Japan's Quest for Neutrality

...The answer is, really, that it cannot It is simply naive for anyone to imagine that Japan will not, in our tune, in this generation, if not in this decade, resume its place as a world-shaking military power—in the name of national defense—after American withdrawal It is here, on the question of remilitarization, that Tanaka may face his toughest test—that the drive toward centralization will clash with Japan's deep revulsion over its millitary past The demonstrators who fight with policemen outside the gates of a U S base are not likely to approve Japanese Self-Defense Force umts occupying the grounds after the Americans' withdrawal "We want to use the base as a park and a schoolyard," one of the leaders of the Japan Communist party told me after the APCs had left the re-parr depot at Sagamihara, some 25 miles southwest of here "We are against the militarist tendencies of our government" The Japan Communist and Socialist parties have each issued strongly worded statements denouncing the government's proposal for a military build-up costing some $16 billion over the next five years The JCP called the plan a "prodigious plot for military expansion," while the Socialists charged that the government was acting "in sheer disregard of the wishes of the majority of the people for peace and neutrality " It is safe to assume, when the plan finally comes up for discussion in the Diet, that leaders of the minority parties will filibuster endlessly At the same time, thousands of students will stage demonstrations, as they do every year for one reason or another Well-disciplined police will spray them with water, hit them with sticks, arrest some of the ringleaders, and send the rest home on the last trains from Shinjuku and Shibuya stations It will be a great performance, noteworthy as always for the skill and coordination displayed by both sides But the Liberal-Democratic party, for all the pyrotechnics of the opposition, will force the plan through the Diet, and the great Japanese manufacturers will revel m new contracts for trucks, rifles, ammunition, and planes Planes' Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the plan is that it stipulates Japanese rather than American manufacturers should build T-2 jet trainers and FST-2 air-to-ground support aircraft The Finance Ministry had strongly urged the government to buy them all from the Americans in order to redress the balance of trade somewhat, but the National Defense Council deemed it much simpler and more expedient to pur chase them from Japanese firms The names of the aircraft manufacturers were not revealed, but the most important one will probably be Mitsubishi, the same company that produced Japanese Zeroes during World War II Mitsubishi already assembles American F-4 phantom jets at its plant in Nagoya It may, in the near future, be able to manufacture more and better aircraft than any other company in the world The thought of Japanese jets streaking over Asia has a powerful narcotic effect here-irresistibly tempting, yet repugnant and saddening Can Japan somehow rationalize the desire for peaceful neutrality, as displayed in the China trip, with the yeasty urge toward remilitarization...

...Socialist and Communist politicians have won important victories in urban centers afflicted by problems of social welfare and industrial pollution Could they possibly transform these local victories, in such major centers as Tokyo, Osaka and Yokohama, into nationwide success...

...It was a rather amusing footnote to the entire exchange that the Communists—that is, the Japan Communist party (JCP)—were more reluctant than the far Right of the LDP to endorse it The official logic ot the JCP was that Japan should first abrogate the security treaty with the United States, but actually the hesitation resulted from the JCP's rather cool relationship with the Chinese Communist party Despite internal confusion in terms of the international Communist movement, JCP leaders finally decided they should join all the other parties in expressing their approval They feared, apparently, that failure to support rapprochement with China not only would put them in too pro-Soviet a position but might also isolate them from their student and intellectual following By the time Tanaka landed at Peking's airport, he may have come closer to achieving a national consensus on his foreign policy than any other prime minister since the War Certainly since wresting control of the LDP in July and then winning election in the Diet to his present post, he appears to have gained much wider support than did his predecessor, Eisaku Sato But if Tanaka's trip to China was a complete success as a foreign pol icy gambit no less than a domestic political ploy, it may only have been the high point ot the period of grace accorded any new national leader in Japan It all happened so fast—the secret talks between Chou and emissaries from Japan, the arrival here of the Shanghai Ballet Troupe, led by a clever Peking diplomatic negotiator, the final flurry of statements and promises—that it might be better compared to a honeymoon journey than a permanent marriage Which side, Japan or China, was the more eager for swift and complete "normalization" ot relations...

...Or is there some possibility that radical opposition may grow so strong as to prevent the government from rearming, even on the highly limited defensive scale outlined m current planning...

...No one I have spoken to here thinks so Japan Incorporated has done so well economically that the opposition has difficulty finding national issues capable of arousing popular enthusiasm beyond limited confines And the Socialist and Communist mayors and parliamentarians from the metropolitan sprawls depend on big business for campaign contributions and other "donations," too Thus, in the end, it appears that Japan will rationalize the contradiction between peace and war, just as it rationalizes other differences Even the discipline of the demonstrators, chanting slogans for peace, suggests military order and action It remains conceivable, however, that a decisive struggle between Tanaka, or the LDP, and the Japanese Left will produce a new consensus...

...How will Japan respond, let's say, if the Soviet Union and China begin to fight each other along their frontier...

...DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY IN Japan's Quest for Neutrality by donald kirk KAKUEI TANAKA Tokyo Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka sweats profusely when he works He also likes to drink, which raises the level of his perspiration And he did a lot of sweating and drinking during his recent trip to Peking The drink he seemed to prefer was a certain wine offered by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai "Very good," Tanaka remarked after a sip from a glass tendered by his charming host "Have another," Chou suggested After three or four rounds Tanaka was not only reaching for his handkerchief but beginning to nod It was because he had to pause for a brief nap, according to reports reaching here, that he was 15 minutes late to one of his appointments on the first day of the journey No problem Both Japan and China were so eager to make amends for several generations of hostility that almost nothing short of a direct and calculated affront by one of the leaders could have jeopardized the journey Judging from this vantage point, it may even have been more successful than President Nixon's junket to the Middle Kingdom last February It is indicative of the competitive nature of the Japanese that radio and television announcers, editorial writers and commentators kept on comparing Tanaka's reception, mood, and comments with Nixon's If the American President walked such-and-such a distance along the Great Wall, the Japanese Prime Minister walked so much further If Chou smiled politely on greeting the for mer, he beamed broadly on receiving the latter The reports on Japanese television, which carried it all live, reminded me of the kind of remarks one hears almost every day from bankers and doctors, diplomats and trade officials "Formerly we copied from American techniques," a banker may say in the opening moments of a conversation, "but now we are doing better on our own' "The United States is still ahead of us medically," observes a doctor at a Tokyo hospital, "but before long we will catch up " Thus for the Japanese the great importance of Tanaka's meeting with Chou, of Tokyo's rapprochement with Peking, was that it proved Japan had indeed "caught up" with the United States diplomatically If Nikon can produce better cameras, if Sony can market better tape recorders, then Tanaka can manufacture a better foreign policy No matter that Japanese use Japanese-English words for "taperekoodo' and "terebi" and even "rajio no nyuusu " Forget that Nixon set the example first, that the same honor guard that Donald Kirk is the Far East cor respondent for the Chicago Tribune greeted Tanaka had already been satellited by TV m February It is proof enough of the Japanese sue cess story that its own prime minister could do what Nixon had done —only do it better Of greater significance, the Japanese public seemed much more united in its approval of Tanaka's venture than the Americans had been for Nixon's Aside from a few diehards in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP), it was almost impossible to find anyone who really opposed the trip The opposition, if you want to call it by that term, was totally stymied, the Socialists, after all, had been demanding a "new China policy" for years, and they got it What else could they say...

...What if the Soviet Union makes serious overtures toward Taiwan (There have been re ports for several years of "contact" between Moscow and Taiwan, but they appear extremely tenuous at best ) As the United States withdraws militarily from Asia, as its troops pull out of Japan and Korea, how can Japan possibly avoid a military build-up, just for defensive purposes...

...That internal struggle, rather than Tanaka's new foreign policy, may decide the future of Japan Such, at least, was my impression after witnessing the China trip live on television and the demonstration outside the American Army depot live in person "We will never stop fighting," one of the Socialists assured me, as a line of armored policemen stood between him and the APCs "We will carry our struggle throughout Japan We have just begun...

...Both," said one Japanese official "China," said another The final un derstanding that emerged from the dialogue was a masterful face-saving compromise Japan would indeed have to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but Peking would not insist that Japan also abandon its economic ties with the Kuomin tang regime In other words, even though Japan could not technically adhere to a "two-Chinas" policy, it could still carry on business as usual —which may be much more important to the leaders here than diplomatic or military considerations Nor did Peking insist that Tokyo break off its mililtary ties with the United States The Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, always the target of Leftist demonstrations, will survive —although on a new basis that might not be altogether pleasing to the Americans "You cannot take everything too literally," was the essence of Tanaka's rather impatient reply to a Japanese reporter's inquiry about the status of the pact Meet ing the press at his residence on the afternoon of his homeward flight from Shanghai, Tanaka implied, but did not quite say, that the treaty would lose much of its meaning as a result of the new China policy So why upset the Americans, and the rest of Japan's pro-American trading partners in Southeast Asia and other coiners of the world, by abrogating a treaty that might not be very meaningful in the event of a showdown ? The government indicated its am bivalent attitude in its position on demonstrations in front of the gate ot an American Army depot repairing tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) for shipment to Vietnam Some 5,000 not policemen broke up a 45-day radical encampment outside the gate, permitting 10 trucks laden with canvas-shrouded APCs to roar down the highway to the port of Yokohama amid the shouts and taunts of the mob Having insured that much compliance with the treaty, government officials then urged the Americans to cease using the repair depot by 1974 The key to any understanding of Japan today lies not so much in apparent divisions but in the final capacity for achieving unity and mutual agreement Historians and political scientists have written many learned works tracing the causes of this unity deep into Japan's evolution from a conglomerate of militaristic fiefdoms to a highly centralized state While it might not serve much purpose to reiterate this background, my feeling from observing events here over the past summer is that one cannot overemphasize the drive for cohesion m this most organized of modern societies And yet, after grasping the sense of centripetal force that governs Japanese society, one must still probe and dissect the overall framework to find the differences—and the dangers Tanaka's China trip represents only one side of Japan's quest for a neutral, independent stance amid the other great powers with interests in Asia What happens after the Japan-U S Security Treaty loses all meaning and is perhaps discarded entirely...