No Thaw in Korea

...SERVING NOTICE TO THE BIG POWERS No Thaw in Korea byjean EGAN CHUNG HEE PARK Seoul Any government, if it ignores popular wishes, should be considered an enemy of the people" These are not the words of Karl Marx, Mao Tse-tung, Herbert Marcuse, or any other revolutionary ideologue, but of one So Chae-pil, speaking in 1896 after the Royal Army had suppressed widespread revolts by some 10,000 Korean peasants At that moment, the corrupt Empress Mm of the Yi family was bargaining away her nation's sovereignty to the encroaching Russians and Japanese So Chae-pil argued that by promoting civil rights, social justice and economic betterment for its people, the government could strengthen and unify the country sufficiently to resist the pressures of neighboring states As it happened, So was not heeded In the next 15 years Korea became first the battleground, then the pawn of foreign powers vying to dominate Asia, and finally the plundered colony of Japan Today So's advice continues to be largely ignored, but the experiences of his time have not been forgotten In fact, an increasing number of South Korean intellectuals and government officials, among them President Chung Hee Park, are striving to insure that similar events will not occur during the present decade The seriousness of their concern was revealed by Park's December 6 declaiation of a state of national emergency " Asserting that the country was "confronted with a grave situation," the six-pomt document allows the restriction of constitutional liberties when this is deemed necessary to protect the nation's security Five months earlier, in the inaugural speech for his third term as President, Park had warned that South Koreans would have to "adjust themselves actively and flexibly to changing international trends " He spoke of unifying the country by peaceful means, but cautioned that North Korea was still planning to use force for the same end—a point he had stressed repeatedly in his campaign for reelection Nonetheless, he promised that every effort would be made to solve the differences between Seoul and Pyongyang "one by one, starting with the most feasible ones " What Park considered most feasible became clear m August, when South Korea's National Red Cross suggested to its Northern counterpart that talks be held on the question of reunifying families separated during the Korean War Pyongyang quickly agreed to the discussions, prompting Park to respond "I would like to offer assurance that a forum for peaceful reunification can be arranged at any time, if and when the North Korean Communists genuJean Ecan is a free-lance correspondent currently traveling in Asia inely renounce their policy of force and violence and assume a sincere attitude " Three weeks later, however, Premier Kim Jong-pil asserted in a press conference that North Korea's sincerity was belied by the doubling of its infiltrations into the South following the Red Cross proposal He also cited the threat posed by the North's 500,000-man Army, 1 4-million-man militia and 700,000-strong Youth Guard Corps Once the Red Cross talks got underway at Panmunjom in late September, newspapers here started carrying detailed accounts of the infiltrations Psychological warfare was reported to have increased "six to ten tunes" over 1970, including new efforts to stir up criticism of the Seoul government, praise for Pyongyang, and disruption between the U S and the South Such tactics, it was noted, were in keepmg with the "traditional Communist approach" of advocating peace and applying force When university students took to the streets in October, officials immediately accused the North of instigating student opposition to the government The daily rock-throwing and tear-gas battles between students and police were firmly squelched by 3,000 troops, with no discernible popular protest and a surprising amount of praise from influential sectors of the society The public's reaction may have been tempered by President Park's Armed Forces Day speech on October 1, m which he warned, "It is imperative for us to have the right concept of this era This is not a time of peace and relaxation " Despite the current "thaw" in world relations, he said, "North Korea is a marked exception to this international trend " He charged that it was using the Red Cross talks to launch a "spurious peace offensive and renewed armed provocations at the same time " Park further observed that Pyongyang had signed a new military assistance agreement with Peking on September 6 Coming on top of President Nixon's plans to visit China and the United States' recent refusal to give Seoul more modern arms, it made him doubt the reliability of Western promises to assure South Korea's security "It is quite clear that the big powers' guarantee is not the only element needed to prevent war on the Korean peninsula, on the contrary, it may lead to the danger of provoking a war in the course of obtaining peace " The Munich Pact and the Potswith 188 Northerners killed or captured, in 1967 the number climbed to 770, m 1968 it peaked at 1,142 On January 21 of that year, 31 North Korean commandos tried to force their way into Chong Wa Dae (The Blue House) and assassinate President Park Only one