Johnson, Vietnam and Instant History

...Perspectives JOHNSON, VIETNAM AND INSTANT HISTORY BY JOHN P ROCHE As a historian I find it both intriguing and infuriating to watch the "Battle of Johnson's Speech"—that seemingly interminable argument over who persuaded the President in March 1968 to deescalate the war in Vietnam The latest participant is Phil G Gouldmg, former Public Affairs Director at the Pentagon, who is promoting Robert S McNa-mara in the dove race In his just published Confiim or Dem Informing the People on National Secwm, Gouldmg notes that the former Defense Secretary recommended a bombmg cutback to the 20th Parallel in 1967 This should come as no shock, since I reported it myself more than a year ago, and it hardly qualifies McNa-mara as a dove (I was opposed to the bombing strategy from the day it started, but not on pacifist grounds I just do not believe you can substitute airplanes for infantry, though they are effective mobile artillery ) On another front, former Undersecretary of the Air Force Town-send Hoopes, whose The Limits of Intervention proved a quite inaccurate preemptive strike, is now flailing about trying to defend his version of the policy shift from the emergmg documented record His thesis is that he and some friends converted Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who in turn brought President Johnson to the path of reason Hoopes is in a difficult position because the record indicates that Clifford managed to do a number of things without first clearmg them with him True, Hoopes and his friends have some memos they passed among themselves, but his evidence of what went on in the White House, or in Rusk's office or, for that matter, in Clifford's, is thud-hand hearsay He heard from X, who learned from Y, who heard Clifford say that the President chewed the rug at the thought of a bombing halt, etc This is gossip, not history Hoopes' most recent "reconstruction" ("LBJ's Account of March, 1968," New Republic, March 14) is that Secretary Clifford never received a February 28, 1968, directive from Johnson asking for an examination of our alternatives in Vietnam Somebody oi other told Hoopes this, and on one recent occasion Clifford himself seemed to have trouble recalling the directive But the record, fortunately, is not based on hearsay or memoiy The memo was quite precise "What specific goals would the increment of forces if recommended [italics mine] aim to achieve What neJohn P Roche, a tegular contnb-utoi to these pages, was serving as Special Consultant to President Johnson dining the period of the contioversy under discussion here gotiatmg postures should we strike in general9 and what modifications [in bombing policy] would you recommend r>" These were among the questions asked and they clearly pertained to the whole matter of options in Vietnam Clifford got this directive, signed a receipt for it, and on March 4 responded, one by one, to the President's questions In other words, it is perfectly evident that the initiative for exploring alternative strategies in Vietnam came from Johnson But the mythmakers have had the field to themselves, for most of the items in the huge Vietnam files are highly classified, leaving those of us who are aware of their contents hamstrung I, for example, have avoided "the battle of Johnson's speech" for several reasons (1) The President should not have his memoirs scooped by his staff, (2) in principle, I dislike "instant history", and (3) there are laws governing the use of classified material Thus I have confined myself to correcting gross errors, as I did a year ago when I reported that it was Dean Rusk who injected the bombing cutback into the Vietnam discussion Now that President Johnson opened up the subject in his February 6 tv interview with Walter Cronkite I think a good deal more can be said, with appropriate use of paraphrase to avoid classification problems I should like to make clear, first, that I have no personal stake m the outcome of the argument I worked for Lyndon Johnson and never had any illusions about my own "power " He was the only President in the White House and he made his own decisions m his own way, without instructions from me I do have a professional stake however History should not be employed as a form of penance by officials in search of retrospective absolution The principal officers of the government in March 1968 were in quest of a sound policy in Vietnam, not in contest for "Dove of the Year " To understand all the efforts to rewrite the history of American involvement in Vietnam, and particularly of President Johnson's March 31, 1968, announcements, it is essential to appreciate the background of decisions made in 1963, 1964, 1965 In 1963 President John F Kennedy determined, for better or worse, that Southeast Asia was not expendable Realizing that Laos was not the place to make a stand, he decided the line would be drawn in South Vietnam With only a handful of dissenters (who argued that Thailand was preferable) the Kennedy Administration went to work on the problem All hands were Gung Ho Attorney General Robert F Kennedy became an expert on counter-insurgency, Arthur Schlesmger Jr went forth as Presidential Nuncio to the liberals to explain the virtues of the "domino theory," and there was not a dove to be found anywhere in town Roger Hilsman for instance, was then Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Although he later published a book suggesting he was the original dove, Hilsman was at the time a great counterinsurgency ("cowboys and Indians, in the phrase of one of his bosses) fan Paratroops were taught how to swim, sneak through jungles, mobilize the hearts and minds of peasants, and perform the other exploits symbolized by the Green Berets In general, Hilsman made his chief, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, look like a Quaker Indeed, in the fall of 1963, when the Ngo Dinh Diem government was m deep trouble, Rusk suppressed a Hilsman memo arguing that if Diem came out in tavor of a deal with Hanoi to neutralize Vietnam, then the United States should launch a coup in Saigon and bomb North Vietnam if the Communists attempted to intervene Rusk, who was not Gung Ho, was constantly cut up at Camelot cocktail parties for his lack of elan He was an anomaly at the Round Table, this