Shadows in the Middle East

...Thus Mrs Meir is thought to have asked Nixon to assure her that his visit to the USSR next May would not produce an imposed settlement What she reportedly obtained was a pledge not to dicker with Moscow over the Middle East without consulting Israel Truly, one of the more urgent diplomatic imperatives confonting Israel at the moment is to communicate to Nixon precisely what it will and will not do to arrive at the bargaining table??east he propose to the Soviets concessions Israel would not deliver There is a certain weakness in Israel's position on this matter Any argument about conditions, preconditions and other procedural or technical aspects of negotiations inevitably elicits questions about the Jewish State's fundamental substantive aims on boundaries, security guarantees, refugees, Jerusalem, etc...

...Some Israeli observers feel that Jerusalem should respond to State Department queries about its "minimum terms" by asking Washington first to state its long-range intentions in the Middle East They argue that Mrs Meir's main objective in meanwhile, indicate that ever fewer Israelis believe the Arabs are willing to make peace Probably as a consequence, there is a parallel decline in the already small number of those who expressed themselves ready to give back all or almost all the territories occupied in June 1967, and a marked increase of those who would object to any substantial terntorial revisions Still, the polls show that the majority of Israelis remain willing to exchange terntory for peace But??and the Arabs would be wise to note this??their propoition is definiely talks with Nixon, Rogers and congressional leaders of both parties should have been to get answers to questions like Is the U S only regrouping its forces in Europe and the Mediterranean' Or is it pulling back from all overseas commitments??including its presence on the southern flank of Europe' And should Israel therefore accommodate itself to the new situation as fast as it can' This course of action was recently suggested by Six Day War General and now Professor Matityahu Peled m a much debated newspaper article Current public opinion soundings, nitely decreasing as the Arab position appears more intransigent In fact, one again hears considerable criticism of the government's retreat two summers back, under American pressure, from its June 1967 position that peace could be discussed only in direct negotiations with the Arabs Agreeing to Gunnar V Jarring's mediation is today seen, even outside Right-wing Herat concles, as the root of Israel's present diplomatic dilemma It is more convincing to say that Arab refusal to bargain face-to-face proves their unwillingness to make peace, than to say that Israel would go to war before permitting Egyptian troops to cross the Suez Canal The government would like to find a way to let Sadat out of the corner his crescendo of threats have painted him into And for a time there was some small hope that this could be achieved by accepting (he suggestion of the African Piesidents (of Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zane) who were sent to Israel and Egypt on a peace mission by the Organization of African Unity??namely, that the Jarring talks be resumed without preconditions But that hope has grown exceedingly faint since several of the OAU's member states joined in submitting to the UN General Assembly a draft resolution calling upon Israel to announce, prior to negotiations, its intention to withdraw from all of the Sinai peninsula In any event, a resumption of the Jarring talks on a basis acceptable to Israel would require a significantly modified attitude on the part of both Sadat and Jarring??and they display little inclination to be flexible Consequently, the resumption of hostilities in the not too distant future is taken here as a distinct possibility, while in Egypt it is seen as a certainty Military commentators in each camp are discussing in what form Cairo should or would choose to restart the war Israeli experts assume that if the Egyptians do start, it will be with very limited and well-defined political goals either to compel UN intervention to freeze the battle lines after an initial success, or to "soften' the Israehs with heavy casualties from shelling or hit-and-run commando raids But judging by past experience, Israel's forces are not likely to remain passive while absorbing mortal blows The trouble with "limited" war in the Middle East, as elsewhere, is that it has a tendency to get out of hand, even when neither opponent wants it to...

...Sadat can construct at least two alternative scenarios that make military adventurism seem attractive, even reasonable In one, an all-out Egyptian effort to establish several bridgeheads across the Canal would immediately be followed by a Soviet-sponsored UN Security Council cease-fire, to be imposed before the Israelis have a chance to chase the Egyptians back In the other, Egypt would resume its "war of attrition" against Israeli positions in the Smai, but this time under the umbrella of the Soviet-manned missile and mig air-defense system The Israelis would suffer extremely heavy casualties, and be unable to retaliate with the same force they employed in the summer of 1970 Stymied by the Russians, they would ultimately have to accept Cairo's terms for an interim and permanent settlement...

...One can also assume that she tried to secure from Nixon a commitment to restrain the Soviets if Sadat resumes the shooting Though she is not so naive as to have requested (or felt the need for) unconditional guarantees, she would like some reason to believe Moscow will hesitate to involve itself directly in fighting in and over the Sinai, its active involvement west of the Suez Canal is a fait accompli...

