Egypt's New Strategy

...At the same time, Sadat reportedly suspects that--except in the unlikely event of an unconditional Israeli withdrawal--any protracted refusal to fight for recovery of the occupied territories could lead to an attempt by the hawkish younger officers to replace him...

...The hope was that Sadat, unencumbered by any personal stigma for the 1967 defeat, would decide to make his mark by improving the lot of Egypt's poor instead of by chasing after glory on the battlefield...

...Even without an accompanying general offensive to recapture the Sinai Peninsula, such a bridgehead would sharply boost Egyptian military prestige and make it possible for Sadat to seek a new, more favorable Security Council resolution...

...In fact, however, as February 5 --the expiration date of the second cease-fire--approached, his speeches became increasingly bellicose...

...As a result, Mrs...

...Thus his only hope of "winning back with blood what has been lost in blood" (a favorite phrase of Egyptian speech writers) was to actively involve Russian soldiers on Egypt's side...

...Like those involving Suez alone, though, they are clouded in contradiction and at best constitute tentative first steps toward peace...

...Israeli officials do not look upon this as inevitably doomed to failure, especially if an effective face-saving formula for the Egyptian President can be devised...

...Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fawzi is believed to favor this course, and he is reportedly urging his boss to continue a political rather than military strategy...

...Nasser's sudden death, it will be recalled, pushed Sadat into power just before the three-month ceasefire along the Suez Canal was due to expire...

...In addition, he implied that Israeli ships would be given rights of passage through the canal, as well as the Straits of Tiran, but only after solution of the refugee problem...

...A genuine peace settlement--under whatever formal name--is the obvious precondition for alleviating Egyptian dependence on Moscow and undermining Soviet influence in Cairo...

...Yet the offer--hinging at the moment on Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories captured in the Six Day War--is more complicated than some might think...

...Eagerness to enable him to extend the moratorium was said to have been a major reason for the profusion of pro-Arab resolutions approved by various UN bodies at the time, exceeding what has become a customary bias for the world organization since its domination by the Afro-Asian and Communist nations...

...Indeed, that explains why some very responsible people here did not immediately dismiss as empty propaganda Sadat's proposal early in February to reopen the Suez Canal in exchange for a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai...

...Israeli experts believe, though, that Sadat recognizes the risks involved...

...This could be accomplished by gradually escalating the shooting until Soviet pilots in Egypt were finally compelled to engage in combat with Israeli pilots, thereby placing Moscow's prestige on the line...

...expanded more rapidly than at any previous time in 22 years of friendly relations...

...A second alternative would be a massive effort to cross the Suez Canal in force and establish a major bridgehead on the east bank...

...This means that to reach an understanding with Washington, Cairo would have to risk incurring the Kremlin's displeasure, with some possibly unpleasant consequences for Egypt's leaders...

...When this stage was reached in the scenario, Jerusalem was supposed to throw up its hands and retreat, rather than face the destruction of its entire Air Force...

...For all its superficial similarities to a scheme put forth by General Dayan, the original Egyptian plan was quite different: Instead of calling for a thinning out of forces on both sides of Suez and a clearing of the waterway for ships of every nation, including Israel, Sadat offered to open Suez to all ships except Israel's--after the Jewish State's partial, unilateral retreat from the east bank...

...One theory held that Sadat had concluded he could not get the Israelis out of Sinai without either concluding a formal peace or winning a major victory in a new round of warfare...

...The Jarring talks have apparently become both an instrument and a symbol of this policy...

...Meir again responded mildly, expressing Israel's long-standing position that it is ready to enter "meaningful negotiations relevant to a peace agreement...

...When the late President Nasser decided to respond to the Rogers initiative, he obviously hoped to begin mending his country's badly battered relations with the U.S...

...OUT FROM NASSER'S SHADOW Egypt's New Strategy BY ELIAHU SALPETER Tel Aviv An old Jewish proverb has it that a clever man can get out of a tight corner, but a wise man would not paint himself into one in the first place...

...Certainly Cairo's announced willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel is a dramatic demarche...

...Some of the older officers and most high-ranking bureaucrats, on the other hand, were believed to be counseling a political course: Try to win the maximum from Israel by diplomatic and political means and leave the use of arms for a later date, when victory will be safely assured...

...On the home front, the relaxation of tensions accompanying the cessation of hostilities has been welcomed by most of the urban population...

...And nobody believes there is any possibility of that one chance materializing relatively quickly...

...Even a more pro-Arab interpretation of present Four Power instructions to Jarring would be thought a significant political gain...

...By now it must be clear to everyone in Cairo that the key to moving the Israelis away from the Suez Canal and out of Sinai by political means lies in the hands of Washington, not Moscow...

...At least that would appear to be the case from the rapid developments giving promise to the peace efforts of special United Nations mediator Gunnar V. Jarring...

...But Washington would only exert its influence if the Israeli withdrawal also brought about a substantial reduction of Soviet influence in the Arab world...

...It also should not be forgotten that a smokescreen of propaganda and diplomatic maneuvering often obscures objectives in the Middle East, and that Sadat's real intent is still unclear...

...But the odds against the gap between Egyptian and Israeli minimum demands being closed are seen here as about 10-1...

