Kremlin Paranoia

...The mailed fist is meant to impress the Arabs that any withdrawal was the result of U.S./ Israeli inability to withstand Soviet armed might...

...Meanwhile, each encounter with Kremlin obduracy plunges Washington observers into the depths of depression, and any Soviet diplomat's ritual obeisance to the formula of "peaceful settlement" leads to a state of euphoria...

...It is not so much that Soviet Jews are suffering because of Middle East considerations, but rather that Moscow's animus toward Israel is exacerbated by a paranoid obsession with the "Jewish Question...

...Although the Soviets have undoubtedly recouped some of the prestige lost as a result of the Six Day War, the symbol of their inability to "liquidate the consequences" of that debacle still waves defiantly over Israeli bunkers along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights...

...Of course, this fits into the traditional framework of the diplomatic game Moscow has played for several decades and, as such, bears the hallmarks of an essentially rational approach...

...Thus it faces a very real dilemma: It must either leap into the uncertain realm of full-scale war against a superb army, with the U.S...

...These relate primarily to the Kremlin's fixation with all matters involving Jews--above all Soviet Jews, who have become the kgb's security preoccupation...

...Yet there are also nonrational aspects to Soviet policy...

...Avigdor Dagan and Aaron S. Klieman seem to feel uncomfortable with this understandably frightening phenomenon and have therefore chosen to focus on the much more manageable "diplomatic" factors in the Soviet behavior pattern...

...Moreover, while there are easily comprehensible global and regional arguments for Moscow's general Middle East policy, the degree of venom and hysterical vituperation aimed at ''Zionists" (a transparent surrogate for "Jews") can only be explained by a Weltanschauung nourished by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion rather than the Communist Manifesto...

...Moscow knows very well that its Arab clients are incapable of storming these bunkers, and it is not sure to what extent direct Soviet military intervention would be tolerated by the United States...

...Both authors contribute to an understanding of Soviet policy in the Middle East, avoiding the journalistic cliches that so often interfere with clear analysis...

...Judging from certain revealing commentaries, like those written by the authoritative "observer" E. Primakov, the Kremlin believes that conflicting interests may eventually lead Washington to pressure Israel, as in 1957, into a unilateral rollback from the Suez Canal--something Moscow is incapable of effecting on its own...

...Eager to avoid this unpalatable choice, Russian policymakers are apparently counting on a third option...

...This is not to imply that a traditional, raison d'etat analysis of Soviet policy in the Middle East is irrelevant...

...In Soviet Russia and the Middle East, Klieman presents a well-integrated regional evaluation...

...forgotten entirely is Moscow's adherence to the Clausewitzian concept that force and diplomacy are simply means to achieve a fundamental political goal...

...Sixth Fleet looming ominously close, or confess to its clients that it cannot regain for them the territories lost in June 1967 (largely as a result of the Soviet "information" which precipitated that conflict...

...It is a striking fact that the Soviet communications media, including local newspapers, give absurdly disproportionate coverage to Jewish and Israeli topics, as if they were of greater concern to the Kremlin than events in the U.S., China or Germany...

...This can be accomplished, Soviet leaders seem to feel, by a calculated mixture of threats and blandishments...

...The time has come, however, to recognize that there are other, less "civilized" factors operating in the Kremlin, and that a truly realistic appraisal must include this unfortunate reality...

...Tactics--i.e., confrontation versus negotiation--continue to be mistaken for policy...

...ask Western journalists, analysts and government officials, apparently believing Soviet policy there constitutes some kind of riddle...

...Dagan's Moscow and Jerusalem is a carefully documented, well-informed history of Soviet-Israeli relations, although sometimes he gives the impression that for reasons of professional discretion he must skirt lightly around certain delicate episodes...

...At the same time, occasional references to a "peaceful" or "political" settlement are intended to fill Western hearts with such joy at the thought of avoiding violence that few questions will be asked about the precise nature of the Soviet-sponsored solution...

...Reviewed by Uri Ra'anan Professor of International Politics, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy "What is Moscow's game in the Middle East...

...For similar reasons, perhaps, he seems reluctant to deal with the nonrational aspects of Soviet policy...

...He tends to view the USSR as a basically "normal" state, devoting only cursory attention to the peculiarly Soviet dimensions of Moscow's decision-making process...