Double Impasse in the Mideast

SALPETER, ELIAHU

THE LEGACY OF SUSPICION Double Impasse in the Mideast BY ELIAHU SALPETER TEL AVIV WHATEVER the achievements, it any, of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' Middle East trip earlier this month,...

...Israel, however, would have been content to see a narrowing of Egypt's credibility gap...
...Ironically, it was the formation of the new federation that also seemed to provoke the abortive "coup" against Nasser's successor two weeks ago...
...Finally, Jerusalem demands that Egypt end its state of belligerence, and that there be no time limit on the cease-fire—robbing Cairo and Moscow of their ability to threaten what Washington fears most, a resumption of hostilities...
...To insure these conditions, Israel would patrol the territory returned to Egypt and Israeli troops would be pulled back only 8-12 miles, leaving the Canal well within distance of their long range artillery...
...The first inkling of an imminent power struggle came only two days before Rogers' arrival, when Vice President Aly Sabry, the most vigorous foe of the federation, was summarily dismissed and reportedly placed under house arrest...
...Egypt believed that an Israeli retreat from the well-fortified Bar-Lev Line would be the decisive step toward total recovery of the occupied territories...
...On the eve of Rogers' arrival in the Middle East, Cairo added that following the "first stage" of Israeli withdrawal it would merely clear the Canal...
...Egypt takes a hard line on reopening the Canal because it wants Israel's exodus from Sinai, not a lasting peace...
...He simply could not overcome in one week what his assistant secretary, Joseph J. Sisco, labeled the "legacy of suspicion" in the Middle East...
...This last statement followed Egypt's entry into a "Union of Arab Republics" with the militant regimes of Libya and Syria (Damascus being the only combatant in the Six Day War not to have accepted the November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution as a basis for ultimate settlement...
...Furthermore, Cairo insists on the right to move its troops across the Canal, meaning that Israel would actually facilitate the regrouping of Egyptian forces behind its best defense line...
...Israel is inflexible because it reads Cairo's plans as the groundwork for a later assault, perhaps behind the 1967 borders...
...Israel would thus have to give up almost as much territory in a limited settlement, without getting peace in return, as the Egyptians expect in an overall settlement...
...In the space of three months, President Anwar el-Sadat has successively offered to sign a peace agreement, refused to formally extend the Suez Canal cease-fire, insisted he still wants the Canal reopened, and declared that under no circumstances would he bargain with Israel...
...From an Egyptian point of view, Israel's conditions are equally unacceptable...
...As Secretary Rogers knew before he left Washington, Sadat's bellicose posturing with Qaddafi and Assad in the Libyan capital made Israel even less responsive than before to his plan for an overall settlement...
...THE LEGACY OF SUSPICION Double Impasse in the Mideast BY ELIAHU SALPETER TEL AVIV WHATEVER the achievements, it any, of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' Middle East trip earlier this month, the belief here is that they have been temporarily blunted by the subsequent political upheaval in Cairo...
...Hence Rogers came to the Middle East seeking an interim agreement: Israel would withdraw from the west bank of Suez and Egypt would reopen the Canal to international shipping...
...International shipping would not resume until Israel returned the entire Sinai Peninsula...
...Nasser had often sung the praises of peaceful settlement, safe in the knowledge that while Western newsmen would report his enthusiasm for a peace treaty, the Egyptian press would infer simply that he would rather have Israel give up the occupied territories without another war...
...IN THIS CASE, though, the common interest in avoiding a resumption of shooting is unlikely to prove strong enough to prevail...
...Even then, Israeli vessels would not be allowed passage without the "restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people...
...These fragile hopes were jolted by his refusal to extend the cease-fire along the Suez, and then smashed in Benghazi...
...the Bar-Lev Line fortifications would remain intact and off-limits...
...The Canal would be opened to vessels of all nations almost immediately upon Israel's withdrawal?eliminating Cairo's main hope of mobilizing Western European pressure against Israel...
...As Assistant Secretary Sisco so decorously put it after his second round of consultations with Sadat, "we are not on the brink of a settlement...
...in other words, even if Israel accepted every last one of Egypt's own demands, Cairo would still claim belligerent status on behalf of a third party...
