Cooling It in Asia

...and the conviction that Hanoi is Peking's puppet—a cat's paw on a string—is no longer accepted even m the Pentagon Even the "domino theory" has been subject serious reevaluation, given the failure of the 1966 Communist attempt to seize power in Indonesia Japan's emergence as a major economic power—its Gross National Product is expected to surpass that of the rest of Asia by the 1980s—and the country's increasingly active participation m regional arrangements, should add a vital new dimension to the overall Far Eastern picture The island nation has the potential for leadership, and could gradually become an alternative to Communist China A compelling example of successful, purely Asian economic development, Japan may be able to play an important part in the normalization of the cpr's relations with its neighbors—and we should encourage it to assume such a role As for the fourth element in the equation, the Soviet Union's very geography defines it as an Asian power, a tact dramatized by the recent severe border tensions and military skirmishes between the USSR and China But the Soviets have been a significant diplomatic factor m the area throughout the '60s, and can be expected to assume a position of increasing strategic consequence during the '70s Moscow's eyes have agam turned eastward, and a major drive to settle sparsely populated regions of the USSR's Far East provinces is under way Popular Soviet literature is full of references these days to the threat of a new "Mongol horde," while the Peking Daily seldom misses a chance to attack the Kremlin leadership in lurid terms Behind the emotion-laden propaganda, both sides seem to be deploying their forces for a long and harsh geopolitical confrontation m north-central Asia How profound a change has been wrought by the Smo-Soviet antagonism is apparent when we compare today's circumstances to those prevailing at the time of the Korean conflict In the early '50s, there was close military collaboration between Peking and Moscow in waging the war, and at least the facade of a monolithic Communist bloc The deepening of Smo-Soviet hostilities will be a primary ingredient shaping the Asian scene in the '70s Some experts have even predicted nuclear war, but the world must hope those two vast nations will avoid any such catastrophe For the United States, the principal significance of this confrontation is that it could serve to improve the security of our Asian allies and friends, providing a needed respite to the smaller non-Com-mumst countries The Southeast Asian nations in particular would have a chance to develop their economies and political systems, and to operate in an atmosphere favorable to greater regional advancement We must, of course, be very wary of taking any action that might be misconstrued as an effort to manipulate the Sino-Soviet impasse for our own advantage Rather, over the long haul we should pursue a strategy of correctness and nonintervention, while using the openings that may arise in our own relations with non-Communist Asia to insuie the success of the President's Guam Doctrine 2. The '70s should see an end to the Vietnam war And, in accordance with the Guam Doctrine, there should be a reduced U S military role m the Far East Clearly, the war's conclusion and the consequent lowering of the U S military profile in Asia could have a profound impact on the evolution of U S-China relations For the Guam Doctrine, m addition to its disavowal of any more Vietnam-style interventions, assures a reduction of those "close-in" deployments of U S striking power along China s periphery which Peking has considered so threatening and provocative And recent advances m weapons technology will enable the US to continue to provide a nuclear shield for our Asian allies without having to maintain our present military bases in Southeast Asia, Okinawa or Taiwan Then, too, President Nixon's announced intention of shifting the central focus of U S policy actions in Asia to the support of regional and multilateral development institutions is more likely to soften the Chinese attitude than any attempt to resolve by frontal assault the major diplomatic issues of recognition and UN admission Similarly, the probable rejection of the Pentagon's "anti-China" <\bm proposal will increase the possibility of positive gestures from Peking There is great skepticism m the Senate over the matter of abm, and if there is any further expansion—which is open to question—I believe it will be in the form of general antimissile defense, not a specialized system against the threat of attack from mainland China 3. A major government transition can be expected within Communist China over the next decade perhaps involving a serious succession crisis Chairman Mao is already 77, and his principal associates in power are all of comparable age Thus, a generation of Chinese rulers is destined to pass from the scene—a revolutionary leadership tempered by the Long March of the 1930s and the lengthy internal struggle against the U S -supported Nationalist regime Most experts see the new Chinese leadership as bemg drawn heavily from the military and taking an essentially