Learning the Wrong Lessons
OREN, STEPHEN
Perspectives LEARNING THE WRONG LESSONS BY STEPHEN OREN In retrospect the Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel may appear irrational. But this irrationality has a logic of its own that is rooted in...
...in 1973, it has been to drive them back to the pre-'67 borders...
...The Arabs and the Jews, as President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia once pleaded, must face the fact that they have to find a way to live with each other...
...The concentration on surprise shows that the Syrians and Egyptians preferred to focus on Israel's tactics rather than on the nature of the society that permitted the successful '67 strike-and a response within 48 hours to the Yom Kippur attack...
...The rapid growth in Arab military strength, combined with Israel's increasing diplomatic isolation, could suggest to Jerusalem that for the next out-break it cannot rely on conventional weapons but will have to develop its nuclear potential--and Israel is perhaps six months away from the ability to detonate a nuclear device...
...This would leave Egypt two choices: It could turn to Moscow for nuclear protection, thereby heightening the danger of a superpower confrontation in the Middle East...
...Finally, in neither Syria nor Egypt was pressure mounting for war...
...On the battlefield as well, it soon became clear that Arab military planners had absorbed a good deal from the Six Day War...
...On the Arab side, it is Sinai and the Golan that have assumed primary importance...
...That is appropriate...
...Foremost among these was the importance of surprise...
...The Israelis are almost certain to come away convinced that a genuine peace is impossible...
...Although there may be minor adjustments in some places, Israel will probably aim at holding the bulk of the territory gained in 1967-Indefinitely...
...A Middle East balanced between two local nuclear powers is, to put it mildly, not a pleasant prospect...
...In 1967, the Arab aim was to drive the Israelis into the sea...
...Cairo also was promoting a long-range coordinated plan against Israel whose brunt would be borne by the oil-rich Arab states of the Persian Gulf, not by Egypt...
...Reinforcing this mood, in the Sherlock Holmes tradition, is the nonbarking dog...
...Considering the unexpectedly effective performance of the Egyptian and Syrian armies, no matter what happens now the Arabs can be expected to believe a future victory is within their grasp...
...Unlike 1956 or 1967, for example, tension was not rising in the region prior to the outbreak of hostilities last October 6. On the contrary, only a week earlier Egypt had signed oil pipeline installation contracts with U.S...
...Like Israel, Egypt and Syria consider the disputed territory essential to their sense of selfhood and safety, whatever outsiders may say...
...For the one clear message written in the blood spilled during the latest Mideast confrontation is that neither side can hope to be truly victorious...
...The obvious answer is confidence in the new fighting capacity of their Soviet-trained troops, and in the power provided by Soviet missiles and other advanced equipment...
...A major argument against retention of the captured areas had been the security problem posed by the presence of a million Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza...
...Moreover, prior to the current conflict, the one thing that Israel could offer the Arabs in return for peace was territory...
...Thus, just as the '67 war ultimately resulted in the present fighting, there is little chance that the '73 war will solve anything...
...But this irrationality has a logic of its own that is rooted in Middle East history, and it will continue to dominate events in the area in ways that are bound to befuddle the outside observer...
...And to fend off Libyan President Muammar el-Qaddafi's wild revolutionary blend of socialist puritan-ism and Islamic fundamentalism, both countries had improved relations with Saudi Arabia and its client state, Jordan-who were likely to be embarrassed by a military flare-up...
...Looking at Israeli societyas Soviet, Western and Israeli experts urged-would have meant putting off a war against the Jewish State for at least a generation, while condemning the Arab world, including its military elites, to the agonies of social revolution and forced-draft modernization...
...In 1969-70, Egyptian politicians eager to bolster their sagging prestige did talk of a strike across the Suez Canal...
...But if, as it now seems, the Yom Kippur attack date was fixed for strategic rather than internal political reasons, why did the Syrians and Egyptians think they could regain a foothold in the Golan Heights and on the east bank of Suez...
...That these Arabs did not immediately rise in revolt will incline Israel to feel that they can be incorporated into the Jewish State without endangering domestic security or social institutions...
...When by 1972 it became apparent that the Kremlin would not support such a move, Cairo sent huge contingents of Soviet advisers packing...
...In short, lessons are learned from the Mideast wars, but on neither side are they very often the ones outside observers think should be learned...
...One final possible and ominous Israeli conclusion from the '73 war should be mentioned...
...Yet equally significant may be the lessons the Arabs felt they learned from 1967...
...Oddly enough, the Palestine issue is no longer paramount...
...Despite Egypt's ability to cross the Suez Canal and smash the Bar-Lev Line, therefore, the Sinai desert is today seen as the best buffer between Cairo and Jerusalem...
...firms that presupposed prolonged peace...
...A treaty with neighbors who have unhesitatingly violated a firm cease-fire on Israel's holiest day-however guaranteed by great powers whose ability to act is clearly restricted by larger international interests-will be seen as virtually meaningless...
...They assumed full Soviet diplomatic and military backing...
...Even such doves as Dean Am-non Rubinstein of Tel Aviv University have been moved to note that had a strike similar to the one that took place on Yom Kippur been carried out across the pre-1967 borders, it would have put President Anwar el-Sadat's forces in the suburbs of Tel Aviv...
...Hence the Syrian-Egyptian determination to take no action that might tip their hands, such as prewar coordination with other Arab states or attempts to start a Palestinian revolt in the West Bank and Gaza...
...The difficulty, of course, is that they still do not seem ready to accept this judgment...
...But Egypt's attack has demonstrated that superiority does not exist...
...After a War of Independence, a Suez War and a Six Day War, Israelis are now speaking of the Day of Judgment War...
...A similar withdrawal from Syria took place just days before the latest fighting started, suggesting that the USSR remained at least dubious about the planned adventure...
...or it could try to pool Arab oil money to pay for crash Egyptian nuclear development...
...For all the talk of Israeli "expansionism," it was expected that when a settlement actually came, most of Sinai would be returned to Egypt...
...The Syrians, meanwhile, had cracked down on the Palestinian commando groups...
...Given Israel's vast military superiority, it was privately reasoned, Jerusalem could afford the restoration...
...This could make the Arab unity that has slowly developed during the fighting more meaningful than it has ever been in the past, a development that would surely raise the odds for a fifth round...
Vol. 56 • October 1973 • No. 21