...Moreover, Cairo must remember that twice in the past, 1956 and 1967, its brinkmanship boomeranged...

...That is clear from the pattern of events during the six months following Israel's acceptance of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' Mideast initiative, marked by the Soviet-Egyptian missile-freeze violation on the western side of the Suez Canal: Cooperation between the Jewish State and the U.S...

...A resumption of hostilities would stymie the UN intermediary's efforts, if not bury them for good...

...Short of that, a favorable rewording of the 1967 Security Council resolution would be considered a worthwhile reward...

...Meir altered her initial flat rejection of the Egyptian proposal...

...The third theory envisioned two conflicting approaches to the problem within the Egyptian power structure...

...Actually, it was primarily a 30-day grace he gave to himself to make up his mind about two crucial, interrelated questions: Should Egypt resume shooting on March 7, or should it press efforts to improve relations with the only power that may be able to persuade Israel to leave Sinai...

...Sadat's third alternative--the one he already appears to be pursuing--would be to abandon military threats and begin serious negotiations...

...Effective Western pressure to force the Israelis to move back without a proper quid pro quo from the Arabs would be the most desirable result of this tactic...

...Eliahu Salpeter is a member of the editorial board of Ha'aretz, one of Israel's leading newspapers...

...simply to satisfy those who are impatient with the lack of diplomatic and political progress in "liquidating the consequences of Israeli aggression...

...What are the logical alternatives for Sadat on or about March 7? One would be to resume shooting on a limited scale--in an attempt to "implement the warning" he issued February 4--without provoking a major Israeli retaliation...

...Later he defined a partial withdrawal as one extending to "a line behind El Arish," which is 90 miles from the canal and includes nearly the entire occupied Sinai Peninsula...

...Nobody can guarantee that warfare, once resumed, will remain under control: "Crisis management" is not a strong point of Egypt, or of any other Middle Eastern country...

...It had the younger officers, representing the hawkish element, arguing that they were trained, equipped and ready for "the battle of destiny" with Israel "to restore the honor of the Egyptian soldier...

...Meanwhile, Prime Minister Golda Meir has made it clear that Israel will study carefully and sincerely any Egyptian document submitted through Ambassador Jarring, but will not negotiate under the threat of an Egyptian 30-day ultimatum...

...Sadat represented his cease-fire extension as a one-month grace period for Israel to begin implementing the Egyptian and Soviet interpretation of the November 1967 UN Security Council resolution...

...And in recent weeks he has been showing signs of wanting the answer to be affirmative...

...His hope was that in response to threats of renewed fighting, the West--particularly Washington --would agree to compensate him for any display of "reasonableness...

...Consequently, despite the optimism expressed in some quarters, the specter of renewed warfare along the Suez Canal this spring still casts a dark shadow over this country...

...Yet many Israelis wonder whether he really sees the two approaches as mutually exclusive...

...The peace plans Egypt's President then put forward toward the end of February naturally overshadowed these earlier developments...

...Diplomatic circles in Jerusalem had three explanations for his behavior...

...Speaking before Parliament, she simply restated Israel's policy on reopening the Canal...

...According to another theory, Sadat never really thought the Russians would risk armed confrontation with the U.S...

...But Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan has publicly warned that any large-scale Egyptian crossing of the Canal would be crushed so decisively as to make the 1967 debacle look like a mild spanking--and Cairo knows he is not given to blustering about the Israeli Army...

...It is Egypt's international dilemma, though, that poses the most delicate problems...

...To the proponents of this view, Sadat's decision to extend the cease-fire one month only indicates a compromise between the hawks and doves...

...He appeared to be intentionally taking positions from which he could not retreat without serious loss of face --or to be trying to convince the West this was so...

...In any event, it is evident that Egypt's new President faces two dilemmas, one at home and one abroad...

...He was not prepared to pay the political price of the former, nor could he achieve the latter by himself--as he was probably well aware--for the Egyptian Army still was no match for the Israelis...

...The middle class in the cities is not exactly enthusiastic about the Soviets' growing influence in their country, yet they--as well as Sadat--are well aware that a new military adventure would heighten Egypt's dependence on Russian support and increase Moscow's pressure on Cairo...

...The confusion surrounding the whole issue notwithstanding, strong voices within the Israeli Cabinet argued for testing whether Sadat was seeking a modus vivendi...

...Day by day he raised the ante for any further extension of the truce, setting conditions that could not be met before the deadline regardless of Israel's reaction to them...

...The further Cairo moves from a peaceful solution, however, the less likely it is to weaken the Jerusalem-Washington ties...

...Receiving vital arms deliveries, dollar credits and political support from the White House, Israel became more sympathetic and responsive to the tactical considerations that determine American policy in the Middle East...

...At this writing it would seem that Sadat has opted for the latter...

...Applying this yardstick to his performance since he took over last September as Egypt's President, the only question that remains to be answered about Anwar el-Sadat is whether he is a clever man...

...After strenuous Cabinet debate, Mrs...

...Not surprisingly, the same six months saw a significant improvement in communications between Cairo and Washington...

...Thus Moscow--while it opposes full-scale hostilities that might erupt into a Soviet-American confrontation--has no interest in seeing such a peace established or in eliminating the Israeli bogey...