pragmatic and managerial, rather than ideological and revolutionary, approach to affairs Such a regime, it is felt, would naturally move toward gradually improved relations with the outside world It is worth noting that a change of leadership in Nationalist China is also inevitable, for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is about the same age as his old rival Mao Tse-tung Chiang's passing will undoubtedly lead to a review of Taiwan's status I have already made known my view that the people of that island are entitled at some stage in the near future to self-determination, exercised through a plebiscite that would envisage an independent Taiwan as one ol its options 4. The 1970s could witness a significant strengthening of constructive regional development in non-Communist Asia, and wise policies coupled with proper use of resources can mean the spread of economic growth to areas that have not shared the impressive expension achieved in the '60s by South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan Malaysia, and the Philippines Meanwhile, these nations, along with a flourishing Japan, are likely to sustain high rates ot economic advance throughout the decade Regional development, though, can become a reality only with the substantial assistance of U S capital investment and know-how For this reason, I do not believe the United States can or should withdraw from active involvement in Asia In addition, Japan's vital economic contributions will be acceptable to other Asian nations only if administered in multilateral cooperation with the United States Were we to disengage and seek to push Japan into the role we have played in the last 20 years, there would be a strong reaction, fear and mistrust, derived from memories of World War II, could drive the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia toward Peking Fortunately, the Administration's pronouncements with respect to foreign assistance, including the recent Peterson Report, indicate that U S policy in the '70s will have the kmd of regional, multilateral focus appropriate to changing circumstances and new opportunities But while the United States must continue, in the broadest sense, its aotive involvement in the Far East, mainland China, because of its size, location, demography, and cultural heritage, will necessarily remain the hub of Asia Indeed, if arrangements there are to have any permanence and stability at all, Peking must function at the center of Asian affairs In presenting the four principal Asian developments I foresee in the decade ahead, I do not mean to convey the impression that I believe clear weather is an assured forecast for U S -China relations Conditions point instead to reassessment and readjustment on both sides, which will provide an environment for evolving a new era ot Smo-Amencan accord, based on mutual respect, normal relations and an absence of military confrontation Many contingencies could of course upset this favorable prognosis For one thing, the Vietnam conflict has not yet been ended, and recent events in Laos and Cambodia indicate the sort of difficulties which must be overcome before a stable settlement endmg the long war in Indochina can be achieved I would like, therefore, to ofier a few specific recommendations for improving communication between the United States and mainland China, within the context of developments I have already outlmed First, we should not attempt to "solve" the problems of diplomatic recognition and United Nations representation for Communist China by early direct negotiations Under present circumstances, these issues, as well as the question of the ultimate status of Taiwan, are not susceptible to immediate solution We should concentrate, rather, on ameliorating the underlying conditions that have caused the acute tensions between Washington and Peking since 1949 When, and if, this is achieved, the issues of recognition and UN representation will take care of themselves Second, the United States should seek to help the Chinese people achieve a higher standard of living through application of the new agricultural methods of the "green revolution" now transforming many parts of non-Communist Asia If mainland China is left to fester in poverty and discontent in the center of Asia while the nations all along its outer run succeed m breaking the old bonds of economic stagnation and fatalism, a dangerous new imbalance will arise, jeopardizing progress and stability Again, this is not a matter likely to yield results if tackled directly, as things stand Chinese suspicion and national pride would lead to an out-of-hand rebuff of any offers of aid Regulanza-tion of U S -Chma trade, travel and informational exchange, however, will furnish ample opportunity to encourage and indirectly assist sound economic advance on the Mainland, which alone can prevent ultimate famine Next, Washington must have the perception and sophistication to recognize that not all the turmoil and disruptions that occur in Asia result from Chinese instigations, even if Peking may at times try to claim credit There are many deep-seated, historically rooted ethnic rivalries in the