...Both scenanos, however, presuppose that Washington, the Secunty Council and??most important ??Israel will behave as Egypt expects them to, a large and unlikely supposition Of greater concern to Jerusalem, therefore, is the possibility that Sadat's threats, hollow or not, will induce Washington to demand "more flexibility" on Secretary of State William P Rogers' six-point plan for reopening the Suez Canal Israel is totally opposed to this interim measure, which calls for the stationing of Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Canal??I e , beyond the Bar Lev Line??in exchange for a temporary extension of the informal cease-fire One can assume that Mrs Meir, with no promise of renewed Phantom deliveries, did her best to chip away away the President's support for the Rogers proposal...

...For all his due warnings...

...Dayan and Abba Eban as well as the Prune Minister have warned him to this effect repeatedly But the question is how strong does the deterrent look from Cairo—and if it proves insufficient, how high would the price of another Israeli victory be' Far from mollifying the Arab states by withholding the Phantoms, Washington actually gives Sadat the impression that it is giving in to his blackmail It is intolerable, Jerusalem officials maintain, that the hands on the spigot of American arms supplies to Israel should, for all practical purposes, be those of Egypt's President Another factor prompting Mrs Meir's visit was that the end of 1971, the tune Sadat had set for a final decision on war or peace, was drawing near Under his terms, the decision depends exclusively on whether Israel agrees, as a precondition to any mdirect talks, to withdraw from all territories occupied in June 1967.Mrs Men contends that if one party accepts the other's maximum demands in advance of negotiations, there remains nothing to negotiate...

...Eliahu Salpeter, our i egular Middle East coi lespondent, is a member of the editorial boaid of Ha'aretz, one of Israel's leading newspapers...

...Here again, the Phantoms enter Israel's argument Assuming, as seems most likely, that Moscow prefers to limit its participation m any future conflagration to avoid the possibility of a major-power confrontation, it will want to do everything it can to lower its expenses and profile But the stronger Israel's Air Force is, the more planes the Soviets must commit??and the more reluctant they will be to do so??of an Egyptian campaign east of the Canal is to have the slightest chance of success...

...Officially, Israeli requests to purchase additional Phantoms??filed as far back as February??are still "under consideration " Unofficially, Washington explains its delay by two arguments first, since Israel already enjoys considerable qualitative air superiority over Egypt, supplying more muscle would merely heighten the temptation to use it, second, a new shipment of Phantoms would destroy whatever chance the U S may yet have of steering Cairo toward an interim or permanent peace settlement No doubt Mrs Meir disagreed It is true that even lacking the jets Israel is strong enough to defeat Egypt, should President Anwar el-Sadat choose to resume the war, Moshe...

...To Israel it seems that the answers to these questions should be the very subject of peace negotiations, and therefore cannot be given in advance Yet Israel is also aware the Americans do not share this view...

...Israelis say, Sadat must know that if he opts for wai he will be badly beaten again His own chief of staff, Major General Saad Hussem al-Shazh, is said to have told a meeting of Arab defense ministers earlier this month that the Israelis are still twice as strong as the Egyptians, and two weeks ago Jordan's King Hussem openly admitted that the Arab side is not prepared for war There have been persistent reports, too, that during Sadat's last trip to Moscow he was advised not to anticipate direct Soviet intervention on his behalf????for now, anyway, shooting across the Suez Canal would complicate President Nixon's spring talks in the Kremlin Nevertheless, Washington and, ever increasingly, Jerusalem have begun to take Sadat's threats more seriously, remembering that Egypt's rulers have not always been guided by reason in the past Moreover, it is quite possible that by the intensity of his fulminations and the frequency of his deadlines Sadat has painted himself into a corner from which the only exit may seem a renewal of hostilities...

...That Washington continues to "defer" its decision on delivery of the Phantoms is taken by many here to indicate a brewing American-Soviet deal on the Middle East Secretary Rogers' recent commendation of "Soviet restraint" in arms shipments to Egypt, mentioned in conjunction with an explanation of State Department policy on the Phantoms, reinforced Israeli anxieties over such a deal...

...NEARING SADAT'S DEADLINE Shadows in the Middle East BY ELIAHU SALPETER Tel Aviv When Prime Minister Golda Meir left for Washington late last month, no one here really expected President Nixon to repudiate his State Department's "no-Phantoms" line, which has become a symbol of current U S policy m the Middle East Nor, on the other hand, did anybody think two astute politicians??one less than a year from elections, the other two years??could agree to meet without first being certain that there was little chance of subsequent embarrassment So now that Mrs Meir has returned with assurances of continuing American support but without the warplanes, commentators are finding it difficult to decide whether her trip was a success or a failure—or neither...