A U.S. Portfolio in the USSR?
BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW
THE ECONOMICS OF DETENTE A U.S. Portfolio in the USSR? BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI It is rightly said that there is no alternative to detente. I can assert this in good faith, for as far back as 1960...
...Finally, on leaving government service in 1968 I published a comprehensive plan for East-West negotiations designed to establish a framework for eventual reconciliation...
...Here I can only endorse Henry Kissinger's statement of October 8. 1973, while deploring the White House's failure fully to apply it: "This Administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system...
...These five areas should be borne in mind when formulating U.S...
...A comprehensive agreement should encompass broad cultural and political accommodation...
...the adoption, both in principle and in practice, of true reciprocity in our relations...
...American newsmen and scholars have been harassed and excluded from the Soviet Union—in marked contrast to the welcome extended here to Soviet specialists...
...I should note as well that the spurious argument of domestic nonintervention did not prevent—justly—the Soviet leaders from condemning anti-Semitic practices in Nazi Germany, nor, more recently, from changing their stand on Chile in the wake of Salvador Allende's overthrow...
...I am thinking particularly of the American-Soviet space venture, which has become a vehicle for the one-sided transfer from the U.S...
...Unquestionably, detente has advanced sufficiently to warrant the discontinuation of the first course, and this has already been done for the most part...
...But this, they feel, should not interfere with economic cooperation...
...Clearly, it is in our national interest, and that of peace in general, to seek a more inclusive, more enduring detente, one that is not restricted to economics nor offset by officially sustained enmity...
...In brief, the time is not yet ripe for a high-risk U.S...
...Though one of the key beneficiaries of increased commodity prices throughout the world, it remains largely unresponsive to the needs of less developed countries now burdened with huge food and energy costs...
...Although it may be argued that some commitments should be made to encourage accommodation, in my opinion the current level of U.S...
...Nor can I square our concern for human rights with our apparent willingness to sell the Soviets lie detectors and voice-print detection equipment—fortunately blocked because of Congressional outrage...
...We have judged movement in our relations with the Soviet Union, not by atmospherics, but by how well concrete problems are resolved and by whether there is responsible international conduct...
...Future progress on the broader issues would of course justify more extensive American commitments...
...2. Strategic secrecy...
...From the American perspective, to be sure, a circumscribed detente is better than nothing, and can be regarded as a necessary way station on the road to a fuller accord...
...interest that a Soviet-American trade bill be passed: The Soviet Union could initially be given MFN for a two-year trial period...
...Unfortunately, in at least five areas the Soviets' current behavior is not consistent with progress toward these goals: 1. Ideological hostility...
...Moreover, in the light of this country's traditions, adopting a posture of amorality means sacrificing something very precious, something that should not be sacrificed lightly...
...Actions of this kind are a basic violation of the concept of detente...
...For this reason, an equitable salt II agreement is a major litmus test of Moscow's intentions...
...and Soviet positions on important regional disputes, as in Europe or the Middle East...
...With regard to the debate over granting the USSR most-favored-nation status (MFN), Congress might consider the following compromise solution since it is in the U.S...
...investment in the Soviet economy, accompanied by heavy Soviet indebtedness, an undesirable state of affairs could develop...
...it affects adversely and directly Soviet-American relations much in the same manner that any U.S...
...Moscow openly views detente as a limited and expedient policy, in no way aimed at terminating the tensions of the Cold War...
...and the rejection of the harmful and antiquated notion that ideological and class struggle are properly part of detente...
...Indeed, the Soviet rulers have emphasized over and over again that, far from abating, ideological conflict is to intensify during times of "peaceful coexistence...
...Still, if there is no alternative to detente, it is also true that the word can mean different things to different people...
...or (3) to actively promote them by political means...
...We have insisted that disarmament had to be mutual...
...diplomats, businessmen and tourists are subjected to incomparably greater restraints in the USSR than are their counterparts in the United States...
...We have always insisted that progress in technical fields, such as trade, had to follow—and not reflect—progress toward more stable international relations...
...For this reason, too, current U.S...
...Consequently, our policymakers are obliged to consider whether detente is not seen by at least some Soviet leaders merely as a breathing spell, designed to lull the U.S...
...Economists must judge whether large-scale trade would in time leave the United States more dependent on Soviet raw materials than the USSR would be on American markets...
...the shaping of closer social ties...
...It is only natural that the two major powers, in different geopolitical situations, would have diverse and occasionally conflicting estimates of their vital interests...
...portfolio in the Soviet Union...
...I can assert this in good faith, for as far back as 1960 I was directly involved in developing the idea of peaceful engagement with the Communists as the only acceptable means of ending the Cold War...
...Paradoxically, the very size of the Soviet debts would give the Kremlin additional leverage...
...Whereas Soviet citizens are free to lobby and to promote joint U.S.-USSR lobbies in this country, American access, even to the Soviet elite, is severely restricted...
...Ideological hostility, artificially kept alive by impediments to wider contacts, could become a source of renewed strain...
...has three options in its economic relations with the USSR: (1) To restrict trade and investment by political means...
...In reaching a decision on any of these matters, however, we should remember that U.S.-USSR trade arrangements are politically weighted on the Soviet side because its economy is controlled by the state...