Far East which have nothing to do with Peking The Malay-Chinese antagonisms present in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, for example, do not derive from Mainland policies or actions, any more than the animosities among the Thais, Khmers, Laotians, and Vietnamese of Southeast Asia And the struggle between the dominant plainsmen and the more primitive hill tribes in the whole submountamous arch stretching from India to Vietnam is sure to continue throughout the '70s, independently of Peking's will Finally, the United States must pay close attention to the broader implications of any nuclear arms-control agreement it reaches with the Soviet Union in the salt negotiations taking particular care not to create the false impression that we are joining Moscow in a nuclear pact against Chma Nor should Moscow or Peking be led to the false belief that we would look on with indifference if the USSR attempted a preemptive strike at China's infant nuclear facilities On the contrary, we should make it unquestionably clear that if either nation felt it could employ atomic weapons against the other, it would be of supreme concern to the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world The pressure of international opinion can serve as a potent deterrent force, but only if it makes itself felt in advance of the contingency it seeks to offset In sum, it would appear that conditions in Asia—the deescalation in Vietnam, Japan's economic success, the relatively calm aftermath of Communist China's traumatic Cultural Revolution—offer President Nixon a unique opportunity to fulfill his inaugural aspirations With wise statesmanship, for the first time in over 20 years we can look forward to normalizing relations with mamland China, a nation that surely holds a primary key to world peace...

...Thinking Aloud COOLING IT IN ASIA BY JACOB K. JAVITS In his inaugural address last year, President Nixon said his highest aspiration was to be known in history as a peacemaker It he is to achieve that goal, he must devote particular attention to the situation m Asia, where the United States has had to fight a major war in each of the past three decades—with the Japanese in the 1940s, in Korea during the 1950s, and since 1961 in Vietnam For the last 20 years, moreover, our Asian pohcy has been largely determined by our perception of Communist China as an implacably hostile state posing immediate danger to the interests of the United States and its allies The key to making progress in U S -China relations in the '70s is to "cool it" The tune has come, therefore, for a major reassessment of existing positions One element of the reappraisal should be a recognition of what actually occurred m Asia m the '60s—as opposed to the expectations of policy assumptions Here, of course, the lessons of Vietnam will be paramount Fortunately, our concern over possible massive Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia, and Peking's fear of an American military threat to its southern border, did not lead to a repetition of the bitter struggle between U S and Chinese forces in Korea Prophecies based on extreme mutual hostdity and distrust often become self-fulfilling, the overreaction of each side feeding the worst suspicions of the other With respect to China, however, the most significant aspect of Vietnam is the caution exhibited by Peking, despite all its verbal intemperance, arms supply and other aid But even more important than Vietnam are the fundamental changes in Asia that can be anticipated in the new decade In my judgment, there will be four major developments, all of which could help to ease tensions between the United States and China Cumulatively, they may not only provide an oppoitumty for the two countries to normalize relations, but also help establish the foundations for a peaceful and more prosperous Asia Although widespread ferment and turmoil will no doubt continue in the area and the prospects for peace there are by no means assured, skillful U S diplomacy throughout the transitional years Jacob K Javits (R -N Y) is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee This article is adapted from his recent address to the World Affairs Conference in Peoria sponsored by the Vniveisity of Illinois of the '70s could produce results of considerable significance 1. During the next several years, the strategic situation in Asia will be essentially a four-power, or quadrilateral, equation—involving the Soviet Union, Japan, the United States, and the Chinese People's Republic (cpr) This state of affairs could prove to be inherently much more stable than the "power vacuum" of the '50s, when U S policy was predicated on the belief that postcolonial Asia lay helplessly at the doorstep of an aggressive Communist China The introduction of "countervailing" military strength along China's periphery was the U S response, based on our view of Cold War conditions at the time Specifically, Washington adopted a policy of "close-m" military containment of the Mainland, augmented by a tactical as well as global strategic nuclear capability Since then China has shown military restraint throughout the Vietnam war...