U.S. Phase-out in Taiwan

...Phase^out in Taiwan BY ARNOLD ABRAMS quemoy They still blow balloons at each other across the three-mile channel separating this Nationalist island fortress from mainland China They also blare loudspeakers, blast dummy artillery rounds and, on bright days with good visibility, make faces through binoculars It is all part of the carefully choreographed affair Quemoy's defenders and Peking's forces continue to carry on, almost a decade after Communist guns last roared in real anger at the offshore islands Now the exchanges involve only propaganda material, deademng but not deadly The Nationahst pitch contrasts Taiwan's unprecedented prosperity with the rigors of Mainland life, the Communists promise that amends can be made once the American "imperialists" have been driven from Asia and Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit gang" is booted from office Each side has its pomts The surrealistic aura surrounding this situation is belied by the live ammunition stacked and ready in both camps It is as if time here has stood still for a decade Although tensions have been reduced since Quemoy sparked an mternational crisis in 1958, the framework re-mams unaltered Chiang's followers and Mao's legions are chained to the past The intervening years have made a mockery of the great debates of 1960 between Presidential aspirants Richard Nixon and John Kennedy The late President called Quemoy and its sister island Matsu chunks of rock, strategically indefensible and not worth an American life, yet he never fulfilled his campaign pledges to negotiate the reduction of Chiang's offshore garrisons Nixon in 1960 stoutly defended what he deemed the islands' strategic value and basic indispensability How ironic it is, then, that the Nationalists should today be nursmg their greatest doubts about Washington's willingness tc- stand by a longtime ally But there is good reason for such apprehension, for the Administration has taken a series of significant steps which may have far-reachmg effects on US-Taiwan relations resumption of diplomatic talks in Warsaw with the Peking regime, easing the U S trade and travel curbs against Communist China, and the announced intention of lowering America's "profile" in Asia—a goal of the so-called Nixon, or Guam, Doctrme Several symbolic gestures have further shaken Nationahst morale They include the elimination of U S Navy patrols in the Taiwan Strait, the Senate's refusal to grant Chiang Kai-shek a gift squadron of Phantom jet fighter-bombers, and, most recently, a Senate proposal retracting several old Congressional Arnold Abrams is Southeast Asia correspondent of the Seattle Times resolutions—one of them passed in 1955, authorizing the President to undertake whatever action he judges necessary to defend Taiwan and the nearby Pescadores Also in question is a 1954 defense treaty that commits the U S to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores and "such other terntones as may be determined by mutual agreement " Action in the last category, which involves the offshore islands, hinges on the word "mutual " The President has pledged to uphold all U S treaty commitments, but nobody on Taiwan professes to know Washington's precise policy regarding the offshore islands—possibly because none now exists According to a U S embassy official, American action "most likely would depend on what circumstances force the question to arise " One strong clue to Washington's disposition, however, might lie in the formal briefings offered by the Taiwan Defense Command, the key U S military planning group The offshore islands' primary value, information officers declare, is "political and psychological" rather than military The Nationalists naturally dispute this evaluation, and many Americans side with them "That judgment is dead wrong," said Colonel Robert Barber, a 28-year Army veteran and commander of Quemoy's seven-member U S advisory team "This island has a military, strategic and intelligence value that could not be duplicated if it were not Nationalist-occupied Its political and psychological values are secondary " And as the debate moves along the same lines it has traveled for the past decade, so does life on Quemoy While the world's attention has wandered elsewhere, the island has been made into a seemingly impregnable Asian Gibraltar Its shores are a maze of booby traps, barbed wire and pillbox fortifications The interior is honeycombed with underground tunnels and bunkers, the landscape pock-marked with camouflaged artillery and antiaircraft positions, lookout posts and communications points Defending the 60-square-mile enclave are more than 40,000 troops, who act as if an enemy invasion were imminent They hve underground, drill continuously and maintain a degree of discipline and security higher than that on most posts m Vietnam The majority of Quemoy's 60,000 population, largely farmers or small merchants, is part of the defense apparatus too All fit adults and teen-agers are militia members, taking periodic training and participating in regular military exercises Clearly, an invasion by the "Chicoms,' as the enemy is called, would result m fearful casualties even if successful "Hell," a top-ranking American adviser recently observed, "I doubt if we could take Quemoy " Such an attempt, though, would appear to be far from Peking's mmd at this time Reliable intelligence sources report that about one-quarter of the approximately 800 Communist artillery pieces positioned against Quemoy have been removed in the last six months, and enemy troop withdrawals have been noted as well These fighting resources are believed to have been dispatched to the Sino-Soviet frontier, where more than balloons have been blowing Nevertheless, Peking's pullback is overshadowed by more significant, albeit gradual, changes that have been effected in American military deployment on and around Taiwan Specifically, the presence of a powerful U S force