Dear Editor

...Dear Editor Rhodesia Russell Warren Howe's report on the proposed settlement of Rhodesia's rebellion against Britain ("An African Munich7", CC, January 24) turned out to be remarkably prophetic Not only did he anticipate strong black opposition to the tentative accord, but he foresaw that "the nation's blacks will seek to take advantage of the British commission's presence to demonstrate their feelings, as Catholics have done in Northern Ireland " The day your issue appeared on the newsstands, blacks began noting in Salisbury, by the end of the week, mob violence had broken out in four other Rhodesian cities Though it became clear that the British fact-finding team, led by Lord Pearce, would not legitimately be able to approve the pact as "acceptable * Edward Heath's Conservative Government remained firm in its commitment that the settlement must stand Thus Parliament is faced with a Hobson s choice If it rejects the plan officials warn that it will not be renegotiated and the result will be even worse restrictions against the nation's blacks Yet if Parliament accedes it will indeed have its "Second Munich ' Men York Cm Salvia Edwards Pakistan and Vietnam Jack Anderson's release of secret minutes of the deliberations among Presidential advisers involved m formulating US policy toward the India-Pakistan war, cited by Andrew J Glass ("Nixon, the Press and Vietnam," NL?January 24), has revived an old complaint Echoing the clamor that accompanied the publication of the Pentagon papers a few months ago, critics charged that the government had concealed from the public the reasons for the policy's adoption, objections and misgivings voiced within the Administration, and even the real meaning of the steps taken It is true that the necessity for keeping the Pentagon papers classified had probably ceased to exist long before they were disclosed, and their continued suppression was therefore improper But the implication that the government should at any given moment inform the public about details of its moves, its motives and all the pros and cons of Us options, is most unrealistic No successful policy—belligerent, pacifist or neutralist—can be conducted in that way To be sure, crudely deceptive tactics are reprehensible, especially when directed against Congress, as seems to have b?en the case in soliciting financial support for Cambodia The idea, however, that foreign affairs can be managed in a goldfish bowl should have gone out with Woodrow Wilson Largely overlooked in the debate thus far is the remarkable difference between the way decisions were reached regarding Vietnam and India-Pakistan President Johnson kept George Ball, the outstanding opponent to his position, m his councils The evidence is abundant throughout the Pentagon papers that nobody was intimidated, and some leading officials shifted from, approval to skepticism to criticism of the intervention even earlier than Daniel Ellsberg There was nothing like Henry Kissinger's comment that he was "getting hell from the President every half hour," nor any indication of Presidential "wrath" against dissenters The importance of this point can hardly be overrated The President cannot be an expert in all areas where his word is final Thus it is vital that he listen carefully and patiently to the experts whether they approve or disapprove his own inclinations If he intimidates those who disagree with him, he will be surrounded by yes men whose advice is worthless Nixon s handling of the India-Pakistan crisis, though amateurish and unstatesmanhke, has not had the grave consequences that followed from Johnson's Vietnam decisions But that is because of the intrinsic differences of the two situations The fact remains that Johnson's method of dealing with his advisers was as good as could be expected and Nixon's is execrable Berkele\ Carl Landauer Professor of Economics University of California...