of them survived the unsuccessful mission?he is now reported to be living in the South "as an ordinary citizen"—• but the impact was traumatic Seoul had been penetrated once and could be again if defenses remained inadequate The Homeland Reserve Force was immediately beefed up (it has dam Proclamation, Park recalled, allowed foreign powers to occupy Korea while disarming Japan, and resulted ultimately in the Korean War five years later "These are merely examples to prove how ineffective the guarantees or pledges of the big powers can be against those who constantly seek an opportunity for aggression," he concluded This theme was quickly picked up by the press and the intellectual community The media's intensive discussion of Communist strategy served to remind the public that there have been more than 12,000 incidents since the 1953 armistice Mass infiltrations began in 1965-66, now grown to 2 million fully armed men) Confidence was somewhat restored later in 1968 when the reserves joined with regular Army troops to thwart an attempt by 120 Northern commandos to land on the East Coast's Pukpyong area The "January 21 incident," as it came to be known, was followed two days later by North Korea's seizure of the American intelligence ship Pueblo in the East Sea, resulting in the year-long imprisonment of its crew in Pyongyang Although it was not a direct military threat to the South, the U S failure to take retaliatory action was certainly a psychological blow For the first time Ill Koreans had reason to question how far Washington would go to defend Seoul (After a naval intelligence plane was shot down by Pyongyang in 1969, South Koreans were not amused to see off-duty U S military personnel adorning their clothes with a scorecard that read, "North Korea 2, U S Navy 0 ) The image of the America that had sacrificed 33,000 of its men in the Korean War 15 years earlier and declared itself the defender of free nations everywhere was shattered South Korean leaders realized that their Armed Forces would have to be modernized and reequipped before they could successfully take on the nation's entire defense burden by themselves The first in a series of joint conferences for that purpose was held in Washington m May 1968 In June 1969 the U S agreed to arm the reserves with modern rifles and to build an M-16 factory here By July 1971 a plan for upgrading Korea's military capacity was completed, concomitant with the scheduled reduction of U S troops Any lingering hopes of retaining a meaningful U S presence indefinitely were abruptly dispelled by Nixon's announcement of his pending visit to Peking and China's subsequent admission to the United Nations Park reassured his people that the U S would continue to help until South Korea's Armed Forces became fully self-reliant But he warned that much effort and sacrifice would be required to enable the country to stand on its own Indeed, South Korea remains weak, without U S backing it would be highly vulnerable to pressures from its neighbors And both Koreas—divided by foreign powers, brought to war by their blunders, kept in peace through their protection, grappling with modernization and development through their guidance and support—have little international standing or influence At the same time, the "Korean question" is a potential source of contention for the US, China, Japan, and Russia, as they seek to come to terms with each other in Asia The threat of war on the peninsula would make it difficult for these four to do business with one another Thus Seoul and Pyongyang fear that the big powers may try to impose peace here on terms that would not appeal to either the North or the South As one observer put it, the two nations could become the Ping-Pong balls to be paddled back and forth between East and West To avoid that fate, it is in Seoul's interest to take the initiative and negotiate directly with Pyongyang Naturally, it wants to do so from a position of unity Yet while the South may be increasing its military strength, it has a long way to go socially, politically and economically The civil disorders, chronic strikes, inequitable distribution of income, social injustices, and widespread corruption that have plagued the country can only serve to weaken Seoul's bargaining position vis-a-vis Pyongyang In the light of this, one can perhaps understand Park's state-of-emergency declaration and his swift moves to stifle protest by students, workers and displaced slum dwellers—even though the steps taken were often out of all proportion to any obvious danger On the other hand, the government's prohibitions against hippie-style shirts, miniskirts, shaggy hair, dance halls, "filth" in movies, etc , strike one as being irrelevant to the society's real problems Still, the South Koreans have finally learned that in international politics national interests prevail over idealism, ideology or brotherhood For the first time in this century, too, they have the opportunity, and seemingly the will, to decide their own future And their determination not to be robbed of that chance has no doubt been a major factor m President Park's repeated assertions of his nation's autonomy as the big powers begin their round of summit conferences this month...