protecting Chiang's territory is a myth, a fact rejjeated-ly cited by Peking—and not denied by Washington Even now, several months after the events, U S officials remain reluctant to admit that naval patrols have been ehmi-mated in the Taiwan Strait Moreover, the Seventh Fleet has not been stationed there for years, its primary duties have involved support activity m Veitnam and patrolling the coast of Korea Before their phase-out late last year, U S Navy patrols in the 100-mile-wide waters that separate Taiwan from the Mainland were being undertaken by only two vessels, small destroyer escorts that took turns steaming around "If any kind of enemy action had been initiated in these waters," declared one of the highest-ranking Amenoan officers on Taiwan, "those escorts would have been about as useful as tits on a bull " If called, American jets can make the approximately 1,800-mile flight from Vietnam m about three hours Seventh Fleet vessels coming from the Tonkin Gulf would require between two and three days That is what Washington officials mean when they say naval reductions have not affected the U S defense commitment or capability regarding Taiwan Although cessation of patrols in the Strait was officially the result of worldwide U S military cutbacks, reliable American souices here note that the Administration was fully aware of the political and psychological implications of the move It would not be incorrect to assume, they add, that the naval reduction was tied to general U S efforts at thawing Smo-American relations The image of a formidable U S military establishment directly on Taiwan is also misleading Appioxi-mately 8,000 Americans are stationed on the island, most of them Air Force personnel with neither combat nor defense capability The majority works at the giant Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, helping to load and fly Vietnam-bound cargo, anything from ammunition and fuel to food and toilet paper "You call, we haul—that's our motto here," quipped one officer "If there ever was an attack on us, we'd have to dive under the tables We are not in the fighting business " It is evident, then, that the American military might deployed for Taiwan's protection?long and often decried by Peking—is a paper tiger In fact, Washington in recent years has moved teas-mgly close to Red China's demands that U S forces withdraw from the island and the Strait as a precondition to substantive diplomatic talks And with the winding down of the war in Vietnam, American operations on Taiwan are due to be phased out still further Yet m its apparent desire to appease Chiang and maintain a steadfast facade, the Administration will not bluntly reveal the reality of the Taiwan situation "What would that accomplish'" argued one U S embassy official "Do you really think the Chinese don't know the facts9 They know better than anyone, and when they're ready to do business, they will That's all there is to it" Perhaps But some observers point out that the Chinese Communists do not publicly demand Washington's retraction of treaty commitments to Taiwan Rather, their declarations refer to the U S military presence on what Peking considers Mainland soil and waters This being the case, these observers contend, the U S has much to gam and very little to lose from calling the Communist Chinese bluff by focusmg attention on the actual situation At the very least, this would show that what Peking paints as an intolerable provocation actually amounts to a pinprick With or without a formidable American shield, however, Chiang's regime is determined to continue clinging to power, paying fervent and ritualistic obeisance to its raison d'etre: Mamland recovery Here too, though, the image conflicts with reality Nobody on Taiwan really believes the dream will come true—not, at least, in the lifetime of men who fled the continent two decades ago Acharacter in Art Buch-wald's current Broadway comedy, Sheep on the Runway, asks "Do you realize that the average age of Chiang's privates is now 64...

...Funny but untrue Most of the privates who accompanied Chiang to Taiwan have by now either risen to far higher rank or retired The bulk of the Generalissimo's present recruits are native Taiwanese, who comprise about 95 per cent of the Nationalists' unwieldy, 600,000-man military machine The overwhelming strategic obstacles to Mamland recovery aside, this imbalance in Chiang's forces makes the unlikely event even more questionable It also raises a long-range political question How long will the present regime survive after the death of the 82-year-old "Gimo"7 Conflict still exists between the 12 million native Taiwanese and the 2 million Mamlanders Once the antagonism was deep enough to spill blood m city streets and throughout the countryside That was more than 20 years ago, of course, and time has healed many hurts Nevertheless, great cultural differences remain, and Nationalist policy has been designed to preserve them The theory is that only by maintaining their separate identity will the Nationalists be able to keep alive the regime's primary goal Thus, Taiwan natives, some of whose ancestors left the Mainland two centuries ago have not been allowed to occupy power positions in political or military spheres This policy has preserved Nationalist control, without providing for the future Chiang's eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, is widely regarded as his successor But "the Prince," as Chiang Junior is known, is 60 years old and reportedly in frail health And there is no sign of the musty Kuomintang political machine producing another candidate of equal stature The disappearance of father and son from the scene could conceivably create a power vacuum that will be filled from the middle-level bureaucratic ranks now well-staffed by Taiwanese Where Taiwan would go fiom there is a matter of con-jectuie—and, more important, of future developments in and between Peking and Washington...