Rise of the Third Reich

...Weinberg shifts the focus from the well-documented period immediately preceding the war to 1933-36, when the fateful course of later events was actually determined...

...He also made extensive use of a particularly interesting collection of Czechoslovak diplomatic correspondence seized by the Nazis in 1939 (and brought to Washington with other captured documents of the Third Reich...

...And while the two great Communist powers have demonstrated commendable restraint in recent years, they nonetheless have shown a tendency to capitalize on the weakness of others, or even to attempt to induce such weakness...

...His opponents were unhappy about what the German dictator was doing yet, lacking the will to oppose him, they "were determined to make certain that they would not find a way" to obstruct his designs...

...And for domestic rather than international reasons the task was entrusted to Hitler, a man as unscrupulous as he was determined to develop his nation's might to the utmost...

...As long as the U.S...

...Taylor's description...

...The concept of containment--the true antithesis of appeasement--has survived as the guiding principle of our foreign policy because most Americans still want it that way...

...The introductory chapter, entitled "The World through Hitler's Eyes," offers little new information about the Fuhrer's expansionistic ambitions, yet rarely has the case been stated so clearly and convincingly...

...the liberal Left is fearful that the men in charge of our foreign policy will not respond adequately to diminishing international tensions...

...The reader cannot escape a sense of inevitability in the drama of the '30s...

...Western leaders, of course, must take their cues from the mood of the majority of their constituents...

...But the faults were not those of individual politicians alone...

...At least in the Western democracies, the leadership reflected the weariness and short-sightedness of electorates excessively preoccupied with domestic problems...

...Hitler trod his path "with a combination of caution and bravado, of opportunism and consistency," Weinberg maintains, his political style "was clear in its ends but entirely flexible in its means and instruments...

...The conservative Right, for instance, is concerned lest the West weaken in its resistance to Communism...

...But perhaps more to the point, the fact that they do is the great difference between our times and those of 35 years ago...

...Similarly, Weinberg leaves little doubt that the crisis touched off by German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 could hardly have ended other than it did...

...Official policies could not deviate too far from the popular mood, although more courage and guidance of the public could have been expected of men whose vocation it was to steer the ship of state...

...Unlike the usual, deservedly criticized narrow accounts of activities at the various chancellories, this is social and intellectual history of diplomacy at its best...

...To be sure, none of today's potential aggressors approaches Hitler's monstrous depravity, a change due perhaps as much to the ultimate ignominious failure of the Nazi dictator as to anything else...

...The "diplomatic revolution" of 1933-36 consisted of Germany's dramatic transformation "from a barely accepted equal on the European stage . . . [to] the dominant power on the Continent...

...In relations among nations, like those among men, aggression is usually aided, however unintentionally, by its victims...

...Thus, the Nazi dictator is not seen as either a madman--the image that emerges, for example, from Shirer's account--or the equally implausible "conventional, though no doubt a wicked statesman"--A.J.P...

...remains committed to this stance--at least in principle, if not necessarily in tactics--there is reasonable hope that we will continue to benefit from the lesson of the '30s that Weinberg's book restates with both elegance and force...

...The seemingly fruitless encounter between Hitler and Sir John Simon in 1935, for example, was decisive to future developments because it shaped the basic assumptions on which both sides subsequently acted: "Hitler gave an impression of deep sincerity, Sir John of weakness...

...Acting Director, Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University Concerned thinkers and intellectual jongleurs have recently become intrigued by the question of whether what happened in Europe in the early 1930s can happen here or, indeed, is not already happening...

...This is no excuse for the dismal performance of Western and Soviet statesman, who proved so deficient in judgment, backbone and professionalism...

...The aid Hitler's weak and disunited opponents unwittingly gave to his easy success in the 1930s is well known...

...Interestingly, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany shows how our appreciation of Nazi aggression has been matured by revisionist enterprises, although in the end the traditional view is closer to the mark...

...To some, the fatigue of the peoples and the incompetence of their leaders suggest a link between the '30s and our own times...

...Reviewed by Vojtech Mastny Assistant Professor of History...

...It adds importantly to our understanding of the origins of World War II, a subject that has become somewhat sterile because of repeated reinterpretations of essentially the same material by both the "revisionists" and their critics...

...But prospective little Hitlers do exist, particularly in the Third World where Europe's chastising experience of two great wars is lacking...

...But Weinberg goes beyond the confines of conventional diplomatic history to show how, in the process of appeasement, the mere attitudes taken and impressions made often mattered as much as any concrete acts...

...Gerhard Weinberg's book contributes significantly to the answer by authentically recreating the international political mood at the time...

...The course of events could have been different only if Hitler were not Hitler, Simon not Simon, Laval not Laval...

...In researching those years, he not only combed the rich archives of the German Foreign Office but took full advantage of receiving access to diplomatic and military records...

...He accepted the possibility of war, "but he clearly did not think the contingency very likely...

...Citing the factors responsible for this ultimately catastrophic development, Weinberg stresses that in contrast to the other European powers, Germany's latent strength was not decisively impaired by its World War I defeat...

...Consequently the outcome of the ensuing crises was predictable and it is futile to speculate about missed opportunities to stop Hitler...

...What is more, the author took special care to document it from contemporary evidence rather than from later testimony that benefited from hindsight...

...it was merely a matter of time before the country's potential would be realized...

...Hitler risked very little by challenging the status quo with that deliberate provocation...

...Thoroughly familiar with all the arguments about the nature of Hitler's foreign policy, Weinberg does not fall into any revisionist traps...