Political Maneuvering in Saigon

...BIG' MINHS CHALLENGE Political Maneuvering in Saigon BY DONALD KIRK OUR PROBLEM is to win the peace, not the war," remarked Senator Vu Van Man during a recent interview in the old white-columned Senate building that laces a fetid canal "The regime should propose entirely free elections--and let the people themselves decide what kind of government they want Only the people can decide " Since one is likely to hear almost any viewpoint m Saigon's tangled political environment, these comments might not seem particularly significant What makes them so, however, is the fact that in last August's senatorial elections Mau, a professor at Saigon University, led a slate of 10 candidates to victory over one slate regarded as pro-government and another considered moderate Mau's suggestion of Vietcong electoral participation was in effect a challenge to President Nguyen Van Thieu, whose October 31 State of the Nation address accused those advocating a coalition with the Communists of "betraying" the country Thieu stated baldly what every political observer here already knew Under no circumstances would the government support a peace proposal that was acceptable to the Communists (They themselves, of course, have rejected any coalition including Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky or Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem ) In the light of Senator Mau's popularity, Saigon's ruling triumvirate may find it impossible either to suppress his views or inhibit the growth of his political power But looming even more ominous for the top three at the moment is the prospect of a showdown with General Duong Van Minh--who led the 1963 coup against the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem, was exiled to Thailand after only three months in power, and then returned (with Thieu's apparent blessing) in 1968 Like Vu Van Mau, "Big" Minh has assiduously wooed and won the favor of students, monks and laymen affiliated or allied with the An Quang pagoda, headquarters of the militant antigovernment wing of the Buddhist Church of Vietnam Again like Mau, he owes his popularity in large measure to the publicity and sympathy offered by Buddhist intellectuals too fearful of government reprisal to express their own views It is almost certain that "Big" Minh has decided to lead the crusade against Thieu, and many expect him to announce his candidacy in the near future As a hedge on such an announcement, though, Minh has said that he believes Thieu will seek to cancel or postpone the Presidential election, scheduled for the fall The general impression here is that if Minh were Thieu's sole opponent, he would coast to an easy victory But there is always the possibility that the campaign will be complicated by the entry of several lesser candidates, as in 1967 when the Thieu-Ky ticket ran first with only 33 per cent of the vote While Thieu might try to conjure up some technicality for calling off the election, it is extremely doubtful that he would have the power to arrest Minh The General's influence with both religious and military figures makes him unique among the President's opponents, for he cannot be manipulated or easily isolated from his sources of support Still, Thieu may attempt to intimidate him indirectly by criticizing and threatening anti-government monks and intellectuals, and by undermining the position of military officers thought loyal to Minh The game is one Thieu plays exceptionally well Indeed, he has repeatedly demonstrated his extraordinary ability to maintain power through a strategy of "divide and rule " But all his skill may not be sufficient to resist the mounting pressure here for peace through compromise And Minh appears determined to take full advantage of the situation The day after Thieu's State of the Nation call for complete defeat of the enemy--coincidentally, the seventh anniversary of the Diem ouster --Minh declared peace to be the country's "priority objective' He also seemed to embrace the growing anti-American sentiment among Vietnamese politicians and intellectuals by urging an end to the nation's dependence on foreign aid "With all the goodwill m the world," he noted, "foreigners can neither grasp the psychology nor fully understand the aspirations of the people of Vietnam, nor the genuine needs and special conditions of Vietnamese society " Minh's words were obviously designed for more than local consumption He and his aides hoped these views would mesh with Washington's aim of extricating itself from Vietnam Senator Mau, enlarging on Minh's "stategy for peace," noted that the US, like Minh, was "more interested in ending the fighting than winning the war " Several political analysts m Saigon--including members of Thieu's camp--believe Washington may support Thieu's peace-minded opponents in the Presidential election American diplomats and other important members of the local U S Establishment have tended to corroborate these suspicions, remarking that the U S is not wedded to Thieu but rather will support any candidate capable of winning a plurality of the votes Washington, to be sure, can assume a powerful, perhaps even decisive, role in any campaign by juggling the dispensation of aid funds, the timing of statements favorable to the government, and so forth It was, after all, American pressure that compelled Ky, then Prime Minister, to run for Vice President on Thieu's slate m 1967 At that point the U S feared Ky's candidacy for President would destroy completely any semblance of political unity Now, however, it may be inclined to let Ky run against Thieu to split the vote and thus enhance Minh's chances of victory Three other key factors enter into the impending political showdown First is the military strength of the North Vietnamese, who may in the next two or three months launch a dry-season offensive m South Vietnam's northern provinces Should they inflict a decisive defeat on the arvn forces, Thieu's prestige could be so diminished that he would have to accept some form of compromise In fact, Thieu, Ky and Khiem might be compelled--By a combination of military pressure from without and political pressure from within--to abandon politics Another factor is the possibility of a revolt against Thieu by Rightist generals who find his policies vis-a-vis the Communists too weak The leading light of this faction is Ky To date he has avoided a direct confrontation with Thieu, but he may only be biding his time Other Rightist generals--among them Do Cao Tri, who controls forces m the provinces around Saigon--have also evinced an interest m politics Finally, the government may yet succumb to economic--rather than military or political--problems Thieu has failed in his efforts to curb widespread corruption and skyrocketing inflation, much to the discontent of the peasants and workers, who otherwise show no interest in affairs of the capital Observers are not predicting "collapse"-a Western term that bears little meaning m an agrarian Asian society--but they do believe the government may become too unpopular in the countryside to implement its programs If Thieu's economic difficulties worsen by the fall, the appeal of a Presidential candidate with a peace-and-prosperity platform may well be irresistible Donald Kirk regularly reports in these pages from Southeast Asia...