions taken wholly within their borders they can bring an end to industrial Europe This is not science fiction (That they, with lesser opec countries, have had the temerity to concert their designs at meetings in Vienna is an irony that ought not go unnoticed ) Would a situation of this kind have been possible 10 years ago...

...Forty years ago the Middle East was for the most part the property ot Europe Except tor Persia, it was composed ot principalities created by British and French diplomacy...

...In a static economy, the question is From whom should be taken, to give to whom...

...No But why...

...In a disrupted economy, where gigantic sums are trundled off yearly to vaults ot small emirates and their allies, the question becomes Who should bear the brunt ol the severe loss ot income—the increased unemployment, the gravely accentuated inflation, the reduced social services, the growing incapacity to buy essentials abroad, the termination ot many civilized amenities...

...Probably not At that time, too, the regional balances ot power were markedly different than they now are The United States, with others, had the ability, if not to dictate the affairs of the Middle East, at least to influence the flow of events and contain the more dire tendencies of the troubled region For example, a nimble exercise of the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, by order of President Johnson, may have discouraged Soviet intervention in the Six-Day War of 1967 But much has changed since then In any eventuality other than the worst conceivable one, US naval supremacy m the Eastern Mediterranean is currently nonexistent Moreover, should there be a new Mideast war, the Arabs may be able to purchase their allies Such are the grim realities An Arab oil producer, or an opec devotee, will argue that oil is a commodity, to be sold or not sold, and that it is hardly a grievance under either equity or law for the producer to determine his price Historic wrongs further intensify the Arabs' conviction of Western hypocrisy—and strengthen the temptation both to expose it and to bask in the warm sun of reverse exploitation Although feelings ot this sort could have disastrous consequences for everyone concerned, the danger is obscured by chimeric prospects of gathering in $1 trillion or more from a compliant world each decade Thus, the oil-importing nations face a prospect of choosing between bankruptcy and the risks of using force, unless opec reverses course and cuts prices And the United States while less affected than the Europeans and the Japanese because of its higher degree of self-sufficiency, is nonetheless confronted with the same urgent problem For in contrast to all postwar crises, what distinguishes this one is the ubiquity of the objects it directly and simultaneously erodes It is genuinely systemic It permeates and could profoundly derange the entire world In addition, where some crises intensify and subside according to sequences of decisions, the present one is the result basically of only the oil price hijack Everything else ensues from this, including the central political concern—the ability of Western democratic institutions to handle the profound domestic stresses imposed on them Most advanced democratic societies, plagued by pre-oil-price-rise inflation, have already been experiencing internal commotion about distributive justice The oil-energy-monetary crisis does not merely exacerbate this struggle, in many countries it appears to destroy the possibility for any solution In an expanding economy, the question is How should a constantly growing pie be sliced...