sober, tight-lipped Georgian Power gave him no zest and his cold eyes rejected the pseudointi-macy of the White House staff (his views were reserved for those he trusted) In short, he just wasn't "clubable," as the British say He refused to join the fraternity of self-designated world shakers, and they have had their revenge m a dozen volumes Rusk's aloofness was not due to any innate lack of cordiality or intelligence It was simply founded on his experience He had been to the other side of the moon In 1950 he had confidently informed his bosses, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry Truman, that the Red Chinese were not going to intervene m the Korean War It was a tough judgment to make, and it was wrong (although it must be said that at the time the evidence was hard to evaluate) But from his error he learned a profound lesson about (to borrow a phrase) the arrogance of power With the exception of Rusk, the top figures in the Kennedy Administration looked on Vietnam as a war game, not a war Over at the Pentagon, scenarios were put through computers and there was general agreement that Hanoi would collapse with fright if the United States upped the ante In the White House, McGeorge Bundy, who was plugged mto the McNamara frequency, shared this technological optimism In 1964-65, when Johnson had to make the decisions—with the same set of advisers—he chose the McNamara course Johnson was President, and to the extent that a mistake was made, he made it On the basis of the advisory material he received, the President had a right to assume that our intervention—bombing the North and sending troops to the South—would end the crisis in about two years Three years later when he was preparing his speech, it was clear that his optimism of 1965 had been illusory He recalled that among his principal advisers in 1964-65 Rusk alone (with Undersecretary George Ball m support) had been skeptical of the technocratic formula for victory, had urged caution in escalating our response So it is hardly surprising that on March 4, 1968 when Dean Rusk said, "I think the time has come for a bombing pause," Lyndon Johnson took him seriously According to the "instant historians," there were two teams lmed up at opposite ends of the field that March The doves and hawks then went into battle, in the end the doves won and the President, with bitter reluctance, deescalated Not only is this a distortion of history, it is an absurd view of government that ignores a whole set of crucial variables The President wanted to win the war—that is, "win" in the Korean sense of persuading the Communists to end their aggression in the South—and all the principal officials shared his goal At issue was the appropriate strategy and tactics Rusk was not dovmg when he proposed a bombing halt, he urged it as a tactic designed to accomplish American objectives In fact, he was skeptical about its consequences—rightly so, as events have demonstrated—but he thought it an initiative worth taking There were, as Townsend Hoopes' effusions indicate, those m the government who looked on a bombing halt as the first step in an American retreat from Southeast Asia, a calculated liquidation of a liability A withdrawal was advocated for varying reasons the military allergy to "land war in Asia", a preference for nuclear containment of Asian Communism, a feeling that Europe and the Middle East should be the focus of our concern, and last but not least, the conviction that the war was dividing the nation and the Democratic party While I dissented strongly from this position, it was a legitimate analysis of national interest But what is important to recall about the discussions of March '68 is that the only top-level participant associated with this viewpoint was Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach And he entered after the key decisions had been made, and after Rusk had departed for Asia to brief our allies Clark Clifford arrived in office just as all the activity got under way, equipped with a reputation as a superhawk It was justified In November 1967, lor example, when the President circulated in closest secrecy a memorandum arguing for a total halt in bombing (written by McNamara, though Johnson did not identify the author), Clifford responded with a stark, hard line (Interestingly enough, only Rusk and Katzenbach expressed any sympathy for dees-calatory proposals ) This was the man who assumed office in time to meet a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 262,000 more men, 205,000 of whom were ticketed for Vietnam Compliance would have meant calling up the reserves, extending enlistments and, of course, a huge budgetary commitment After a number of meetings, on March 4 Clifford recommended m writing to the President that the reserves be called up and enlistments be extended, he thought the time unfavorable for negotiations In principal, the force levels requested by the Joint Chiefs were approved, but only 23,000 reinforcements were authorized for Vietnam (12,-000 were sent) and the 205,000 figure was put on ice pending a careful review Clifford reported that his advisers were divided on bombing, some wanted to take out Haiphong, others simply urged a general step-up At this stage Rusk threw in the recommendation for a bombing halt above the 20th Parallel, and Johnson told him to get to work on it and bring in a plan After this, there was much cabling On March 16, Rusk sent an "eyes only" message to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon with two options —a total or a partial bombing halt —and asked for reactions On March 20, Bunker replied that the total halt would be militarily impossible, that the partial halt would be dangerous, but they could live with the latter Upon receipt of Bunker's cable in Washington, the principals went around the track again Clifford urged no partial bombing halt without a quid pro quo from Hanoi, but Rusk stated flatly that this would not work, that it had to be unconditional On March 28 the President settled it Rusk's formula, slightly modified later by Katzenbach, went into the speech There were no heroes, no villains —only dedicated, talented men who were trying to serve the nation and the President They were simply trying to do a difficult job, not competing to score points for the historical record...