...policy on business investment in the USSR and U.S...
...But I cannot help wondering if we have come far enough yet to justify exercising the third option, which would mean providing Moscow with credits at concessionary rates and making a determined effort to encourage massive U.S...
...or the Soviet Union, who were unsympathetic to the present accommodation...
...I might add that the availability of American credits to the Soviets would enhance their ability to make similar commercial deals and obtain the same sort of leverage with Western Europe and Japan...
...In addition, the Soviet rulers have shown a tactically cynical nonchalance to the threat of nuclear proliferation triggered by India's atomic explosion...
...And given its limited scope, the Nixon-Brezhnev understanding could easily be reversed should individuals ever come to power, either in the U.S...
...President Nixon and Party Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev therefore deserve credit for resuming the efforts of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and of First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev—initiatives that were interrupted by the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968—to counterbalance the competitive aspects of our relations with cooperative arrangements...
...Surreptitious military planning, development and deployment by the Kremlin stimulate legitimate anxiety in Washington about the extent and depth of its commitment to peace...
...The above list, I might point out, does not include any reference to divergent U.S...
...5. Reciprocity of treatment...
...This would permit Congress to make a fresh determination based on observation of Soviet behavior during the interim...
...and Soviet leaders—a proposal he did make, and one that President Nixon later implemented...
...During the 1968 Presidential campaign, I suggested to the Democratic contender, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, that he publicly propose annual summit meetings between U.S...
...I emphasize these points not out of vanity (though I do take pride in them) but because I believe firmly that a protracted and unchecked Cold War entails risks no sane statesman can afford to underestimate, and is prohibitively costly as well...
...The Communist record here leaves much to be desired...
...2) not to restrict them...
...I am also troubled by the Department of Commerce's efforts to modernize the Soviet Air Control System—something that will significantly strengthen Moscow's airlift capability, especially against the Chinese...
...Thus Congress should explore the idea of creating a formal instrument, perhaps a joint Executive-Legislative coordinating organ, to monitor this crucial area and insure that American interests are not slighted...
...3. Indifference to global problems...
...The Soviets have made it quite plain that they have a very clear concept of the kind of detente they desire and—by and large—they have so far succeeded in shaping U.S.-Soviet relations according to it...
...The USSR appears remarkably insensitive to matters that cry out for greater cooperation among the advanced nations...
...research and development aid—and I use the word "aid" advisedly—seems to me difficult to justify...
...Most significantly, were the existing detente to break down after a period of sustained U.S...
...Zbigniew Brzezinski, a frequent contributor, is director of the Trilateral Commission: A Private American-European-Japanese Initiative on Matters of Common Concern...
...to the USSR of a technology that has obvious military applications...
...As Professor Marshall Shulman of Columbia University ably stated in his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee last April 25: "Rather than face the politically painful choice of instituting fundamental economic reforms, the Soviet leadership has opted for a massive effort to overcome its shortcomings by increasing the flow of trade, advanced technology, capital, and management experience from abroad...
...It simply does not follow that what is good for U.S...
...America's relatively free market system makes it difficult to infuse a sense of national purpose into business transactions, yet unless we attempt to do so, the USSR will derive important political advantages from its economic relations with us...
...into a false sense of security while the USSR attempts to move from strategic parity to a position that could be exploited politically...
...It is a political fact that many Americans are deeply concerned about those Soviet citizens wishing to leave the Soviet Union, and in that sense the question is not only a domestic one...
...4. Human rights...
...That is, we would reduce internal pressures for economic modernization and political decentralization without really altering the external American-Soviet relationship...
...concessionary credits is sufficient under the present circumstances...
...As noted, Moscow's intensification of Cold War animosities not only contradicts the spirit of detente, but poses a potential threat to it...
...We have maintained a strong military balance and a flexible defense posture as a buttress to stability...
...Subsequently, I promoted this concept while serving in the State Department, often over strong internal opposition...
...But one can certainly conceive of a Soviet leadership being tempted to use its indebtedness to the United States and American dependence on Soviet raw materials for political purposes...
...The grant would automatically terminate at the end of that time and its renewal would require affirmative Legislative action...
...limitations on the right of Americans wishing to leave for the Soviet Union—were such limitations to exist—would affect American-Soviet relations...
...business is automatically good for the United States...
...The central point to remember is that a comprehensive understanding—political, strategic and social—is the only solid base for an enduring agreement, and until we obtain it, we would be wise to proceed cautiously, not allowing the economic association to become detente's primary blossom...
...Yet we must recognize that the present arrangement is potentially quite unstable...
...Unless we apply the Secretary of State's injunction very precisely and most deliberately, we run the risk of perpetuating the USSR's existing system and ideological attitudes...
...investment in the USSR...
...Almost every day some new example of this asymmetrical treatment emerges, such as Moscow police physically barring people from entering the American embassy...
...In my view, Washington's approach ought to be closely calibrated with accommodation on the larger political-strategic issues, and should not outrun it...
...While President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are correct in saying we cannot insist other governments alter their systems to please us, to assert that proposition is to skirt the real issue...
...credits for Soviet economic development...
...the expansion of global collaboration to cope with the many new international problems...
...In the broadest terms, the U.S...
Vol. 57 • August 1974 • No. 16