...Seven days after Rogers left, the dissidents made their move: Five Cabinet ministers and three prominent ASU officials resigned in an attempt to shake public confidence in Sadat...
...Yet such differences usually can be accommodated if the adversaries really want to make a deal...
...Some highly placed political observers in Jerusalem believe the parties could more easily agree on an overall settlement than on a partial or temporary one—which is to say that the Middle East is locked in a double impasse...
...The reaction of Israeli officials to the Egyptian crisis was perhaps best summed up by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who noted that while President Anwar el-Sadat had apparently strengthened his position, Israel doesn't know what that position is...
...Not surprisingly, Egypt also insists on a time limit, preferably not exceeding one year, for any new cease-fire...
...This has been the "legal basis" for barring Israel's use of the Canal since 1948...
...For although he was warmly received in the Arab states, he failed in the primary objeotive of his junket: progress toward a "partial" (as it is called in Jerusalem) or "temporary" (as it is called in Cairo) peace settlement...
...Accordingly, the "gap" remains wide, the chances for compromise slim...
...Neither Nasser nor Sadat, of course, ever hinted at peace with Israel in the latter sense...
...He came to the Middle East—if one may borrow President Nixon's definition of the aim of the Jarring negotiations?to keep the parties talking rather than shooting...
...Egypt would be permitted to send only police and civilians —no soldiers—across the Canal...
...He left with the momentum of conversation already ebbing, and the political turmoil in Cairo has now brought discussion to a precarious standstill...
...The Arabs have two words for "peace": One means the end (or absence) of war...
...Upon returning home, Rogers claimed to perceive a "narrowing of the gap" between the Israeli and Egyptian terms for reopening the Suez Canal...
...Despite Rogers' wishful thinking about a "narrowing of the gap," the conditions issued by each side for reopening the Canal remain mutually exclusive...
...With the negotiating positions hardening and the chances for peace receding, the State Department decided it must somehow maintain the momentum of discussion...
...the long-simmering opposition to Sadat within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's sole political organization...
...With that adroit maneuver Sadat had mobilized world opinion behind Egypt and sent Israel's image reeling, for in addition to endorsing the concept of peaceful settlement he appeared ready to have his words interpreted at home as they were abroad...
...But Sadat's response to the Jarring initiative did raise hopes that such an accord might someday be attained in the Middle East...
...The suggestion that Egyptian sovereignty might be subordinated to the new alliance brought to a boil ELIAHU SALPETER is a member of the editorial board of Ha'aretz, one of Israel's leading newspapers...
...Indeed, Sadat's signature on the Benghazi Pact, alongside those of Libya's fire-breathing Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi and Syria's Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad, marked a retreat to the principle of "no recognition, no negotiation, no peace" set forth in the notorious Khartoum Resolution of 1967...
...Sadat departed significantly from Nasser's stance by indicating to the Egyptian people his willingness to sign a joint document with Israel to formalize the terms of withdrawal...
...True, their objectives clashed: Israel assumed that once normal Canal commerce resumed, diplomatic pressure for a complete evacuation from Sinai would diminish considerably...
...the other implies settlement with reconciliation...
...Secretary Rogers obviously hopes that as long as there is discussion of a partial settlement, war will not break out for the absence of an overall solution...
...This seemed the most promising approach to a larger peace, since both Israel and Egypt had previously advanced the same proposal...
...But the President, responding quickly and decisively, arrested them, formed another Cabinet, and successfully rallied public support...
...Sadat's oscillating pronouncements on the Arab-Israeli dispute, some observers contend, were designed to keep his rivals at bay...
...Cairo demands that Israel withdraw to El Arish, virtually the pre-1967 border...
...A similar ambivalence greeted Rogers, whose efforts in personal diplomacy have been assessed more ?. personal than a diplomatic success...
...That may be, yet they not only failed internally but dissipated the diplomatic gains of his "positive response" to UN envoy Gunnar V. Jar-ring's mission last February...

Vol. 54 • May 1971 • No. 11


 
Developed by
Kanda Sofware
  Kanda Software, Inc.